Guancha Interviews Alexei Gromyko

Russian-American negotiations, which ones are absolutely unacceptable to Russia?

The Grandson of the famous Soviet Diplomat Andrei Gromyko was interviewed on the sidelines of the Sanya Dialogue taking place in China. Alexei is now Director of the Institute of European Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Guancha has produced an excellent background header before getting to the interview, which is long and detailed. Hat tip to Pepe Escobar for alerting me to this important chat:

After Trump's second term, the resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict seems to have hit the acceleration button. The countdown to the strategic decoupling of the United States and the European Union has begun? When will Russia and the United States reach a consensus? What are Russia's red lines in the final peace agreement? What are Russia's core interests that it cannot give up?

Alexei Gromyko, director of the Institute of European Studies (IE RAS) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, said in an exclusive interview with the Beijing Dialogue in Sanya that the root cause of the Russia-Ukraine conflict is NATO's eastward expansion, and it is necessary to reach a consensus on the framework of the armistice first, rather than a hasty ceasefire. He stressed that Europe's unilateral dispatch of peacekeeping troops to Ukraine would be considered a military target. Any peacekeeping arrangements should be authorized by the UN Security Council.

Gromyko's grandfather was Andrei Gromyko, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the former Soviet Union and the longest-serving Foreign Ministry. Gromyko said that his grandfather's proudest diplomatic achievement was the creation of the United Nations. Despite many criticisms of the United Nations, the United Nations remains an important pillar of the international system and a forum for resolving international differences, and the Yalta-Potsdam system established after World War II continues to benefit future generations.

Han Hua: As an expert on European issues, what was your first reaction when you heard J.D. Vance's speech at the Munich Security Conference?

Alexei Gromyko: I'm not shocked, and it's not surprising to me.

Han Hua: But everyone present was shocked.

Alexei Gromyko: I think it's just a reflection of the ignorance of those people. In fact, this has been evident for a long time, not just since Trump's victory last November, but in the four years since he was first elected in 2017 when many people were understandably surprised, frustrated or shocked.

The problem with the European political elite, in my opinion, is that they cannot keep up with the pace of changes in the international system and world politics. It is not difficult for many Russian experts, and even for many in China and other countries, to predict the actions of Trump and his team. This is not only determined by factors of Trump's personality or character, but by the embodiment of "Trumpism" – it is a powerful political current that affects not only the United States, but also Europe. Thus, the ill-preparedness of the European political elite before Trump's "second coming" and the failure to anticipate what will happen at the Munich Security Conference is in itself a problem for some politicians, as well as for the think tanks and experts who advise them.

Vance, of course, uses a very cold way of saying that the greatest threat to Europe's political elite does not come from without, but from within. This statement sharply highlights the current divergence in the strategic thinking of the United States and Europe.

In Russia, we have long foreseen the so-called "strategic decoupling" between the United States and Europe in the era of Trump 2.0. Now, that's becoming a reality. So, for me personally, as well as for other experts in our country, this is not surprising, this is a trend that we have long foreseen strategically. It may happen in different concrete ways, but in the end, the state of affairs still develops according to its inherent logic. This is precisely the essence of "Trumpism".

Han Hua: So you think that this change is inevitable, a fundamental change, and it will have a huge impact on the traditional transatlantic relationship. So, how will this affect Russian-European relations?

Alexei Gromyko: Russia's relations with Europe do not exist in isolation but are deeply embedded in world politics and are influenced by the global situation. At least two external factors play an important role in the dynamics of Russian-European relations: US-EU relations and Sino-European relations.

During the administration of former President Joe Biden, the United States pursued a "dual containment" strategy against Russia and China. At the same time, Washington pursued a policy of "double decoupling": weakening ties between the United States and Europe on the one hand, and decoupling the European Union from Russia on the other.

In the coming decades, the focus of the United States will be on competition with China. Judging by all the strategic documents of the United States, China is perceived by the United States as a systemic challenge of the 21st century, while Russia is labeled an "immediate threat". This strategic line of thinking has also prompted the United States to push for decoupling from the United States and Europe, as well as to force the European Union to sever economic ties with Russia. Washington has made this goal one of its top priorities under the Biden administration.

At the moment, I think Russia is willing to stabilize relations with the United States first and then normalize relations with European countries that can recognize the reality. Russia has never initiated sanctions or restrictions of any kind, and each time it has only been a response to external pressure. But Russia is a global power and at the same time a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Therefore, it is necessary for Russia to maintain stable and pragmatic diplomatic relations in its own periphery, even if not necessarily amicable. In the coming years, Russia will strive to establish pragmatic diplomatic relations with the United States and a number of European countries.

At the same time, Russia has a clear judgment on the current and foreseeable future global geopolitical landscape, which is the strategy of "turning east". Russia's strategic focus will be on building closer strategic partnerships with China, India, other major Asian countries, and emerging powers in Africa and Latin America.

In the current situation, Russia has put its foreign policy towards Europe on the back burner. The development of Russian-European relations does not depend on Russia's will or what it is able to offer the European side. For a long time, European countries, especially Germany, have benefited greatly from the establishment of comprehensive economic relations with Russia. Now, the restoration of Russian-European relations depends entirely on whether the European ruling elite can make pragmatic and rational decisions.

Han Hua: I think the Eurasian security architecture you mentioned is actually a signal that Russia is seriously and strategically pivoting to the East. But at the same time, Russia remains a global power, not just a regional power, and therefore needs to maintain stable relations with Europe. This depends first and foremost on the stability of relations between Russia and the United States, and a key factor in measuring the stability of relations between the United States and Russia is whether the two sides can sit down and negotiate directly to end the war. So, in the foreseeable future, do you think such negotiations can be reached?

Alexei Gromyko: A new window of opportunity has indeed emerged. Russia has been steadfast in its quest to resolve the issue and negotiate through diplomatic means. Over the past three years, there have been several key points in the process of a possible diplomatic breakthrough, notably in the spring of 2022, when Russian representatives, diplomats and politicians negotiated with the Ukrainian side, and the two sides came close to reaching an agreement, which was ultimately undermined by the United States and the United Kingdom.

Since then, the West has sought Russia's "strategic defeat." However, it turned out that this was not really a strategy, but wishful thinking, and one could even say a strategic mistake made by the United States (not to mention the European Union) in the Ukrainian crisis. Trying to inflict a strategic defeat via Ukraine on a nuclear power like Russia, is in itself an extremely dangerous illusion. For Moscow, defeat in the Ukraine crisis would mean a real strategic defeat.

Today, there seems to be some noticeable change in the political thinking of the United States. They realize that it is pointless and extremely dangerous to continue to waste hundreds of billions of dollars on what was already a castle in the air. Trump wants to focus on America's domestic affairs and restore America's economic power. He is reluctant to be mired in foreign military action or proxy wars, which would not only be a heavy burden for the United States, but would also most likely lead to a direct military conflict with other nuclear powers.

The major powers should find a balance between safeguarding their national interests and security, as they have done many times in history. The Ukrainian crisis is not only a bilateral crisis between Russia and Ukraine, although it is true that there are certain contradictions between the two countries, but the root of the crisis actually lies in the development of Russian-NATO relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially in the conflict in the field of national security.

Han Hua: When Russia and the United States enter the negotiation stage, what do you think must be done and what must not be touched? For example, is the proposal by Western European leaders to freeze Russia's $300 billion in assets for post-war reconstruction a red line that is unacceptable to Russia? What are the other core interests that Russia will never concede? What are negotiable and compromised?

Alexei Gromyko: First of all, Russia is very adamant that NATO expansion is the main threat to our national security. NATO is not a non-governmental organization, but a military alliance, and its official documents clearly define Russia as the main threat and the main adversary. NATO's expansion is not just a diplomatic statement, but a concrete military reality, involving the construction of military infrastructure, the deployment of military forces, and all this is gradually approaching Russia's borders, and even closer to Russia's military command and political decision-making centers.

The proxy war waged by the collective West against Russia in Ukraine is a "Cuban Missile Crisis 2.0" for Russia, which is the bottom line that Russia will never compromise. Russia is certainly willing to negotiate, but if the future European security system remains based on the concept of "Russia is a threat" and continues to push for the militarization of Western and Central Europe, then this will never be an acceptable solution for Russia.

As a result, a future peace settlement will go through complex and comprehensive diplomatic negotiations, culminating in the hope of a peace agreement, but this will involve multiple negotiating tracks. The first track is bilateral negotiations between the United States and Russia, which is currently being pushed forward between Moscow and Washington. Because of this, Europe is not included in the negotiating table, and no one believes that Europe should be present in the negotiations. At present, the negotiations between the United States and Russia are mainly focused on restoring the normal functioning of the diplomatic institutions of the two countries, that is, restoring the normal functions of the US embassy in Moscow and the Russian embassy in Washington. If substantial progress is made on this point, it will be easier to move on to a political solution to the Ukrainian crisis.

Russia's position is clear: a diplomatic solution cannot be rushed. Especially when the problem is extremely complex and involves multiple interests, it must be addressed in a step-by-step manner. If all goes well, this year may see some kind of normalization of relations between the United States and Russia, as well as some progress in the process of resolving the Ukraine crisis, but there will be no miracles, no magical solutions. It takes time and requires a lot of effort. At the same time, we must be aware that there will be a large number of political forces trying to undermine the peace process, whether in Europe, in the United States, or within Ukraine.

That is why China has an important role to play. China has boldly put forward peace initiatives and sent senior diplomats to mediate in various countries. I believe that a comprehensive solution to the Ukrainian crisis will not be possible without China's active participation.

Han Hua: Thank you very much for mentioning China's efforts over the past three years, and our Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs, Ambassador Li Hui, has traveled almost all over the world to promote the resolution of this crisis and put forward China's proposals and contributions. But Trump is a businessman, and he doesn't have much patience.

So how can we manage or help Trump control the tempo? I very much agree with what you have said about advancing the peace talks through the gradual restoration of diplomatic relations, and I agree that the terms of negotiations should be put on the table for discussion. But the problem is that Trump wants to solve the problem as soon as possible. In your opinion, should a ceasefire be reached first, followed by gradual political negotiations?

Alexei Gromyko: The problem is that a simple ceasefire is not a solution in itself; it has to be placed within a complete framework. If a ceasefire is part of a peaceful settlement, then this can be considered. But if a ceasefire is declared unilaterally, without clear follow-up arrangements, such a ceasefire is likely to break down quickly.

Before really talking about a ceasefire, Russia and the United States must have in-depth consultations, which should be closed-door talks and, when appropriate, China and other countries that have put forward peace initiatives over the past few years can also be brought in.

A ceasefire is feasible if there is indeed political will to make it a first step towards a peaceful settlement and to ensure that the process is in Russia's national interest. But if a ceasefire is simply hastily declared, without a clear plan for the future and without a follow-up political roadmap, then such a ceasefire is meaningless and could even lead to the situation getting worse.

Han Hua: Do you accept any European military force as the core peacekeeping force in Ukraine?

Alexei Gromyko: The root causes of Russia's involvement in this crisis are, most notably, NATO's eastward expansion, Russia's demand for military neutrality in Ukraine, and humanitarian issues, especially the future of the millions of Russian-speaking inhabitants of Ukraine. Millions of Ukrainians have fled to Russia, experiencing multiple waves of refugees.

It didn't all start in 2022, but back in 2014. At that time, there was a coup d'état in Kiev, and the newly inaugurated government sent regular troops to attack eastern Ukraine. Subsequently, in January 2015, Kiev launched a second military operation. As a result, the war in Ukraine has gone through several stages. Initially, it was a civil war in Ukraine, with the Kyiv government using regular troops; And since 2022, Russia has become deeply involved in this situation.

To solve this problem, we must fully consider the underlying causes of its occurrence. It is not just one mine that needs to be dismantled, but many issues are intertwined. Sooner or later, Russia and Ukraine will inevitably reach some kind of ceasefire agreement, but there are different types of ceasefire agreements: some can promote a real solution to the problem, and some are only temporary interludes in the war. The ceasefire agreement that Russia hopes to reach must be the first step towards a real solution.

Russia will not accept any foreign troops deployed in Ukraine without its consent. If French or British troops enter Ukraine under the guise of peacekeepers without formal authorization, they will be considered legitimate military targets for Russia. In reality, the only legal mandate that can be recognized by all the great powers is the UN peacekeeping mandate, and this mandate must be approved by the UN Security Council. I admit that this will be a difficult diplomatic game, but how can resolving such a complex crisis be an easy task? Theoretically, at some point in the future, we may see troops from different countries deployed in Ukraine, but only if there is a clear mandate.

Han Hua: I completely agree with you. The only official peacekeeping force in the world is the United Nations peacekeeping force. Your statement is very clear and very powerful. China is a major contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, not only in terms of personnel deployment, but also in terms of financial support. Therefore, I believe that China has a key role to play in the decision-making of the UN Security Council and in the mandate of peacekeeping in the future.

Growing up in a family of scientists and diplomats, how has this influenced your career and worldview? What lessons should we learn from the history of the cold war? Before his death, your grandfather, Andrei Gromyko, spoke highly of the reforms that were underway at that time. Can you tell us about the situation? Nowadays, many people compare Trump to Gorbachev, what do you think of that comparison?

Alexei Gromyko: Actually, I have always followed in the footsteps of my grandfather Andrei Gromyko and my father Anatoly Gromyko. Andrei Gromyko began his career as a scientist. In 1936, he received his Ph.D. in economics, with a focus on the American economy. It was only in 1939 that he was invited to join the USSR Foreign Ministry and began to work in diplomacy. But even so, he remained active in the field of scientific research. In 1957, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, but just a year earlier, he had completed his doctoral dissertation.

When he served as the Soviet ambassador to London in 1952-1953, he was still collecting research materials in preparation for his doctoral dissertation. Even after becoming Soviet Foreign Minister in 1957, he wrote a large number of scholarly articles and books. As such, he was both a diplomat and a scholar. He has always believed that diplomacy is not just a profession, nor is it just a public service, but an art. For him, the art of diplomacy must be based on science. This combination of "diplomacy, art, and science" continued throughout his life.

He is a firm believer in the concept of peaceful coexistence. This is precisely why, under his diplomatic push, the Soviet Union gradually achieved a high degree of diplomatic interaction with the United States and other major Western countries in the 60s and 70s of the 20th century, that is, what we call détente. During this period, the Soviet Union signed a number of important bilateral and international treaties with the United States, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, START I, START II, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (which, regrettably, the United States unilaterally withdrew from in 2002).

Throughout his life, he devoted himself to building a global strategic stability architecture, promoting the military and political balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States, and using diplomacy to reduce global military risks. In achieving these goals, Soviet foreign policy employed a variety of means, but at its core was not to impose pressure, but to seek a fair agreement acceptable to all parties. In some cases, compromises are required; In other cases, it is necessary to think outside the box and find new solutions. But most importantly, every negotiation must move forward and reduce military risks, not just in Europe, but on a global scale.

He has always believed that when the artillery is silent, diplomacy should stand in the foreground and make the final voice. I hope the same can be true in the world today. When the peak of military conflict has passed, diplomacy should take the lead in the situation and promote a final peaceful settlement.

Han Hua: Speaking of peaceful coexistence, last year China solemnly celebrated the 70th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and invited many international dignitaries to Beijing. We have also briefly touched on the role of the United Nations in peacekeeping.

So I would like to ask one more question about the United Nations and your views on the future development of the United Nations. You co-founded the Russian campaign "Support for the Democratic Global Order and the United Nations". How do you envision a democratic global order, and how does it fit into the trend of a multipolar world? On the other hand, even in Russia, there are some voices against the UN, arguing that it is no longer adapted to the current global situation. What do you think is needed to reform the United Nations?

Alexei Gromyko: The movement you mentioned was indeed founded by my father, and I supported it at the time. Later, in 2019, the movement developed into the Andrei Gromyko Association for Foreign Policy Studies.

When we asked Andrei Gromyko what he considered his most important achievement was, he usually gave top priority to the creation of the United Nations. He was personally involved in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, followed by the Yalta Conference in February 1945, in which the victorious powers reached a series of key decisions. This was followed by the San Francisco Conference on 25 April 1945, which culminated in the signing of the Charter of the United Nations on 26 June 1945.

The United Nations is one of the pillars of the Yalta-Potsdam international system. Since the 90s of the last century, I have been hearing people say that the Yalta-Potsdam system is outdated and has become history, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. But I firmly believe that the world in which we live today is still to a large extent a continuation of this system, which also laid the foundations of post-war international law. The UN Security Council remains at the heart of international politics, a legacy of the victorious powers of 1945 and continues to this day.

To this day, there is not a single permanent member of the Council, let alone a non-permanent member, who does not highly value its seat on the Council and its place in international affairs. Although the Security Council has long been the scene of diplomatic conflict and strife, it remains an important platform for reflecting changes in the world order. For example, the United States, Russia and China voted in favor of the recent resolution on the Ukraine crisis, while France and the United Kingdom chose to abstain. Only a unique platform like the United Nations can facilitate such a major diplomatic game and decision-making.

I believe that the legacy of the Yalta-Potsdam system is still part of our present world, not a distant history, but a "living history". Because to this day, we are still enjoying the strategic decision of the victorious countries (including China and Russia) in 1945 to "plant trees for our predecessors and enjoy the shade for future generations." [My Emphasis]

We have a new ism—Trumpism—but not much of a body to clothe, and its formulation seems to have occurred during Trump 1.0, so we’d need to look there for clues. Otherwise, we were treated to Russia’s current position on negotiations and relations. However, the suggestion that China should be part of the overall final negotiation is a new point and makes sense if the Eurasian Security System is to be erected as part of the overall peace.

One other point that continues to puzzle me: Why doesn’t Russia condemn the 2014 coup as an invasion of Ukraine by the Outlaw US Empire because that’s precisely what happened? Did Russia not feel sovereign enough to make such a declaration of fact? Was retaining Crimea enough to quench such talk? That’s a series of questions I’d like to ask those capable of providing the answers.

Emphasis was placed on Trump’s lack of patience and wanting to resolve issues quickly. Again, it was emphasized that Russia will not be rushed. And it’s not just Trump but his entire team. IMO, the only way detente will emerge is for the Outlaw US Empire to cease being an Outlaw. IMO, team Trump isn’t ready to do that given the nature of the threats it’s made. I’d like to be proven wrong.

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