Deputy FM Ryabkov's Interfax Interview

Here’s the header for the interview with Sergei Ryabkov published by Interfax on 22 December 2023:

Sergei Ryabkov: Diplomatic relations with the United States are not a totem to be worshipped

The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation told why it is impossible to talk about the qualitative strengthening of the security of the Russian Federation without changing the anti-Russian course of the United States.

RT ran this as its headline for its article about the interview:

Russia warns of ‘complete breakdown’ in relations with US

Ties could be destroyed if Washington seizes Moscow’s frozen assets, Deputy FM Sergey Ryabkov has said.

In its own short article headline previewing the publication of the interview, Interfax wrote:

Ryabkov considers Ukraine's membership in NATO unacceptable for Russia

While T-Rex Santa is cute in its own way, the content of the interview is also represented by the nature of that beast. Neither headline fully capture the interview’s overall content. I should note the Ryabkov was interviewed by Interfax in December 2021 (MFA’s English translation) just after Russia made its security proposals and conveyed a similar tone then. When compared with Lavrov, Ryabkov says the same things but uses somewhat different phraseology and tone so he comes across as the harder of the two. But readers can judge for themselves as this is Ryabkov’s second interview this month to be posted here that can be compared to the plethora of Lavrov material. And now the interview, the Qs are bolded:

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said in an interview with Interfax that Russia will not feel safe until there is a generational change in the leadership of the United States and NATO, about the current "comatose" state of Russian-American relations and their prospects, about the future of arms control

- Serhiy Oleksiyovych, if and when denazification, demilitarization takes place as a result of the special military operation, and if Ukraine acquires a guaranteed neutral status, will this be enough for Russia to feel safe from the United States and NATO, or are there any other steps needed to make this happen?

- The two sides of this case are of key importance. The first relates to what you have formulated directly in the question. Of course, all these goals must be achieved. Of course, Ukraine's membership in NATO for any period is categorically unacceptable for us. Of course, solving the problems facing the special military operation is simply an imperative. Without this, it is impossible to talk not only about our security, but even about the termination of the special military operation. This is a requirement formulated by the president and the political leadership, and we, as well as the military department and all federal executive bodies, are steadily and consistently fulfilling it.

As for the other side of this coin, namely, will we feel more secure if all these goals are achieved, yes, security will be strengthened, but is this enough to say that we now feel in a completely different capacity and it does not matter to us what is happening on the part of NATO? No, absolutely not. Because NATO, led by the United States, is a purely aggressive bloc, and its entire policy, both before and now, is aimed at weakening Russia, at eliminating our role as an independent centre of power, as an influential international factor. In recent years, this aggressive nature of the North Atlantic Alliance has manifested itself to a greater extent than before. Therefore, without a radical change in the anti-Russian course of the United States and its protégés, and without the start of work on the basis of equality in terms of the interests of states and their respect, without this there is no need to talk about a serious qualitative strengthening of our security.

It may sound sad, but it's true.

- How do you convince them?

- We need a generational change. I don't like to say "change of elites". People who have a different perception of what is happening around them should come to the leadership and decision-making centres. It's going to happen sooner or later.

- And at the same time, NATO can stay? Is it not necessary to disband it?

- We can't change anything in this regard by our own will. We are stating an obvious thing that is completely understandable and explainable to us. That NATO enlargement is always tantamount to harming our interests, our security interests. How this is perceived within NATO, what motivates the states that join it, is of little concern to us. We will never see eye to eye with the Western bloc in our assessments, understanding and interpretation of the causes and consequences of this.

We tried it many times in the past, but it didn't work. The inability of the North Atlantic Alliance to negotiate, at least in its relations with us, is simply its key characteristic. The bloc is a source of threats and a source of pressure, nothing more.

- On the recent anniversary of the 90th anniversary of the restoration of diplomatic relations between Russia and the United States, the Foreign Ministry said that relations between the countries "risk being severed at any moment." You've said before that one of the possible red lines could be the confiscation of Russia's frozen assets. Does this now remain a line after which it will become impossible to maintain relations? Are there any other triggers that will be incompatible with the continuation of development for us relations between the Russian Federation and the United States?

- Russian-American relations have indeed fallen into a comatose state, and this happened through the fault of Washington, which not only formulated, but even doctrinally and conceptually consolidated the erroneous and dangerous policy of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia. I cannot rule out that at some point in the future, if there is no enlightenment in terms of assessments of what is happening in the world and specifically in the Russian and Ukrainian directions, I cannot rule out that in this case Washington will not go beyond the "near-zero" level at which relations are now. In other words, it will go for an official reduction in the level of diplomatic presence in Moscow and Washington, respectively, or even a complete break. This will not come as a surprise to us.

So far, the Americans are wary of destroying everything to its foundations, but they are not ready to negotiate honestly on the basis of mutual respect and consideration of each other's interests, even in theory. The existing precarious balance in the Russian-American dialogue and fragmentary work on certain extremely narrow issues, this balance can be upset at any moment due to the recklessness of Washington and specifically the administration that is now in power there.

Diplomatic relations themselves, of course, are not some kind of totem to be worshipped, they are not a sacred cow that everyone cherishes. But we will not take the initiative to break them, to break them. It is not in our rules to act in this way, including on the basis of our understanding that Russia and the United States have a central role in maintaining international security and strategic stability. As for the trigger for a possible round of confrontation with the potential for a rupture in relations, the trigger could be the confiscation of assets, the further escalation of military escalation, and much more. I would not go into negative forecasts here. I am just saying all this to make it clear that we are ready for any scenario, and the United States should not have the illusion, if it has one, that Russia, as they say, is holding on to diplomatic relations with this state with both hands.

- Well, since we are ready for any options, then, probably, we are considering good ones.

- Including, yes.

- According to our forecasts, is the issue of restoring or at least returning to normalcy Russian-American relations a matter of decades, or can it still happen in our lifetime?

- It is obvious to me that we are in a long historical period, at least a deep freeze in bilateral relations. And this confrontational potential, this confrontational charge, it is so significant that it will be quite difficult to get rid of it. The problem is that it is extremely difficult for the US ruling circles to come to terms with the changing world order. And many of them are simply organically incapable of moving away from thinking in terms of their own superiority.

More and more states in the world are not inclined to ingratiate themselves with Washington. I am not even talking about the mood in public and political circles in many countries, including those that are Washington's long-standing and reliable allies. We propose not to build castles in the air and not to arrange some kind of foreign policy sweepstakes about when, who and where can win something or win something. We are confident in our own abilities and in the correctness of our course. We are offering the Americans a sensible and, in my opinion, the only possible formula for peaceful coexistence, where dialogue and cooperation are possible. Apparently, they are not possible in the entire range of issues, but only in certain areas, but this is also conditioned and made dependent on whether the leading and policy-making circles in Washington are able to recognise our fundamental and national interests and come to a serious agreement.

Our position, based on our determination to achieve our goals, should ultimately lead Washington to the conclusion that a rethinking is necessary, and the search for compromises on the track of relations with Russia is the only real way.

- In 2026, START will cease to exist. In the current conditions, is it possible to work out, if not a treaty to replace the START Treaty, then at least some intermediate agreements in order to avoid a vacuum in this area? And how can we prevent a scenario of a slide into chaos in this area of arms control?

- Of course, we keep this time reference in mind. Of course, we are aware that from February 2026 there will be a vacuum in this area. In fact, the process of deregulation of the strategic offensive arms sphere has already begun. I cannot fail to say that the accumulated critical mass of Washington's destructive actions has made it impossible for us to comply with the New START Treaty, except for adherence to the central quantitative restrictions on warheads and delivery vehicles. The suspension of the New START Treaty on our part is absolutely legitimate. And the key reason for this step is the U.S. policy of undermining Russia's security in all areas. Washington's profoundly anti-Russian policy has not changed, and its manifestations have not weakened. This continues to block the path to dialogue on new agreements that could replace the New START Treaty. We do not see any possibility of "isolating" control over nuclear missile weapons from the negative military-political background, including the general depressing state of relations between Russia and the United States.
As for the task of preventing the final chaos of the strategic sphere, there is a certain potential for maintaining an acceptable level of predictability and restraint, in particular, through the implementation of unilateral steps.

In recent years, Russia has repeatedly resorted to this mechanic. In addition to the decision to adhere to the quantitative levels fixed by the New START Treaty, I would also like to mention the moratorium on the deployment of ground-based intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and our confirmed intention to continue adhering to the two agreements with the United States on notifications of ballistic missile launches and major strategic exercises, respectively. What happens in these areas also depends on the actions of the United States. I do not think that today there are any elements in the approach of the American side that give grounds to talk about the emergence of a real prospect of starting to build something new, including on the basis of the approaching expiration of the New START Treaty.

- That is, for the period after 2026, we are not considering the option of some kind of joint document to somehow document the commitment to quantitative levels?

- The contract itself provides for a one-time renewal, and this extension was issued just a few days before the expiration of the initial ten-year period. Back then, the situation was radically different. Now we have suspended the treaty because we see no other possibility for ourselves in the context of the total anti-Russian course of the United States and the conduct of a hybrid war against us. If there were no change in that regard in the coming period, then there would be no treaty, and there would probably be no other instruments or decisions to replace the treaty. We are sending a signal to the Americans that if they are interested in ensuring a certain framework of predictability and stability in this area, then they should start working on their own mistakes and change their policy towards Russia as a whole. Without this, nothing will work.

- Changes in U.S. policy?

-Absolutely.

- In your opinion, how close are the Americans to deploying ground-based missiles previously banned by the INF Treaty in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region? Can the United States' refusal to comply with the CFE Treaty accelerate its plans to deploy intermediate-range missiles in Europe, and are we ready to give a mirror response as soon as possible? Do we have everything we need for this? The other day, the Americans put into operation a missile defense base in Poland. And we used to say that the Aegis missiles that are deployed there are designed not only for anti-missiles, but also for launching cruise missiles, which were banned by the INF Treaty. Do we not see the opening of this base as a signal that it is time for us to respond as well?

- Judging by the eagerness with which the United States is moving towards the practical implementation of its plans for the early deployment of ground-based intermediate-range missiles, almost the only obstacle on this path was the incomplete development of advanced weapons of the appropriate class by the American military-industrial complex. Recently, however, the real progress that the Americans have made in this area has been noticeable, and some elements of such weapons are already sporadically appearing "in iron" outside the national territory of the United States, in particular in Europe. In recent days, there has been a lot of talk that the deployment of such systems in the Asia-Pacific region is about to begin.

I would like to emphasise that we are closely monitoring all these US preparations and pointing out that the unilateral Russian moratorium I have already mentioned is strictly linked to the appearance of US-made land-based intermediate-range missiles in the relevant regions. There should be no doubt about our determination to respond materially to Washington. Judging by the course of events, the moment is ripening when the necessary political decisions in Moscow can be made quickly. Our response will not be long in coming.

As for the missile defence base in Redzikovo, since the INF Treaty does not exist, it was destroyed by the Americans when they felt that this Treaty was beginning to constrain their plans to create such weapons and deploy them in various regions of the world. Of course, we take this into account, including in our own military planning. By the way, I would like to say that, according to the Americans themselves, not only Tomahawk-class cruise missiles, adapted for use from ground-based launchers, but also missiles of other classes - strike weapons - may well use the MK-41 universal launchers, which are equipped with the Aegis Ashore systems, including those located at the missile defense base you mentioned. The policy of universalizing launchers and the ability to change weapons depending on the tasks, without changing, as they say, the basic infrastructure, is very characteristic of the American approach to military activity. But there is no connection with the suspension of the CFE Treaty by the Americans.

- Do we have anything to respond to the continuing and growing supply of weapons by Americans to Ukraine?

- The range of weapons and equipment sent to Ukraine is steadily expanding. We remember that it all started with anti-tank missile systems and man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems, and went to warships, aircraft, and missiles with a range of several hundred kilometers. We do not underestimate the dangers involved. First, the Kiev regime is criminally using the weapons it receives against the civilian population in the territories that have legally and legitimately become part of the Russian Federation, against civilian infrastructure. Apparently, this is done for the purpose of deterrence and so-called collective punishment. Secondly, a considerable part of the military products coming to Ukraine are not detained there, but fall into illegal circulation and smuggle into the arms black market in various regions of the world. One of the latest examples is the Middle East region, where weapons from Ukraine also appeared. Third, as the West moves to increasingly sophisticated and lethal supply systems for Ukraine, the West is not only contributing to the escalation of the conflict, but is itself being drawn deeper into it, risking a direct military clash with Russia.

For example, the issue of transferring F-16 aircraft to the Armed Forces of Ukraine is being discussed. The extreme riskiness of such a supply is obvious, especially since some aircraft of this type are certified for the use of nuclear weapons. In addition, in the face of serious damage to the airfields of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Ukraine, ideas are being voiced about their use from the territory of neighboring NATO member countries. We have warned the patrons and sponsors of the Kiev regime about the possible grave consequences of such a reversal.

At the same time, Kiev's hopes for some kind of wunderwaffe are in vain. Experience shows that our Armed Forces quickly find effective ways to counteract: tanks transferred by the West burn, planes are shot down, missiles and UAVs do not reach the target, they are intercepted, ammunition is destroyed in warehouses - this will continue to be the case. No NATO weapons, even the most modern, will change the course of the NWO, its goals will be achieved.

- The President of the Russian Federation, commenting the other day on the information that Moscow rejected a certain US proposal for the exchange of prisoners, said that we would consider this issue on mutual terms. Does this mean that we have made some kind of counter-offer to the Americans to the one that did not suit us, and does the situation in our relations in general affect the course of negotiations on the exchange of prisoners?

- The issue of exchanges of citizens imprisoned in Russia and the United States is extremely delicate. Decisions in this area are often hindered by their active public discussion. At the instigation of the current administration, the US media are actually savoring these stories. Contacts that have already yielded results in the past, and several of our citizens have returned from the United States, where they served long, mind-boggling prison sentences, contacts are being made through the special services. Interestingly, the participants in these contacts on the American side insist on their complete confidentiality, and we also adhere to this line, but then there are certain twists and turns, when the White House regularly arranges "leaks" and begins to discuss sensitive issues in the public space. At the same time, the specific fate of people is not taken into account, PR considerations prevail. I think that the Russian president's response to a New York Times journalist that despite everything we still hope for a compromise, but the American side must hear us, and Russian interests must be respected, exhaustively covers the current situation.
Contacts have not been suspended, they are proceeding in accordance with the algorithm – this is not a schedule, but in accordance with the canvas for discussing these issues, which logically follows from the content of hypothetical schemes. I can't go into that.

- Does the current state of relations slow down these processes?

- Here, as in many other areas, we observe the American traditional desire to get more for ourselves, and to give the minimum, as they say. But we are talking about the fate of people who are really in extremely difficult life situations, so it is basically impossible to weigh on the scales in the public plane like this. This is a very difficult process, even when it is conducted confidentially behind closed doors. In general, this is characteristic of the Americans, and this quality dominates in their approach to discussing any issues, and not only with us, but also with other major players, with their allies, and, of course, with everyone. It's like a quality of character, a character trait, is the desire to get the maximum and give at a minimum is common to many people, but Americans especially.

- Recently, a meeting of the leaders of the United States and China took place, where, as it was claimed, the issue of arms control was also discussed. How do we feel about this fact, and are there any fears that China will have to choose to some extent and at some point between Russia and the United States, and this choice may not be in our favor in the end?

- I think that it is inappropriate to put the issue in this way: China is a great power that has its own interests in a variety of areas, priorities that are clearly formulated. China is fully sovereign in its dealings with the United States, just as we are. In this regard, the approach is absolutely identical: we ourselves determine with whom and on what issues to conduct contacts and consultations, and China does the same. Given the high level of our relations with Beijing, we always respect each other's steps in this regard. We do not see a problem in the fact that Beijing and Washington have resumed dialogue on certain arms control issues, which were suspended several years ago. This does not undermine or hurt Russian interests in any way. At least because we have established very intensive, structured and trust-based cooperation with China on a wide range of international security issues, including arms control, and we are fully satisfied with the quality and effectiveness of this work.

- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs previously spoke about plans to bet on the development of relations with the Global South. Will the Foreign Ministry expand diplomatic missions in Latin America and open new consulates? Are there any plans to reduce our embassies in the United States and Canada and the corresponding units in the Foreign Ministry?

- Latin America and the Caribbean, in our understanding, is a separate civilizational layer, one of the centers of the renewed world system that is in the process of formation. Even in the current turbulent geopolitical situation, we are receiving signals from many Latin American capitals about the need to preserve and strengthen our partnership with Russia, and this despite the obstacles created by the West. Political dialogue, economy, people-to-people contacts, tourism, interaction at international venues, including the UN, and with some of them in the G20 and BRICS. All this is the basis of our relations with Latin America. None of the Latin American states has joined the policy of anti-Russian sanctions. We, in turn, are ready for the level and scope of relations that these countries are ready for.

As for expanding the number of existing Russian missions abroad, both embassies and consulates general, and opening new ones, it is quite possible if there is a reciprocal interest in this on the part of our partner, the state of accreditation. We will work on it, although it is not cheap, frankly speaking, the region is geographically remote, but nevertheless we will continue to work on it. In recent years, there has been a certain increase in our diplomatic presence, including in those areas that are popular in terms of Russian tourism. But in this sense, we are at the beginning of the road. I do not see a direct connection with the reorientation of human or other resources and staffing tables in the North American countries you mentioned, but adaptation and reform in this area are also underway. This adaptation does not need to be advertised, we are carrying out such work in a routine manner and have already completed it to a certain extent.

As for the number of members of our diplomatic missions in the United States and Canada, unfortunately, in recent years we have seen an endless wave of anti-Russian manifestations, including in terms of restrictions on the ability to ensure the necessary level of diplomatic presence, and in terms of functionality in terms of our diplomats' trips to the above-mentioned countries – purely hostile actions are being taken by the Americans and Canadians. We are forced to respond in kind, we have repeatedly proposed to stop this downward spiral of mutual actions and counteractions, but so far there is no need to talk about even relative stabilisation in this area.

- Adaptation is underway - do you mean the adaptation of the relevant units in the Foreign Ministry?

-Yes.

- Within the framework of Russia's coordination in the "nuclear five" in the coming year, has the schedule of meetings already been approved?

- We have a rough schedule. In the first quarter, the main event, then there will be several thematic contacts, including with the involvement of young specialists - this is the practice of the "nuclear five". And we will conclude at the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference in August.

As Putin has recently said several times, paraphrasing: We won’t worry too much about NATO and its master the Outlaw US Empire. They will come to their senses sooner or later. That that might take years, even decades is actually rather clear as those at the top of the USA’s pyramid aren’t going to alter their way of doing things until their behavior starts harming their core interests, which is to bleed as many people of their assets as possible—It’s exactly like the game of Monopoly: The goal is to bankrupt all the players but yourself. It’s the Age of Plunder/Age of Colonialism reduced to a board game. Russia, China, RoW don’t want to play that game anymore and have started something else. EU/NATO seem like they’re chained to their chairs at the table and unable to escape, although a few seem to have loosened their manacles. It remains a dangerous age as some nations’s leaders still seem to be hypnotized/entranced/seduced/intoxicated by the game as if it’s the Siren’s call beckoning them. How much longer that remains the case is unknown, thus the period of danger is also unknown. With luck, it will pass without the big bang.

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