Well before the Computer Age and advent of the Internet, electronic espionage was engaged in mostly by governments at times with the aid of tech businesses like IBM and IT&T. Most know the stories of sleuths trying to decipher codes during wartime, particularly the cracking of Japan’s code prior to Pearl Harbor. One of the biggest cases/crimes of industrial espionage was committed by the Outlaw US Empire and it’s 5-Eyes allies—Project Echelon—where they all conspired to spy on everyone, including themselves. When I was in the military, I indirectly worked for the NSA as my unit was a Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare unit, and we listened when we worked. Many know the revelations of Edward Snowden and many other related tales. Most also know what we as US citizens are supposed to have as rights to privacy—if our posted mailings can’t be intercepted and read without a search warrant, then why is it deemed legal to steal emails and so forth? Not as many know that US tech corps must install backdoors to their soft and hardware so the government can illegally enter and spy, a practice that’s been ongoing since the internet. The vast majority of nations know all about the crimes committed by the Outlaw US Empire, but it’s been extremely difficult to create global rules mostly because of the Empire’s unwillingness to cooperate. Today, Rossiya Segodnya interviewed Alexander Lyukmanov, Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for International Cooperation in the Field of Information Security and Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the topic of Cyber Crime, beginning with how it affects the SMO and then moving into the wider world. As you’ll discover, Russia has many allies demanding proper rules/laws governing global information systems. One of the reasons why Huawei is persecuted by the Outlaw US Empire is because it refuses to install backdoors so it can spy. Russia’s policy is to eliminate all non-Russian hard and software in tech used by the government. Both Russia and China are working hard to create a quantum communications system that hypothetically is unhackable, and the same would apply to quantum computing. But the rest of the world will remain reliant on current tech for many years to come. Now, Mr. Lyukmanov:
Question: In connection with the special military operation, Russia is subjected to hacker attacks almost on a daily basis. What is the role of Ukraine's "volunteer cyber army," which organizes attacks on Russian networks, government websites, and targets ordinary Russian citizens?
A: Indeed, over the past two years, Russia's information infrastructure has become the target of regular computer attacks. Most of them are carried out from the territory or in the interests of the Zelensky regime. It is indicative that the Kiev authorities, who in the West portray themselves as a victim of "Russian cyber aggression," boast of anti-Russian sabotage using information and communication technologies (ICT). Just last month, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine publicly claimed responsibility for several computer attacks on our information resources.
We have to admit that this country has actually become a testing ground for NATO to test methods of confrontation in the digital space. The entire sphere of information security of Ukraine is under the external control of Western curators. "Cyber" units of the special services and armed forces of the Anglo-Saxon states are sent there, which train and coordinate hackers engaged in anti-Russian activities. For this, solid technical and financial assistance is allocated, which, of course, is mostly stolen. We have no doubt that a significant share of the inflated to a record $13.5 billion. of the U.S. Cyber Command budget will be mastered in the Ukrainian direction.
As for the "IT army", we are talking, in fact, about a bunch of hackers and phone scammers, who are mainly engaged in banal theft. According to our data, there are more than 1,000 "call centers" in Ukraine engaged in extortion of money. We have repeatedly warned Western countries that the "IT army" created in defiance of Russia and with the support of the United States will sooner or later become a problem for ordinary Europeans. In the end, this is exactly what happened. In November 2023, the Hungarian authorities announced that most of the funds stolen in their country as a result of ICT crimes and telephone fraud ended up in Ukraine. We know that the geography and scale of the criminal activities of these "fighters for independence" is much broader and is not limited to Europe.
Question: How is the UN negotiation process on international information security progressing, taking into account the current geopolitical realities? What are the prospects for the adoption of a universal convention on countering information crime in the relevant Select Committee?
A: This year is a landmark year for Russia. 25 years ago, at the initiative of our country, the first resolution of the UN General Assembly was adopted, which launched the negotiation process on the then completely new topic of IIS.
Today, the issue of information security is firmly on the UN agenda. The main negotiating platform is the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG), also established at the initiative of Russia in 2021. This mechanism prepares recommendations on the entire range of IIS issues, including the development of rules for responsible behavior of states, the improvement of international law, capacity building of small countries and the adoption of confidence-building measures. The main thing is that the Group, acting on the principle of consensus, is yielding practical results: in July 2023, a global register of contact points for the exchange of information on computer attacks was agreed upon as the first universal confidence-building measure in the field of IIS. In fact, we are talking about the creation of a "single window service" that will provide direct communication between the competent departments of states in case of incidents in the information space.
One of the priority areas of work for the Russian Federation is the formation of universal legally binding instruments in the field of information security. In the context of the militarization of the digital space and the transformation of computer attacks into an element of military-political confrontation, there is a need for a legal mechanism that will help prevent interstate conflicts. The prototype of such an international treaty – the concept of the UN Convention on IIS – was presented by Russia with a group of like-minded people at the UN this year. It is important that the majority of developing countries agree on the need to develop such a treaty. The U.S. and its allies, on the other hand, are trying to maintain a "free hand" – apparently counting on elusive technological advantages.
A similar trend can be observed in the negotiations on the first-ever international convention on countering cybercrime in the UN Ad Hoc Committee established at the initiative of Russia. Western countries are doing their best to prevent the agreement on a full-fledged document, trying to narrow the scope of the future convention, and limit the opportunities for cooperation between law enforcement agencies of the UN member states. They are trying to emasculate the universal document, reducing everything to crimes against computer systems. In this way, the future treaty will be drawn up in the image of the Budapest Convention, which is outdated and unacceptable for many countries of the world.
Russia, for its part, advocates strict compliance with the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, that is, the development of a truly comprehensive convention. We rely on the support of a wide pool of like-minded people from Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. We will use the time remaining until the end of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee to saturate the draft convention with priority guidelines for us. The objectives are to cover the widest possible range of crimes using ICT and progressive methods of international cooperation in this area, including the exchange of electronic evidence. Let us make every effort to reach an inclusive agreement that meets the aspirations of much of the developing world.
Question: What is the status of the existing bilateral hotlines with Washington, which were established in 2013 specifically to respond to computer attacks/incidents?
A: The use of these communication channels was actually "frozen" back in 2016, when the outgoing Obama administration invented the myth of Russia's interference in the US presidential election solely for domestic political reasons. Unfortunately, even then it became unprofitable for Washington to maintain contacts with us in the interests of joint suppression of malicious activities in the digital space. The US authorities saw much more dividends in the replication of unsubstantiated accusations of our country and other "undesirable regimes" of computer attacks.
In other words, the issues on which we used to have a constructive dialogue have become hostage to a rabid Russophobic policy at Washington's instigation. At the same time, it is the United States that loses the most from this. We see how the Americans bite their elbows when they need to negotiate with us in the international arena, but they cannot step over the wall they have built. In an attempt to isolate Russia, they have in a sense isolated themselves.
Of course, it is extremely difficult to build a global IIB system without key players, such as the United States. Sooner or later, Washington will realize that it is impossible to strengthen its own information security without broad international cooperation, including with Russia. But we are not going to wait for our overseas colleagues to come to their senses. We will continue to work calmly in a bilateral format and on multilateral platforms with our foreign partners, who are ready to cooperate on the basis of the principles of sovereign equality of states and non-interference in their internal affairs. We have already built a schedule of such contacts for years to come.
Question: You said earlier that Russia and Africa intend to strengthen cooperation in the field of cybersecurity. What specific areas of cooperation are we talking about? What can Russia offer Africa in the cyber sphere?
A: Based on the results of the outgoing year, we can say with confidence that our cooperation with our African partners in the field of information security has reached a qualitatively new level.
The starting point was the second Russia-Africa Summit (St. Petersburg, July 2023), where this topic was given close attention: the leaders adopted a separate statement on international information security (IIS). Let me be clear: agreeing on such a multilateral document (48 states have joined it) is already a success in diplomatic practice. But the main thing is that this statement demonstrated the coincidence of approaches of Russia and the countries of the continent on almost the entire range of IIS issues. We share our commitment to the principles of the sovereign equality of states and non-interference in their internal affairs, we advocate the need to bridge the so-called digital divide between the West and the Global South, and we do not accept technological neo-colonialism.
As for practical cooperation, specific steps are outlined in the Action Plan of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum adopted at the summit. In the coming years, we plan to hold a number of joint events that will help determine areas of work, taking into account the needs of all parties. It is no secret that our African colleagues are particularly interested in the developments of domestic companies in the field of information security, dialogue and exchange of experience with the competent authorities, as well as personnel training programmes at our educational institutions. For us, in turn, Africa is a promising and traditionally friendly region.
In general, the potential for the development of cooperation is great, and there is a mutual intention to implement it. The most important thing is that we and the African peoples perceive each other as equal partners, unlike some states that are accustomed to viewing the continent only as a resource base.
Question: How do you assess cooperation between Russia and China in the field of information security? What topics are Moscow and Beijing discussing?
A: China is not only the most important partner in the field of IIS, but also our main like-minded partner. The approaches of Moscow and Beijing are as close as possible. The joint statement adopted in March 2023 by the leaders of the two countries is indicative. The document stresses that Russia and China put their sovereignty at the forefront, including in the digital sphere.
It is important that when discussing the topic of IIB in the international arena, we act as a united front. Our delegations traditionally support each other at the UN, in the OEWG and the Ad Hoc Committee, which I have already mentioned. Together with us, our Chinese friends are advocating the development of universal agreements that would fairly and equitably regulate the activities of states in the information space.
Moscow is in regular contact with representatives of Beijing both bilaterally and through BRICS, the SCO, CICA, the G20 and the ASEAN Regional Forum on Security. Such close communication helps us to speak "one language".
In practice, cooperation between our countries is based on the 2015 intergovernmental agreement on IIS. The main thing is that these contacts are not limited to the exchange of opinions, but are aimed at finding joint solutions, including on the most pressing and sensitive issues of ensuring the information security of Russia and China.
We are confident that mutually beneficial cooperation with Beijing will only expand and deepen, as well as unite more and more developing countries around our countries.
Question: Earlier it was reported that major foreign developers of information and communication technologies allow the presence of malicious software in the devices they develop. How does Russia intend to counter this trend?
A: This is an acute problem, and not only for us. In Russia, the necessary measures are already being taken by the competent authorities. A solid regulatory framework has been formed, including the 2017 Federal Law on the Security of Critical Information Infrastructure and the Strategy for the Development of the Communications Industry until 2035 approved in November 2023.
In China and a number of other countries, they began to restrict the use of Western-made equipment among civil servants. The reason is simple. In an effort to gain control over electronic communications on a global scale, the US authorities and intelligence agencies have relied on the potential of the IT giants of Silicon Valley. Corporations like Microsoft, Apple, Google, Meta, and others were forced to meekly work out Washington's political order. The hardware and software produced by these companies are infiltrated with malicious "bookmarks" and other hidden features in order to, first of all, collect information, personal data, and intercept personal correspondence. The use of Pegasus and Graphite spyware on behalf of the CIA and FBI to remotely access the "contents" of users' smartphones around the world has already become public.
Of course, such activities run counter to both domestic and international law. The irony is that the Americans, who are foaming at the mouth, are defending human rights at the UN stands, but they themselves are grossly violating them. Moreover, this is practiced on a systematic basis – suffice it to recall the revelations of Edward Snowden and the testimony of other former employees of the Pentagon and intelligence services about the creation of a global electronic surveillance system based on the NSA.
We are also fighting against such abuses at specialised negotiation venues. Back in 2018, the UN General Assembly's list of voluntary rules of conduct for states in the field of IIS included a norm on preventing manufacturers from including undeclared capabilities in their products, as well as concealing information about existing vulnerabilities. However, as time has shown, such voluntary norms are simply ignored by the United States. Therefore, Russia is now seeking the adoption of a universal binding treaty. In particular, the Russian concept of the IIS convention, which I have mentioned, contains a ban on the introduction of malicious "bookmarks". It is important that the majority of our foreign partners agree with this.
Question: What measures are being taken to combat the recruitment of terrorists and extremists, which, according to experts, is now 95% online?
A: You are right: modern digital technologies not only significantly simplify the commission of illegal acts, but also increase the scale of possible damage. In the international arena, we want to solve this problem by including special provisions in the above-mentioned Convention on Combating Cybercrime. Our proposals are designed to effectively counter the use of ICTs for terrorist and extremist purposes, the recruitment of terrorists and extremists, which is carried out mainly on the Internet, as well as the illegal trade in weapons and drugs.
However, Western states stubbornly oppose the inclusion of relevant articles in the text of the future treaty. And this is despite the fact that terrorist and extremist activities have long been criminalized at the national level in these countries. We point to such manifestations of double standards together with developing countries, primarily with our Indian colleagues and partners from the SCO, the OIC and the AU. Our friends, like us, are outraged by the maniacal desire of Washington and Brussels to limit international cooperation on such an important issue for global security under the pretext of protecting "freedom of speech" and defending the interests of various minorities. It is clear that this is due to the reluctance of the US intelligence services to abandon their favourite tools for undermining the domestic political situation in countries they do not like, including through the incitement of terrorist and extremist elements through ICTs. [My Emphasis]
Yet another case where the Outlaw US Empire and its few vassals refuse to obey basic law & order requirements that are within their own law codes. One wonders how much longer that situation will last. If the past is to be any judge, it might take until the end of the century, but I suspect technology will advance to the point where hacking will become a relic of the past.
Heh, good luck with all that. Hacking is like the weather: Everyone talks about it but no one can do anything about it.
Here's the bottom line: there is no such thing as "security" - in any context. Things are "secure" until someone else doesn't want them to be.
I am on record for years with this meme: "You can haz better security; you can haz worse security. But you can haz 'security'. There is no security. Deal."
Neither AI nor quantum computing are going to solve the hacking or computer espionage problem. Not as long as human brains are hackable. As the famous line from the KGB colonel put it, "There is no firewall for the human mind."
But if the Russians want a global alliance against US government hacking, that's fine with me. But I view hacking as one of the primary weapons against the state and its corporate masters. So it better not go away. It's their choice: I can hack their money away or I can put a bullet in their heads instead. Either one is fine with me, but the former is much less risky and much more profitable.