New Russian Paper on its African Policy

"The Military-Political Dimension of the African Continent in the Context of Russia's Foreign Policy"

On 3 January 2025, Russia’s venerable International Affairs journal published an analytical paper by Olga Trofimova of the National Defense Control Center of the Russian Federation (Moscow). The paper is academic in nature, contains footnotes and is rather long. Many have asked for an elaboration on Russian/Chinese policy regarding Africa. This paper offers a starting point:

The Military-Political Dimension of the African Continent in the Context of Russia's Foreign Policy

AFRICA is one of the most important regions in world politics and economics. Important political and social processes are taking place in the countries of the continent, which significantly affects the situation in the world. In the future, due to active population growth, military conflicts and waves of migration to the Middle East, Asia and Europe are possible. As one of the main players in building a new global security architecture, Russia has historically been assigned the role of a key participant in the processes of resolving emerging problems, including on the African continent.

It is worth noting the ever-growing interest of the leading world powers in African countries, primarily as a market for various goods, including the military-industrial complex, as well as their desire to expand their military-political presence on the continent. In this regard, it is urgent to comprehensively consider the military-political dimension of the African continent in the context of the new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (RF), to show the existing problems in this area and to outline the main ways to solve them.

To a certain extent, this material can be in demand by the state and military authorities of the Russian Federation in the development and adoption of decisions in the military-political sphere aimed at strengthening Russia's position on the African continent and eliminating existing problems.

It should be noted that in domestic and foreign political science there is still no clear definition of the term "military-political dimension", although it is used quite often in practice and in many documents related to international relations. For example, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed on August 1, 1975 in Helsinki, fixes the main agreements in the field of security, including the military-political dimension[1], expressed in the coordination of a set of confidence-building measures in the military field (preliminary notifications of military exercises, major troop movements, the exchange of observers on a voluntary basis at military exercises, etc.)[2].

This term is also found in the documents of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). In particular, according to the updated CICA Catalogue of Confidence Building Measures (approved at the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the CICA Member States on 12 October 2021), in order to ensure lasting stability, strengthen mutual trust in the "military-political dimension", the Member States, taking into account their legitimate security interests, allow the presence of foreign military contingents in the territories of the Member States, if the disclosure of this information is allowed by the country, accommodating such a contingent[3].

Also, this term is often used in their works by many foreign and domestic scientists. For example, F.O. Trunov, a researcher at the Western Europe Sector of the Department of Europe and America of the Center for Scientific and Information Studies of Global and Regional Problems of the Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, uses the practical aspect of the concept of "military-political dimension" in his research[4].

It is believed that the military-political dimension of the African continent is an important component of Russia's foreign policy, representing the directions of its military and political interaction with the countries of the region and their content.

The increased attention of the Russian leadership to deepening relations with African countries is evidenced by the fact that in the new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 2023, Africa has risen to sixth place among regional priorities[5]. In the previous similar document of 2016, it was in last place. In addition, supporting the development of regional and subregional integration within the framework of multilateral international institutions, dialogue platforms, regional associations, including in Africa, is one of the tasks of achieving the goals of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation[6].

In developing cooperation with the countries of the African continent, the Russian leadership takes into account an important feature of their modern foreign policy. If in the 1960s the newly independent states of Africa were in search of their identity and served as an arena of confrontation between the capitalist and socialist systems, now they have become full-fledged actors in international relations, experiencing a real renaissance.

The current military-political elites of many countries of the African continent are distinguished by the presence of higher education, including those obtained in Soviet and Russian military and civilian universities, and selectivity in the choice of allies, taking into account the lessons of the colonial past. This is confirmed, in particular, by the results of the Russia-Africa summits, which have already become regular, in which numerous representatives of the African military-political elites take part (Fig. 1) [7].

As the analysis shows, the military-political dimension of Russia's interaction with African countries has several important aspects.

The first is related to the fight against terrorism and extremism on the African continent. Russia provides assistance to a number of African states in the field of security, including advisory and instructor assistance, in particular, to Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), Burkina Faso, etc.

The second aspect is Russia's active participation in peacekeeping operations on the African continent. Russian peacekeepers are involved in operations under the auspices of the UN in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Western Sahara, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, as well as in the disputed Abyei region between Sudan and South Sudan.

The third aspect is that Russia offers its own vision of the possibilities of resolving crisis situations in Africa, which, in our opinion, can be described as a model of flexible use of the so-called smart power, which combines components of "soft power" (creating an attractive image of the state, providing humanitarian and other assistance to African countries that are friendly to Russia positions, granting them loans on acceptable terms, training military and law enforcement officers of these countries in various specialties in compliance with Russian education standards, etc.) and "hard power" (the ability to confidently and efficiently defend one's national interests in any region of the world).

This model is more effective than the model currently promoted by the collective West led by the United States, as evidenced by a comparative analysis of their distinctive features (Table). It flexibly adapts to the existing African geopolitical realities, as evidenced, in particular, by the successful testing of certain mechanisms of military-political cooperation with Burkina Faso, Mali and the Central African Republic.

Distinctive Features of the Russian and Western Models of Crisis Resolution in Africa

An example of the successful functioning of the Russian model is the political peace agreement signed in Khartoum on February 6, 2019 between the government of the Central African Republic and the main armed groups operating in the country. These agreements are considered an important event in the political life of the CAR, which marked the beginning of the process of national reconciliation. This agreement was made possible thanks to the mediation efforts of Russia and Sudan, which initiated negotiations between armed groups in Khartoum in August 2018, as a result of which it was possible to form a Central African opposition association in order to achieve long-term and sustainable peace in the CAR.

It is obvious that the presented aspects of the military-political dimension of relations between the Russian Federation and African countries are important for ensuring security and stability in the region, as well as for the development of mutually beneficial economic, military and cultural cooperation.

It should be borne in mind, however, that at present many countries of the African continent are striving to develop multi-vector cooperation, establishing interaction with various states of the world. And in order to understand what chances Russia has in this area and how best to use them, it is advisable to take into account the strategy of other geopolitical players trying to expand their influence in this region.

The modern West is making attempts to recreate the neocolonial system through uneven economic and military-political relations with the developing countries of Africa. To do this, the entire set of available tools in various fields is used. For example, in the economic sphere, the activities of large oil and gas and other transnational corporations, such as Royal Dutch Shell, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Chevron, De Beers, and others, are expanding, and in the cultural sphere, the international organization La Francophonie is stepping up its efforts, seeking to tie the former French colonies to the policy of the former metropolis.

The United States is also pursuing an active neocolonial policy in Africa, primarily in order to strengthen the fight against terrorism and the growing influence of the BRICS countries on the continent. The American approach is to make extensive use of the potential of transnational corporations with the active support of the "deep state" (oligarchic clans). [We know that the West uses its Terrorist Foreign Legion to create chaos so infected nations will beg for Western military intervention which solidifies political control of the infected nation. That policy was very effective until being unmasked with the destruction of Libya and its aftermath.]

Moreover, NATO, led by the United States, is currently working on a new comprehensive strategy for the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel region, which explores the possibility of opening NATO training and advisory missions in the countries of the region to counter the growing influence of Russia.

Japan has shared the economic and political aspects of its relations with African countries and has decided to provide them with humanitarian support. Over the past few years, the trade turnover between Japan and the states of the continent has been about $24 billion. At the initiative of the Japanese leadership, the main format of negotiations is the Tokyo International Conference on African Development, which has been held since 1993. Previously, it was organized every five years, now every three years. The goal is to popularize the African direction, to attract donors. Japan itself has chosen the tactics of shadow diplomacy, i.e., it very rarely reveals the directions of its policy in this region. There is very little information about this, it only occasionally appears in the media and is practically not analyzed.

China focuses its main efforts on investment and infrastructure construction in African countries, offering them affordable loans, since the states of the continent often cannot independently pay for Chinese projects, and therefore they often remain the property of the PRC. This policy, however, seems to be very ambiguous. Coups d'état regularly occur in this region, and the new government can nationalize the Chinese infrastructure, which can become a source of conflict.

The Chinese leadership seeks to expand the list of partners and its diplomatic influence on the continent. However, Beijing is now focusing more on economic expansion than on military or political expansion. So far, more than 35 African countries have signed agreements with China as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. The main model of China's relations with African states is resources in exchange for infrastructure.

India's approach is "soft power". Unlike China, it pays attention not to infrastructure projects, but to the IT sector. At the moment, India cannot have the same economic influence on African countries as China, so it often cooperates with the United States in this region. [It lacks China’s financial power.]

The Gulf countries are pursuing a slightly different policy in Africa. Their activities are not characterized by publicity, they use secret diplomacy (back channel diplomacy) and informal contacts. The United Arab Emirates and other Gulf countries present a kind of attractive model that meets with understanding in African countries. This is done in rather mild ways, for example, by spreading traditional values in combination with advanced technologies.

It makes sense to dwell on France's policy in Africa in more detail, since at present its interaction with the countries of the continent is in a severe crisis. This is pointed out not only by Russian, but also by French experts in Africanism.

This crisis has a threefold character, manifesting itself in the following main areas:

• in the military-political sphere, the unsuccessful completion of Operation Barkhane^⁎, ineffective tactics, lack of a comprehensive approach and, as a result, failure in the fight against Islamist terrorist groups;

^⁎ Barkhane is an operation of the French Armed Forces in Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad (G5 Sahel countries) against Islamist terrorist groups. It was a continuation of Operation Serval, which France has been conducting in Mali since 2013. Since July 2014, having received the name "Barkhane", the operation has spread, in addition to Mali, to Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger and Chad. The Sahara-Sahel region is a zone 400 km south of the Sahara, which stretches through the territories of ten countries for 3.9 thousand km from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Red Sea in the east. The Sahel zone has become a threat to the countries of West Africa due to the actions of terrorists.

• in the financial and economic sphere, the rapid decline of French economic influence in Africa, the growth of anti-French sentiment (sentiment anti-francais), and demands to abandon the use of French financial, economic, and other instruments;

• in the cognitive sphere, it is the loss of image in the international arena, the defeat in the struggle for the minds and hearts of Africans, the failure of the "Françafrique" policy due to the ineffective use of methods, means and strategies[10].

As a financial instrument of its neocolonial policy, France invented the Central African franc (CFA). The franc CFA centrafricain is the currency of the six African countries that make up the franc currency area, which is used in many African countries, but is controlled by the French National Bank. African countries want to get rid of the CFA, replacing it with their own ECO currency, which several states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intend to implement, which is being actively worked on at the moment.

In early May 2022, France was informed of the unilateral decision of the transitional government of Mali to denounce the defense cooperation agreement with it, and on November 9, 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron made an official statement on the termination of the French anti-terrorist operation "Barkhane" in the Sahel zone in Africa[11].

These facts indicate that France's dominance in Africa has ceased to be an axiom. French publicist Thomas Dietrick asks a rhetorical question: "Is France losing its position in the CAR?" And he answers it in the affirmative: "Recent events indicate this; in Paris they see that his influence in the CAR has weakened to a thin trickle"[12]. Charles Bussel and Emre Sari, senior consultants at the Crisis Group, puzzled by the situation, also asked: "Why is Russia's military presence so obvious in this chaotic country that was once under French influence?" [13].

As long as France has not completely withdrawn from the African continent, its military and political presence is still felt in a number of countries on the coast of the Gulf of Guinea–-in Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon: in each of them there are military bases, strongholds and communications. Mali in May 2022, and Burkina Faso in January 2023, terminated status-of-forces agreements with France.

It is worth noting that at the moment the situation in Senegal is not as straightforward as it was before. On May 16, 2024, Senegalese Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko raised the issue of closing French military bases in the country during a joint conference with the leader of the France Insoumise party, Jean-Luc Mélenchon.

Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have seen military coups condemned by ECOWAS partners and Western countries. As a result of isolation from former allies, these states of the Sahel region intensified military-technical and economic cooperation with Russia and severed ties with the former metropolis: France. French troops were withdrawn from these countries. Now the Sahel Troika is assisted by Russian military specialists. As ECOWAS imposed sanctions on the rebel governments, the latter announced their withdrawal from the bloc and the creation of an "Alliance of Sahel States", as well as the formation of a joint anti-jihadist force.

France has not completely left the CAR, only the French military contingent has been withdrawn—the last small military-logistics mission, but the political and diplomatic presence still remains in the field of education and support for humanitarian ties.

In view of the above, it can be noted that there is a more distinct trend of a growing domino effect in changing the positions of an increasing number of countries on the African continent, expressed in their unwillingness to see the presence of Western countries, primarily France and the United States, on their territories. This, for example, is what the CAR newspaper Le Renouveau-RCA wrote about on September 5, 2023, and it also gave a fairly honest answer to the question of why such a redistribution of power in the region is taking place: "This is where the balance is: God has given intelligence to the West and endowed Africa with riches"[16]. As the editors of the newspaper correctly note, expressing the opinion of the citizens of the CAR, Africa is moving in the rhythm of coups d'état. From Mali to Burkina Faso, through Niger and Gabon, the military is coming to power.

It is worth mentioning separately the opinion of the Minister of Defense and Veterans Affairs of the Republic of Mali, Colonel S. Camara, expressed at the XI Moscow Conference on International Security. He spoke about the negative consequences of insecurity in the region, when the collective efforts of African states to find appropriate solutions lead to economic lag.

What are the main security challenges facing the Sahel countries and West Africa? The region is facing a rare history of violence, manifested in certain internal and external aggressions, which, according to the Minister of Defence of Mali, are classified according to their motivations as those of armed terrorist groups, organized transnational criminal groups or hybrid groups with separatist tendencies. They are united by the desire to encourage and exploit the crises of coexistence of the society on which they feed.

Focusing on the particular example of the CAR, it is possible to build a model of how the interests of African countries are reoriented towards the Russian Federation. As is known, this republic was a colony of France when it was still called Ubangi-Shari. Russia's close cooperation with the CAR began with the 2018 Agreement on Military Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the CAR. Following this, Russia initiated a decision of the UN Security Council, which allowed it to arm two battalions of the government Armed Forces and send 140 military instructors to this country.

Kenny Gluck (USA), Deputy Head of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA), in 2019, although he said that Russia's actions cause a certain "nervousness", admitted that "the supply of weapons from Moscow and the training of the military is a very positive development"[20].

In 2023, Russian Ambassador to the CAR Alexander Bikantov said in an interview with a RIA Novosti correspondent that there are a significant number of Russian military instructors in the CAR[21]. According to him, the authorities of the republic highly appreciate their work in training military personnel, police and gendarmerie officers, as well as in advising on the fight against illegal armed groups.

He also noted that the presence of Russian military instructors in the country strengthened the combat capability of the army, although it caused discontent among third countries, in particular France, which until December 2022 cooperated with the CAR in the military field—the French contingent, as part of the MISLOG-B mission, was responsible for the logistics of the base in the capital Bangui, which was used by members of the EU and UN stabilization training mission in the CAR. At the end of 2022, France ceased military cooperation with the CAR, as it considered that the country was participating in an anti-French campaign, and the last 130 French troops left this country [22].

Russia's position on cooperation with African countries, unlike many Western countries, is calibrated and thoughtful, and is aimed at rapprochement and common responsibility for the future of the world, which allows all interested states to get more opportunities to jointly solve global problems and equalize socio-economic development.

At the same time, there are some problems in the sphere of military-political cooperation between Russia and African states due to a number of factors.

First, the negative consequences of the weakening of relations between the Russian Federation and African countries in the 90s of the last century, caused by the collapse of the USSR, Russia's turn to the West with the consolidation of the corresponding political reconfiguration in the Foreign Policy Concept, have not yet been fully eliminated.

Second, other international actors are expanding their activities in Africa, including those pursuing an openly hostile policy towards Russia (the increased activity of the United States, Great Britain and France, their promotion of a neocolonial approach, the desire to squeeze the Russian Federation out of Africa at any cost and regain its lost influence), as well as non-aligned states that have their own interests in this region (India, China, Japan, the Persian Gulf countries, etc.).

Thirdly, foreign media cover the build-up of Russia's presence on the continent mainly in a negative way (fakes and unfounded accusations regarding the Russia-Africa summit held in July 2023[23], etc.), seeking to belittle its successes, achievements and distort the goals of developing relations with African countries.

Russia is quite capable of overcoming these problems, since it has a number of advantages in the African direction, which favorably distinguish it from the activities of Western states.

In order to resolve the existing problems as soon as possible and intensify relations between the Russian Federation and African countries in the focus of the development of the military-political dimension, it seems expedient to intensify activities in the following areas:

• qualitative strengthening of propaganda work in the media of Russia and friendly African countries, the main message of which should be the formation among Africans of a stable image of Russia as a country that has returned to the continent seriously and for a long time and builds its foreign policy on the principles of a mutually beneficial and respectful approach, free from ideological and other dogmas, based on strict compliance with the norms of international law;

• expanding cooperation with African countries in all possible spheres of activity and saturating it with real projects related, for example, to the promotion of the Russian model of education, the supply of modern Russian technologies and equipment, the construction of railway networks, highways, schools, hospitals, nuclear and hydroelectric power plants, scientific and cultural institutions in compliance with high standards in the field of safety;

• improvement and expansion of the regulatory framework in the field of military-political, military and military-technical cooperation both at the level of international agreements and memorandums, including in terms of ensuring simplified entry of ships of the Russian Navy into the ports of African states, as well as education and training of military specialists;

• increasing the intensity of air traffic with African countries, especially direct flights, which, in turn, will significantly increase tourist flows in both directions, attract Russian investment in various areas of activity of interested African countries, primarily in industry, education, tourism, construction and other areas, and will also enable Africans to visit Russia more actively;

• improving the mechanisms of interdepartmental cooperation in the African direction;

• active promotion of a positive image of Russia regarding cooperation with African states on social networks;

• acceleration of the spread of the Russian language and knowledge about the culture of the peoples living in Russia in the region;

• expanding cooperation between Russian and African expert and analytical centers;

• further development of mutual exchange of cultural codes of countries in the form of cross-years: the Year of Africa in Russia, the Year of Russia in Africa;

• improvement and promotion of the Russian model of security in the countries of the continent.

The presented ways of improving Russian-African relations generally coincide with the doctrinal provisions of Russia's foreign policy in this region. In accordance with the new Foreign Policy Concept, the Russian Federation intends to contribute to the further development of Africa as an original and influential center of world development, giving priority attention to:

• supporting the sovereignty and independence of interested African States, including through security assistance, including food and energy security, as well as military and military-technical cooperation;

• assistance in the settlement and overcoming of the consequences of armed conflicts in Africa, in particular interethnic and ethnic conflicts, advocating the primacy of African States in these efforts, based on their principle of "African solutions to African problems";

• strengthening and deepening Russian-African cooperation in various spheres on a bilateral and multilateral basis, primarily within the framework of the African Union and the Russia–Africa Partnership Forum;

• increasing the volume of trade and investment with African states and African integration structures (primarily the African Continental Free Trade Area, the African Export-Import Bank and other leading sub-regional organizations), including through the EAEU;

• assistance and development of relations in the humanitarian sphere, including scientific cooperation, training of national personnel, strengthening of health care systems, provision of other assistance, promotion of intercultural dialogue, protection of traditional spiritual and moral values, and the right to freedom of religion[24].

On the African continent, the Russian Federation has its own interests in many areas. Russian companies are actively working in the field of exploration and extraction of minerals in many African countries, including those located in the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea region[25].

Now Russia is confidently regaining the positions in Africa lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union, as a result of which there is a steady strategic catch-up effect, which is a process of comprehensively filling at an accelerated pace the gaps in Russia's cooperation with the countries of the continent that occupy friendly positions towards it. At the strategic level, in all acceptable spheres and formats, the process of assisting the elites of many African countries in strengthening their statehood, supporting them at all important international venues, primarily the UN, BRICS and the SCO, as well as stepping up activities to create a succession of generations of local elites and their further strong orientation towards Russia as a new geopolitical center of power in the emerging multipolar world.

The effect of strategic catch-up can become an important factor in expanding the scale of the military-political dimension in the military aspect of Russia's interaction with the countries of the African continent in time and space, which, in turn, is highly likely to cause a domino effect associated with a multiple increase in the number of African countries interested in developing mutually beneficial cooperation with the Russian Federation.

It should be emphasized that Russia's multilateral military-political activities on the African continent have been deployed and are being carried out not in the interests of obtaining any unilateral benefits for themselves in geopolitical terms, which many in the West are striving for, but in order to establish mutually beneficial cooperation with the countries of the continent in all spheres, a fair settlement of existing conflicts, strengthening their state institutions and maintaining a high level of security. without which it is impossible to ensure sustainable development.

Summing up the consideration of the military-political dimension of the African continent in the context of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, the following main conclusions can be drawn.

First. At present, Russia is confidently regaining its positions in Africa, which were lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result, there is a strategic catch-up effect, which is the process of filling the gaps in Russia's interaction with African countries that occupy friendly positions towards the Russian Federation, in various spheres and formats in order to ensure further mutually beneficial cooperation.

Second. Russia has developed and is quite successfully implementing its own model for resolving the ongoing armed conflicts in Africa, which consists in the skillful use of the so-called smart power, which combines the components of "soft power" (creating an attractive image of the state, etc.) and "hard power".

Third. In order to develop further successful and fruitful cooperation between Russia and the countries of the African continent in the military/naval spheres, it is necessary to expand activities to conclude intergovernmental agreements/memoranda on multilateral cooperation, including in the naval field, international treaties on a simplified procedure for the entry of warships of the Russian Navy into the ports of interested African countries, and to strengthen comprehensive cooperation with the armed forces of friendly states on the continent, to step up efforts to train their military and law enforcement officers in various areas and specialties, including on countering new challenges and threats in their totality and interconnection.

Fourth. The prospects for mutually beneficial military-political cooperation between Russia and African countries largely depend on the timely disclosure of existing problems in this area, including those related to the unfriendly policy of Western countries, the development and purposeful implementation of optimal ways to solve them, which should become one of the priorities of the governments of the Russian Federation and interested African countries, as well as various scientific organizations specializing in data Issues. [Bolded Italics My Emphasis. All other emphasis original.]

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[1] Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (background information). Available at: http://files.school-collection.edu.ru/dlrstore/11ea82bb-e33e-47ed-966d-de02b146e5d8/OBSE/index.html#:~:text=-%20military-political%20dimension%20-%20agreement,i%20technics%20i%20environmental%20environment (accessed: 01.11.2023).

[2] The politico-military dimension of the OSCE. Available at: https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/international-organizations/osce/politisch-militaerische-dimension.html (accessed: 01.11.2023).

[3] Military-political dimension // Official website of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia. Astana. Available at: https://www.s-cica.org/ru/index.php?view=page&t=military-political-dimension (accessed: 01.11.2023).

[4] Trunov F. O. Military-political dimension of the modern crisis state of relations between the West and the Russian Federation. Available at: https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/voenno-politicheskoe-izmerenie-sovremennogo-krizisnogo-sostoyaniya-otnosheniy-zapada-i-rf (accessed: 01.11.2023).

[5] The Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Paragraph 57. 2023. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/49090 (accessed: 26.02.2024).

[6] National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation. Subparagraph 9 of paragraph 101. 2021. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/47046 (accessed: 01.05.2024).

[7] Photo by Alexei Danichev, RIA Novosti. Available at: https://russianembassyza.mid.ru/ru/press-centre/news/sammit_rossiya_afrika_/ (accessed: 15.06.2024).

[8] On the anniversary of the signing of the Political Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation between the Government of the Central African Republic and the main armed groups operating on the territory of this country // Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. 06.02.2020. URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1426327/ (accessed: 01.05.2024).

[9] El País: NATO is exploring the idea of creating training missions in the Middle East and North Africa // TASS. Available at: https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/20680157 (accessed: 01.05.2024).

[10] Filippov V.R. Politics of E. Macron in the African direction: assessments and forecasts // IMEMO RAS website. 2017. June 21. Available at: https://www.imemo.ru/special-rubrics/africa/text/politika-e-makrona-na-afrikanskom-napravlenii-otsenki-i-prognozi (accessed: 20.02.2024).

[11] Macron announced the end of the French military operation "Barkhane" in the Sahel // INTERFAX. November 9, 2022. Available at: https://www.interfax.ru/world/871747 (accessed: 25.02.2024).

[12] Dietrich T. En Centrafrique, un parfum de guerre froide. Available at: https://www.lopinion.fr/edition/international/en-centrafrique-parfum-guerre-froide-156731 (accessed: 24.02.2024).

[13] Bouessel Ch., Sari E. Pourquoi Vladimir Poutine avance ses pions en Centrafrique. Available at: https://www.nouvelobs.com/monde/20180504.OBS6191/pourquoi-vladimir-poutine-avance-ses-pions-en-centrafrique.html (accessed: 02.06.2024).

[14] The Prime Minister of Senegal criticized the French military bases on the territory of the country // African Initiative. 2023. 17 May 2024. Available at: https://afrinz.ru/2024/05/premer-senegala-raskritikoval-franczuzskie-voennye-bazy-na-territorii-strany/ (accessed: 02.06.2024).

^[15] Ibidem.

[16] Lagnamiliko C. Afrique: des militaries prennent le pouvoir // Le Renouveau-RCA. 5 septembre 2023.

[17] Proceedings of the XI Moscow Conference on International Security. August 15, 2023 // Website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Available at: https://mil.ru/files/МКМБ%202023%20доклады.pdf (accessed: 02.06.2024).

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ourdan R. Soldats, mercenaires et conseillers russes se multiplient dans la capitale centrafricaine. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/04/23/la-russie-installe-peu-a-peu-sa-presence-dans-la-capitale-centrafricaine_5289462_3212.html (accessed: 24.02.2024).

[20] Filippov V.R. The Central African Republic: Confrontation between the Kremlin and the Elysee Palace // Locus: People, Society, Cultures, Meanings. 2019. № 1. Pp. 124—142.

[21] Alexander Bikantov: Russia's partnership with the CAR in military-technical cooperation is actively developing // RIA NOVOSTI. 26.07.2023. URL: https://ria.ru/20230726/tsar-1886299501.html (accessed: 01.11.2023).

[22] Ibid.

[23] Kornilov V. The West Exposes the "Black Magic" of Russia // RIA NOVOSTI. 2023. July 31. Available at: https://ria.ru/20230731/sammit-1887234566.html?ysclid=lznp50bv71304796730 (accessed: 10.08.2024).

[24] The Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Paragraph 57.

[25] Mikhlin A.A., Molochny V.V. Prospects for the development of Russia's military cooperation with the countries of the African continent. 2020. № 3. Pp. 64, 65, 67.

For those who have closely followed the Russian-African Summits and other events that have occurred over the last five years, little of the above will be new. The key African problem besides impoverishment is the need to eradicate the Western supported terrorists so Africans can get on with the task of self-development, which begins with educational empowerment that Russia is very capable of providing. Combine that with establishing pan-African food security and there’s little Africans cannot do.

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