Kommersant Interviews Dmitri Medvedev

New Start and Nukes are the topics

On 26 January the Kommersant publication published its interview of former Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, signer of the New Start Treaty that’s set to expire on 5 February. IMO, his words need to be read closely on this critical topic. Kommersant provides a short preamble prior to the start of the interview:

“Problems in the strategic sphere only continue to grow”

Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev on the key Russian-American agreement expiring in February

On February 5, the Russian-American Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms (START) expires. After this date, for the first time in more than half a century, Moscow and Washington will be left without agreements in the field of arms control and without a negotiation process to develop any new agreements in this area. Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, leader of the United Russia party, during whose presidency the New START Treaty was signed, spoke about the importance of the New START Treaty and the future of nuclear deterrence in an interview with Kommersant’s special correspondent Elena Chernenko.

Kommersant employs its own emphasis via outtakes that are bolded to which I’ve added a single ‘ at beginning and end. Interview:

- What role did the New START Treaty play in Russian-American relations and ensuring strategic stability? Did he live up to the expectations you had for him when you signed him?

- At a certain historical period, the New START Treaty has generally fulfilled its main functions. It really played a quite positive role. It worked to maintain strategic stability and reduce the number of incentives for an arms race. It provided the necessary predictability in the field of strategic offensive arms.

At the same time, there were negative moments. The Russian side had a number of claims against the American side in connection with specific provisions of the treaty. There were also destructive steps by the Biden administration. They ran counter to the fundamental principles and understandings laid down in the preamble of the New START Treaty. Without their agreement at the negotiation stage, the treaty simply would not have been concluded. All this eventually led to the fact that in 2023 Russia was forced to suspend the New START Treaty. Moreover, the problem was not in the “quality” of the agreement itself, but in the irresponsible approach of the United States to its implementation and to the entire range of Russian-American relations.

Nevertheless, the New START Treaty has not lost its positive significance in recent years, when it was already suspended. Realizing this, in 2023, both sides announced their intention to continue to adhere to the central quantitative restrictions of the treaty until its termination in February 2026.

In September last year, our country proposed to go even further. The President of Russia put forward a constructive initiative: the parties voluntarily remain committed to the limits of the New START Treaty for at least one year after the end of its life cycle. The head of our state stressed that this measure can be viable only if America acts in a similar way and does not take steps that violate today’s parity.

The implementation of the Russian initiative could make a significant contribution to ensuring global security and expanding the strategic dialogue with the United States. However, we have not yet received a substantive official response to our proposal from Washington.

- After the signing of the New START Treaty, American officials (primarily from the Republican Party) repeatedly argued that this treaty is disadvantageous to the United States. Recently, President Donald Trump said that the document has “many weaknesses” and “the negotiators did a poor job.”

I think Trump meant American negotiators. He “loves” Obama.

But I want to emphasize the main thing. Washington’s decision to take steps that ultimately undermined the New START Treaty is not the fault of those who drafted and concluded the treaty.

At the negotiation stage, both teams worked professionally. The agreement was complex, multi-layered, and non-trivial. Each point was verified very carefully. The final document was the result of real compromises–-equal and mutually beneficial. At that time, we said directly on both sides: this is a classic win-win situation.

I remember this as a direct participant in the events. For obvious reasons, as the president of the country, I was deeply involved in the negotiation process. I had a large number of telephone conversations on this issue with the then President of the United States. I remember in one of them I ironically referred to a well-known saying: when you want to do something really well, you have to do it yourself.

Although, of course, it was just teamwork. And the scale of the efforts of all participants was really impressive. As well as the achieved result.

‘Therefore, all the negativity that later began to “grow” to the New START Treaty is not related to the document itself, but to the subsequent behavior of the American side and the events around the treaty.’

If Washington has reassessed the parameters of the treaty over time and decided that they allegedly “missed” something within the framework of the New START Treaty, this speaks of only one thing. About the high level of professionalism of Russian negotiators who managed to defend our national interests.

- The United States, as you stated, has not yet responded to the proposal of Russian President Vladimir Putin to maintain its central quantitative ceilings for a year after the expiration of the New START Treaty. Do you see the potential for resuming cooperation with the United States in the field of arms control?

- The prospects for resuming fruitful cooperation with the United States on arms control are directly related to the presence of favorable conditions for this. First of all, a basic normalization of Russian-American relations is needed. After all, under Biden, they have degraded to a level significantly worse than during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

We see that the new US administration is trying to rethink the reckless and extremely risky course of the previous US authorities, who sought to inflict a “strategic defeat” on our country. This is a shift in the right direction, but the movement is still very weak. We are only at the beginning of the journey, success is not yet guaranteed. Moreover, Donald Trump is initially unstable in political orientations.

‘Before building something new, you need to make sure that it does not collapse under the burden of old and unresolved problems.’

We need to make sure that Washington is really ready to show respect for our fundamental security interests not in words, but in practice. And it is able to work on an equal basis to reduce the overall potential for conflict.

Therefore, there is no point in rushing into rosy forecasts regarding the imminent resumption of a comprehensive and fruitful strategic dialogue between Russia and the United States, which would include arms control issues.

Moreover, the problems in the strategic sphere as a result of the destabilizing actions of the United States only continue to grow. Suffice it to recall the extremely provocative anti-missile project “Golden Dome for America”. It fundamentally contradicts the assertion about the inextricable relationship between offensive and defensive strategic weapons, which, by the way, was enshrined in the preamble of the New START Treaty.

It is impossible not to mention the statements of the American leadership that Washington may resume full-fledged nuclear tests. This will significantly complicate any potential strategic dialogue between Russia and the United States.

There are a lot of other negative examples.

But positive signals from the American side are clearly not enough. In particular, there has been no positive response to our initiative on the “post-New START” initiative. Therefore, I will say briefly: no START-4 is better than a treaty that only masks mutual distrust and provokes an arms race in other countries.

How do you see the future of the arms control regime after February 5 in general? Maybe you see the potential for multilateral agreements? Or will there be no regime and the world will face a new arms race between nuclear powers?

- First of all, we need to wait for February 5 and see if there will be at least some meaningful reaction from the United States to the Russian initiative. Theoretically, if you look at the calendar, there are still small chances for positive decisions.

If we do not hear any specifics from Washington, then we will proceed from the real steps of the American side. We are closely monitoring them and will continue to do so.

‘Russia is ready for any development of events.’

New threats to our security will be suppressed in a timely and tough manner. There should be no illusions here. Moreover, in addition to traditional strategic offensive weapons, new, very powerful types of weapons are emerging. All countries are doing this. And we, of course. You don’t have to go far for examples: it is enough to recall the “Burevestnik”, “Hazel”, and “Poseidon” systems.

As for possible multilateral agreements, there is currently no queue of those wishing to discuss a new restrictive regime in a broader format than Russia and the United States. Therefore, conversations on this topic are meaningless. I will say more: I am sure that the nuclear club will expand.

- And how do you see the development of the situation in the field of nuclear deterrence in general, taking into account the fact that, as you said, the prospect of an early resumption of a comprehensive strategic dialogue between Russia and the United States is not visible, but there is no queue of those who want to discuss a new restrictive regime in a broader format?

- A lot still depends on Russia and the United States in this area, since these are the largest countries in terms of nuclear potentials. It is pointless to deny that the nuclear club today is much wider. There are official members of the nuclear club who have signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and unofficial members who either recognize themselves as nuclear powers and even fix this in laws, or do not recognize them, but everyone knows that they are. With this in mind, it is time to look at the problem much more broadly.

As for the overall situation, it is, to put it mildly, not cloudless. It is getting worse because the general global instability, the contradictions, one might even say, the rift that has formed in the world order, are pushing a number of countries to think about how best to defend themselves. It is possible that some countries will consider that the best option is to acquire nuclear weapons. Therefore, as I said earlier, I believe that the nuclear club will continue to expand, despite all the displeasure in this regard.

A number of states have the technical capabilities to create a military-nuclear program; some of them are already conducting research in this area. Yes, perhaps humanity is not interested in this; but, let’s be honest, humanity has not come up with any other way to guarantee the protection of its country, its sovereignty and interests.

‘There is no need to be disingenuous, it is necessary to openly admit that if the Soviet Union did not have nuclear weapons at the moment, then, quite likely, our country would no longer exist.’

In general, my assessments of the future nuclear non-proliferation regime are quite pessimistic.

The current officially recognized nuclear powers have the potential to prevent this scenario from developing—if there is political will.

- Do you have an understanding of which new countries could join the nuclear club?

— I will only say that many states—this is known both from open sources and from intelligence—are engaged in research in this area. But where the peaceful atom ends and the military atom begins is a very mobile border. But the emergence of new members of the nuclear club is quite likely.

- Will it stabilize or destabilize the situation?

— This is a difficult question. On the one hand, it may seem that the more members of the nuclear club, the more countries have nuclear potential, the less stable the situation becomes. You never know if someone will take and use nuclear weapons during some local clash...

But, on the other hand, this will force states to think about the consequences of provoking certain conflicts.

Since you asked me about this: after all, the Europeans, and under the Biden administration, the Americans, constantly provoked us to make tough decisions. And these provocations continue. Remember what happened at the end of the year, when there was an attack on the residence of the President of the Russian Federation using a massive number of unmanned aerial vehicles. In fact, this could be the basis for a retaliatory strike, including with the use of special weapons.

This kind of game is extremely dangerous.

I think it is impossible to say unequivocally what the military atom brings to the conditions of existence of mankind. On the one hand, it creates great tension, and on the other hand, it ventilates the brains of those who may have the most dangerous plans.

— And what measures, in addition to the system of arms control treaties, which is becoming a thing of the past, could, in your opinion, reduce the risks of nuclear war?

— Considering the problems of reducing strategic risks, we have been and are now acting on the basis of an integrated approach. Its core for us, especially in modern conditions, is a set of fundamental principles that should guide nuclear powers in their relations.

I would like to note the most important of them: the principle of equal and indivisible security, the refusal to infringe on each other’s fundamental interests and the focus on eliminating contradictions that could lead to military confrontation. In case of reciprocal compliance with such principles, the reduction of strategic risks will be guaranteed.

Arms control in any case fulfills a secondary function. This is a tool that helps the parties to consolidate their positions in practice, during the implementation of the agreements reached. This is what the restrictions on the types of individual weapons and the regular verification of their compliance serve. But they do not become a panacea in themselves.

We invariably advocate that any strategic dialogue and all efforts in the field of reducing nuclear danger should be systematic. They should rely on constructive political positions in building bilateral relations in this extremely important area.

If we are not heard, we act proportionately to restore parity.

Or we create something fundamentally new. Something that calms down our enemies for a long time. Therefore, the successful work of the Russian military-industrial complex is a tranquilizer for neurotics from the club of enemies of Russia. [My Emphasis}

A very informative interview providing insight into Russian strategic thought as its matured since 1945. The assumption Kommersant and I emphasized that NATO would have employed its nukes to destroy the USSR had it not attained its own deterrent is spelled out via numerous now unclassified documents that begin with Operation Unthinkable in 1945 before the Asian portion of WW2 was completed as well as several assertions for NATO to employ the Nazis Plan Ost and finish the job, which is what the 2014 war on Russian speaking Ukrainians was aimed at doing. Do take heed of Medvedev’s great lack of trust in the Trump Gang and his guarded optimism about the nuclear club’s expansion. Medvedev’s assessment of the treaty as a “win-win” is very likely the reason for Trump’s displeasure since he wants all “agreements” to be Zero-sum—a win for the Outlaw US Empire and loss for everyone else. It’s very likely, IMO, that the reason for the lack of improvement in relations is because of Trump wanting to retain what was “won” (stolen) from Russia, which I believe is why Putin said Russia would be happy to donate a billion dollars from its frozen funds to Trump’s so-called Peace Council: Trump wants to hold onto those funds until a way is found to formally acquire them, and to obtain the first billion will only open the door for the other billions to fly back to Russia, meaning a great loss for Trump.

Again, Trump and the Empire cannot admit defeat in Ukraine, nor can the policy to contain Russia be abandoned regardless what the new security documents proclaim. Technologically, the Empire is way behind Russia, China, Iran, and possibly North Korea on true hypersonic missiles that fly through the atmosphere. We see how moribund NATO’s air defense and air-to-air missilry capabilities are and what seems to be the inability to improve upon 1970s technology. And technological deficiencies are noted in many other areas as well—the Empire’s outsourcing icebreaker construction to Finland is but one example; the supply chain debacles are another. The only improvement I see is the one Medvedev noted:

We see that the new US administration is trying to rethink the reckless and extremely risky course of the previous US authorities, who sought to inflict a “strategic defeat” on our country. [My Emphasis]

Do note the portion I emphasized. He didn’t say the Trump Gang has rethought or reconsidered the Empire’s longstanding policy, meaning it remains the same. And there’re plenty of grounds to convince Russia that there’ll be no substantive change. Other important voices within the Russian policy sphere have made similar observations. Overall, very little has changed relations-wise since 2022—the Outlaw US Empire remains unwilling to bow to Russia’s primary security demands:

I would like to note the most important of them: the principle of equal and indivisible security, the refusal to infringe on each other’s fundamental interests and the focus on eliminating contradictions that could lead to military confrontation. [My Emphasis]

Those were the key principles laid out in Russia’s December 2021 Security Treaty Proposals to the Empire and NATO, and they remain Russia’s key security principles that neither the Empire nor NATO acknowledge. Their policy is for Russia to simply exist without security. The Empire has now expanded that to include all nations except itself, and that’s not going to be possible.

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