Lavrov Talks Arms Control & Negotiations with Rossiya Segodnya

On Sunday December 29, Lavrov engaged in another of his year-ending interviews, this one with Russia’s media group leader Rossiya Segodnya on the status of arms control treaties given the current conflict in international affairs as well as the state of various negotiations. As one can assume at the outset, the arms control prospects aren’t good:

Question: Against the backdrop of the aggressive policy of the West, will Russia withdraw from the START Treaty before its expiration? Or will Moscow be ready to adhere to quantitative restrictions on the New START Treaty after February 2026?

Lavrov: The objective reality is that as a result of the destructive policy of the United States, the foundations of strategic stability have been significantly shaken, and in some places destroyed. At the same time, due to the extreme anti-Russian charge of the current American authorities, there are currently no conditions for a strategic dialogue with Washington. Until the Americans abandon their current anti-Russian course, we will not conduct any negotiations with them on arms control.

This does not mean that Russia will not take a number of measures to maintain an acceptable level of predictability in the nuclear missile sphere on a voluntary basis, which we are doing. In particular, we continue to adhere to the quantitative restrictions on these weapons provided for under the New START Treaty. In addition, Russia's unilateral moratorium on the deployment of ground-based intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF) remains in force. Some other steps are being taken.

However, as we have repeatedly stated, the relevance of these measures directly depends on the extent to which they meet our interests. We assess the situation on the basis of an analysis of the destabilising actions of the United States and NATO in the strategic sphere and, accordingly, the evolution of the threats that stem from them. As of today, it is obvious that, for example, our moratorium on the deployment of intermediate-range missiles is practically unviable and will have to be abandoned. The United States arrogantly ignored the warnings from Russia and China and in practice proceeded to deploy weapons of this class in various regions of the world. As President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin has unequivocally stated, we will respond to this, and respond proportionately. The recent test of the latest medium-range hypersonic system "Oreshnik", carried out by us in combat conditions, convincingly demonstrated our capabilities and determination in the implementation of compensatory measures.

As for the New START Treaty, I would like to remind you that even in the process of suspending this agreement, we announced our intention to comply with its central "ceilings" within the life cycle of the Treaty and warned the United States against steps that could make these efforts meaningless for us. We consistently adhere to what has been declared: by clearly inscribing the process of rearmament of Russian strategic nuclear forces within the limits under the New START Treaty, we are closely monitoring Washington's actions.

What will happen after February 2026, when the New START Treaty ceases to exist, we do not see any reason to guess now. A lot more can happen in the coming year. So at this stage it would be premature, and unwise, to announce our possible moves in this sensitive area. There will be a day, there will be food.

Question: A number of experts believe that the new US administration has enough leverage to start talks on Ukraine. Do you share this point of view? How likely is the start of negotiations on the Ukrainian topic in 2025?

Lavrov: Of course, both the new and the current administration have such levers. It must only apply them, these levers, to itself and its Kiev wards. If Washington really wanted to end the conflict, it would have stopped supplying weapons to Kyiv, demanded that its satellites follow suit and ordered its Kiev puppets to cease fire, resume the negotiation process without any conditions, canceling Zelensky's decree prohibiting himself from negotiations with the Russian leadership.

Our country's position on the settlement is well known and remains unchanged. We are ready for negotiations, but they must be aimed at eliminating the root causes of the Ukrainian crisis and taking into account the real situation on the ground.

President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin clearly outlined our principled approaches in his speech at the Foreign Ministry on June 14, as well as during the year-end news conference on December 19. In particular, we are talking about the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine, ensuring its non-aligned, neutral and nuclear-free status, eliminating long-term threats to Russia's security emanating from the west, including NATO expansion. Kiev must assume specific obligations to ensure the rights, freedoms and interests of Russian-speaking citizens and, of course, recognize the territorial realities enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

The implementation of the specific proposals formulated by the Head of State will make it possible to put an end to the conflict and reach comprehensive, long-term, fair and legally binding agreements. Only in this way is it possible to achieve lasting peace.

In the meantime, judging by what we see and read, Kyiv and the West have begun to discuss the possibility of some kind of ceasefire and truce in order to get a respite and during it increase the military potential of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and then resume efforts to inflict a "strategic defeat" on Russia. Of course, this is a dead end. The road to nowhere. There can be no doubt about that.

Question: In connection with the recent events in Syria, are there any plans to make any changes to the updated Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran, in particular, to the section on mutual military assistance between the countries? Has Bashar al-Assad's departure affected the need for closer coordination with Tehran in the field of defence?

Lavrov: The new "big" treaty, the text of which has long been prepared and agreed upon by the parties, is comprehensive, long-term and all-weather, and in this sense does not require any adjustments.

The treaty is designed to legally consolidate the unprecedented progress achieved in bilateral relations in recent years, to fix their entry into the level of strategic partnership.

Of course, such a comprehensive instrument also has an international dimension. Among other things, it pays special attention to strengthening cooperation in the interests of peace and security at the regional and global levels and enshrines the desire of Moscow and Tehran for closer cooperation in the fields of security, defence, the fight against terrorism and extremism, and countering many other common challenges and threats. In principle, to one degree or another, all this is being done now. However, the signing of the agreement, which we hope will take place during the next high-level contact soon, will open up additional opportunities for further expanding the Russian-Iranian partnership in priority areas.

Question: In early December, Denmark handed over the second batch of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. Earlier, you said that Moscow would consider the supply of these aircraft to Kiev as "a deliberate signal action by NATO in the nuclear sphere." What measures will Russia take against Denmark and other countries that supply and maintain weapons?

Lavrov: Back in August 2023, the Danish authorities announced plans to send 19 F-16 fighter jets to Kyiv. In August and December of this year, it was reported that the first two batches of these aircraft were transferred to Ukraine. Copenhagen is one of the largest donors of weapons to Kyiv, participates in the training of Ukrainian militants and the supply of mercenaries to the war zone, finances the production of military equipment at the enterprises of the military-industrial complex of Ukraine at the expense of income from frozen Russian assets.

We have repeatedly warned that by providing massive military assistance to the Ukrainian Nazis, Denmark, its patrons and allies are provoking an escalation of the conflict, forcing Russia to take adequate measures to ensure the country's security, including of a military-technical nature.

Any types of weapons supplied by Western countries to the Kyiv regime are a legitimate target and are effectively destroyed by the Russian military.

Question: Is Russia negotiating with the armed opposition in Syria regarding the future of the Russian Federation's military bases in the country? Have you received any guarantees of their further location?

Lavrov: The deployment of Russian military bases in Syria is provided for by existing interstate treaties concluded in accordance with international law. Each of them determines the conditions for the functioning of these objects and contains certain obligations of both parties.

Syria is a sovereign country that has the right to conclude and terminate agreements with foreign partners. Over the decades of the existence of the modern Syrian state, many of them have been signed. At the same time, we are not aware of the work carried out by the new authorities on the inventory of such acts and their revision. The Russian side has not received any appeals in this regard. And this is logical. Syria has declared a "transition period" until March 1, 2025, and the current government has the status of an "interim" government, which imposes certain constitutional and institutional restrictions on its policies.

Undoubtedly, the change of power and the change in the state of affairs on the ground make certain adjustments with regard to the Russian military presence in Syria. It is not only about the preservation of our bases or strongholds, but also about the conditions for their functioning, maintenance and support, interaction with the local side. These topics could be the subject of negotiations with the new Syrian leadership.

Question: Do you think it is possible in the current realities to repeat NATO's "double decision" to resolve the crisis around intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles? Under what conditions would Russia be ready to discuss with the United States and NATO the issue of eliminating such missile systems?

Lavrov: We do not consider it expedient to speculate about what can and cannot happen in the minds of those who make decisions in NATO. Moreover, these decisions often seem to us, to put it mildly, inadequate, if not to put it more strongly.

For our part, we are ready for any scenario. In the event of the creation of new missile threats, the opponents will receive a decisive rebuff in the form of military-technical countermeasures. In turn, hypothetical steps to create acceptable conditions for an equal dialogue will be taken into account.

We have repeatedly pointed out that we can only be interested in comprehensive work to reduce the potential for conflict with an emphasis on eliminating the root causes of fundamental contradictions in the field of security. These primarily include NATO's long-term expansion to the east. This is what largely provoked the Ukrainian crisis and continues to pose a threat to Russia's security. Hypothetically, arms control issues could also be discussed, but only as one element of a broader agenda. [My Emphasis]

Lavrov’s closing words return us to the formula that was in place in December 2021. I recently conducted a review of the two treaty proposals submitted by Russia to NATO and the Outlaw US Empire because numerous alt-media commentators deemed credible by many continue to advance what’s clearly a myth: That the proposals included the need for NATO to return to its 1997 condition/deployment, or NATO’s rollback as it’s usually referred to. The draft treaties submitted at the time contain absolutely no reference to such a proposal. Here’s the link to the draft sent to NATO in English. The only mention of any date related matter is contained in Article 4:

Article 4

The Russian Federation and all the Parties that were member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as of 27 May 1997, respectively, shall not deploy military forces and weaponry on the territory of any of the other States in Europe in addition to the forces stationed on that territory as of 27 May 1997. With the consent of all the Parties such deployments can take place in exceptional cases to eliminate a threat to security of one or more Parties.

Here’s the link to the proposal sent to the Empire in English.

I don’t know where or from whom the myth of NATO rollback arose from, but as you can see there’s absolutely zero in either proposal suggesting any such thing. The closest is Article 4, but that has nothing to do with rolling back; it only deals with the deployment of military forces on the territory of non-NATO states at that time—it says nothing about the removal of those states from NATO.

Also, it must be noted that Russia is demanding no such rollback in its current negotiating platform. That entire issue has morphed into something completely different—An entirely new Eurasian Security Structure based on the indivisibility of security, which is the basis for the UN Charter and all OSCE treaties that were agreed upon then broken by NATO’s members. Significantly, the Western Hemisphere is omitted from that structure. And for the conflict between the Outlaw US Empire and Russia to be resolved and the combat within Ukraine to cease, that structure must be agreed upon and deployed. All the above can be found in numerous speeches by both Putin and Lavrov during 2024 as well as in interviews given to Russian media by other members of the Russian Security Council. Yes, arms control negotiations have their place, but they aren’t a substitute for the Big Deal outlined above.

IMO, the Outlaw US Empire Deep State will not agree to that structure because it thinks it can continue its strategy utilizing the arch of instability to further weaken Russia and China and thus also SCO and BRICS. That means the Ukraine conflict will be settled by the unconditional capitulation of Ukraine, probably in 2026, although it’s certainly possible that might not happen until 2027. For Russia and Putin politically, there can be no wavering from the implementation of the Eurasian Security Structure because it involves more than just Russia—it involves all Eurasia which is where all of Russia’s critical partners/allies are located. They need this new arrangement just as much as Russia does for all nations are prey to the Outlaw US Empire until it’s neutralized. To accept anything lesser will drastically affect Russia’s/Putin’s international standing—and neither can afford that to occur.

And what does that mean for Trump? He doesn’t like not getting his way. What happens if he surprises everyone and agrees to Russia’s terms? Will it matter if the Senate ratifies it? Can Trump unilaterally pull the Empire out of NATO? And what happens when his replacement rejoins NATO? IMO, such an arrangement means the elimination of NATO or truncating it to just the Empire and Canada. 23 more days to go until we hopefully learn something official.

*
*
*
Like what you’ve been reading at Karlof1’s Substack? Then please consider subscribing and choosing to make a monthly/yearly pledge to enable my efforts in this challenging realm. Thank You!