"On the Circumstances of the Division of Germany and Austria into Zones"--A Lavrov History Lesson

A primary document selection.

A special hat-tip to reader Natalya Volkova for alerting me about one week ago to this essay by Lavrov published in the Bulletin of the Security Council of the Russian Federation No3 (91) 2024 on 2 October 2024. I have many thanks to give to Natalya for her contributions and hope to be gifted with many more. This is a very long document that was likely stimulated by the issue of what/how to deal with or divide Ukraine when the SMO ends. As we know well, Europe wasn’t denazified at the end of WW2 as the Americans and British rescued Nazis and their ideology so it could be used again as we know witness. Now, here’s Foreign Minister Lavrov:

As the outstanding Russian historian V.O. Klyuchevsky wrote, "history is not a teacher, but an overseer... it does not teach anything, but only punishes for ignorance of lessons." In this regard, on the eve of the 80th anniversary of the Great Victory, I consider it useful to turn to the pages of the past, including in the context of modern international and foreign policy realities.

As is known, the question of the post-war structure of Europe, including the German question, was regularly discussed by the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition almost from the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Already on November 27, 1941, at a meeting with the Soviet ambassador in London, I.M. Maisky, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill openly admitted that the main blame for the aggressiveness of German militarism lay with Prussia and that "in the future, Bavaria, Austria, Württemberg, and so on should be liberated from Prussian domination"1. On December 5, 1941, during a regular contact with the ambassador, he clarified his thought: "... The main task is to eliminate the German danger once and for all. This requires the complete disarmament of Germany for at least a generation, the fragmentation of Germany into parts, above all the separation of Prussia from the rest of Germany.

The first detailed conversation with London on the future of Germany took place during the working visit of the British Foreign Secretary A. Eden to Moscow on December 15-20, 1941. It was also about signing a confidential protocol that would recognize the borders of the USSR in 1941 and propose to divide Germany into a number of independent states, separate East Prussia and its part. Stalin outlined his views on the "reorganization of the European borders after the war", specifying that it was absolutely necessary to weaken Germany, primarily by separating the Rhineland with its industrial area from the rest of Prussia. At the same time, Austria, in his opinion, should be restored as an independent state.

The British ruling circles were not sure that the Red Army would withstand the onslaught of Hitler's Wehrmacht, and even after the Battle of Moscow, they doubted the military potential of the USSR. Hence the frank reluctance to share plans and prospects for the future, especially from the point of view of the development of Europe in the post-war period. Therefore, the British representative was not ready for a substantive exchange of views in Moscow. He only stated that the British Government was in favor of the independence of Austria under all circumstances and was ready to consider the question of the independence of Bavaria and the Rhineland. At the same time, he admitted that even before the USSR was involved in the war, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill had already held consultations on the "post-war reconstruction of Europe."

Until 1943, the Anglo-Saxons did not want to recognize the USSR as an equal participant in the post-war settlement. The Allies' interest in the question of what to do with Germany after its defeat grew as the situation on the Soviet-German front changed.

The goals pursued by the USSR, the United States and Great Britain in the war were different. The anti-Hitler coalition arose and developed in connection with the need to ensure the defeat of the common enemy. However, there were significant contradictions within the coalition regarding the plans for the post-war world order.

In March 1943, this issue was raised at a meeting between Franklin Roosevelt and A. Eden. The Soviet ambassador to Washington, Mikhail Litvinov, who spoke with the Briton following his talks with the American president, concluded that London and Washington "have a complete convergence of views... regarding the disarmament of the Axis countries and the dismemberment of Germany ... It is proposed to restore Czechoslovakia to its former borders and to form a special Austrian state... Eden does not think that the question of our western border will meet with serious difficulties on the part of the United States, and believes that Poland will calm down after receiving East Prussia."3

The same idea was confirmed by I.M. Maisky, who met with A. Eden on April 7 and 12, 1943: "The best way... they consider the fragmentation of Germany into several states... at least three German states... Austria must form an independent state."4

After the Battle of Kursk, which ended with the defeat of the German fascist troops, the military situation of the Soviet Union was further strengthened. London and Washington began to understand the danger of ignoring the interests of the Soviet Union in resolving issues of common importance for the members of the anti-Hitler coalition.

In a detailed report "The Treatment of Germany and Other Enemy Countries in Europe" of October 9, 1943, prepared by M.M. Litvinov as Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, it was stated that "solidarity between the three governments... that all necessary measures will be taken to prevent the possibility of German aggression in the future." The thesis was recognized as indisputable by virtue of which "all the territorial gains of Germany since Hitler came to power, both in the course of the present war and in the pre-war period, should be considered as areas that do not belong to Germany." Outside its territory "both Austria and the Sudetenland, taken from Czechoslovakia, must remain." At the same time, attention was drawn to the presence of official British statements "both about the liberation of Austria from the yoke of Germany and about the restoration of the pre-Munich borders of Czechoslovakia ... The borders of Germany established by the Treaty of Versailles, and first of all the German-Polish border, may also be revised and changed."

As M.M. Litvinov noted, the British are in favor of including "East Prussia, Silesia and, needless to say, the Danzig Corridor in Poland. According to Eden, Roosevelt and his group were also in favor of the transfer of East Prussia to Poland in compensation for the establishment of Poland's eastern border along the so-called Curzon Line. No matter how the fate of East Prussia was decided... we will retain the right to demand the reunification of the Memel region with Lithuania, as well as the eastern region of East Prussia... along the line that will be prompted by our General Staff." The report went on to suggest that "first of all, care should be taken to the fragmentation of present-day Prussia, which, even if it had lost East Prussia, Silesia, and Schleswig, would have remained a powerful state dominating the whole of Germany."5 For all the nuances of further negotiations with the Allies, the Soviet government basically adhered to this scheme of post-war settlement of state borders in Eastern Europe.

During the Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain (October 19-30, 1943), US Secretary of State K. Hull spoke in favor of decentralizing the German political structure and encouraging movements aimed at this within the country, in particular, the movement "in favor of reducing the Prussian influence on the Reich." A. Eden outlined the intention of the British government to "divide Germany into separate states ... the separation of Prussia from the rest of Germany," adding that "the possibility of achieving these goals by force is not excluded." During the discussion, the Americans added that they were inclined to agree to the partition of Germany, but the study of this issue was not yet completed. For his part, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V.M. Molotov, stated that in view of the great preoccupation of the Soviet leaders with military problems, Moscow had not yet come to any definite opinion on this issue, continuing to study it thoroughly.

The participants of the conference approved the Declaration on Austria, in which it was stated that they wanted to restore its freedom and independence. According to the document, the seizure of the country by Germany in 1938 is considered non-existent and invalid. At the same time, it noted that Austria was responsible for participating in the war on the side of Nazi Germany and that "in the final settlement, her own contribution to the cause of her liberation will inevitably be taken into account."

The results of the Moscow Conference largely predetermined the course of the negotiations between the leaders of the "Big Three" in Tehran on November 28 – December 1, 1943. U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt outlined his own plan for the dismemberment of Germany into five independent states. In addition, he spoke in favor of separating from Germany the areas that would be controlled by the United Nations, the four victorious powers or European trustees.

Winston Churchill, in turn, proposed to isolate Prussia from the rest of Germany and cut off the southern provinces of Germany - Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, Palatinate (Palatinate) from the Saar to Saxony inclusive. In his opinion, Prussia should be kept "in harsh conditions," and the southern provinces of Germany should be torn away from Prussia and included in the Danube Confederation.

It is noteworthy that the British, nurturing plans to create Eastern European confederations as a "cordon sanitaire" and a counterbalance to the Soviet Union, in July 1943 distributed a document "The Future of Austria" among the Allies. It considered four "most likely solutions to the Austrian problem." The options were: (1) the unification of Austria with Germany, either as an integral part of the Reich or on a federal basis; (2) the incorporation of Austria into the South German Confederation; (3) the restoration of Austria as a free and independent state; 4) the inclusion of Austria in the confederation of Central or Eastern European countries.

The idea of forming a series of confederations of small powers in Europe, put forward by Winston Churchill, was not supported by the Americans. It did not meet with approval from the Soviet leadership either. Moscow understood that the main goal of these plans was the creation of anti-Soviet blocs. Accordingly, Stalin opposed the formation of such unviable associations, advocating that Austria and Hungary should be independent states.

It should be noted that from the very beginning of the negotiations between the Allied Powers regarding the post-war arrangement of the borders in Europe, the fate of East Prussia was constantly considered as part of the so-called Polish question. The Soviet government repeatedly pointed out that the desire of the Polish people for its full unification in a strong and independent state should be recognized and supported. It also believed that Poland's borders should be determined taking into account the security interests in Europe – from a source of conflicts and wars, they should turn into a factor of stability and lasting peace.

On December 1, 1943, at the Tehran Conference, Stalin explained that "the Ukrainian lands should go to Ukraine, and the Belarusian lands to Belarus." For the same reason, the Soviet Union considered it fair to return to Poland its ancestral territories in the west. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, for his part, made a proposal according to which "the center of the Polish state and people should be located between the so-called Curzon Line and the line of the Oder River, with the inclusion of East Prussia and the Oppeln Province in Poland."

In connection with the settlement of the Polish western border, Stalin recalled that the USSR did not have ice-free ports in the Baltic Sea, and in view of this, proposed to consider the question of transferring to the Soviet Union the ice-free ports of Königsberg and Memel with the adjacent part of the territory of East Prussia. At the same time, a compromise was proposed: if the British agreed to the transfer of this territory to the USSR, the Soviet government would accept the formula proposed by the British Prime Minister regarding the borders of Poland. During breakfast on November 30, 1943, Winston Churchill confirmed that "Russia needs to have access to ice-free ports" and "the British have no objections to this." Thus, in the preliminary plan, the decision to transfer Königsberg to the Soviet Union was agreed.

In 1944, the Red Army won a number of large-scale victories over Germany and its allies. The advance of the front line to the west and the growing power of the Soviet Union made the prospect of defeating Nazi Germany by the forces of the Red Army alone, without the help of the Allies, real. For this reason, in the period between the conferences in Tehran and Yalta, the Allies' views on the future of Germany changed significantly. The Westerners began to work not only to defeat Hitler, but also to contain the USSR.

From the telegram of the USSR Ambassador in Washington A.A. Gromyko dated October 6, 1944, it followed that at that time there was no consensus in the US State Department about post-war Germany. But U.S. diplomacy tended to preserve the country as Europe's leading industrial power to counter the rise of the Soviet Union.

By the time the Crimea Conference opened (February 4-11, 1945), Soviet troops were already sixty kilometers from Berlin. In Anglo-Saxon circles, plans began to be made to create a bloc of Western European states after the war, which was supposed to include Germany. Accordingly, the original Anglo-American projects of complete deindustrialization and division of the country lost their meaning for Western countries.

In Yalta on February 5, Stalin asked the Allies a direct question: do they intend to dismember Germany after its defeat? The Soviet leader recalled that the governments of the United States and Great Britain had twice voiced similar plans - in Tehran in 1943 and during the Soviet-British negotiations in Moscow in October 1944. As a result, the Soviet side supported the proposal of the Allies to introduce the phrase "The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will have supreme power in relation to Germany. In the exercise of this power, they will take such measures, including complete disarmament, demilitarization, and dismemberment of Germany, as they recognize as necessary for future peace and security."

At the same time, the delegations actually put an end to the discussion of the Polish question, indicating that "the whole of East Prussia should not be transferred to Poland. The northern part of this province with the ports of Memel and Königsberg should go to the USSR."7 Representatives of the USSR and the United States agreed to the provision of compensation to Poland at the expense of Germany, namely: part of East Prussia south of the Königsberg line, Upper Silesia up to the line of the Oder River. In the end, the conference decided that Poland's eastern frontier should follow the Curzon Line, and that in the north and west the Polish state would receive substantial increments, the amount of which "will be asked for the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity." It was decided to postpone the final determination of the western border of Poland until a peace conference.

The decisions taken in the Crimea on the Polish question and part of East Prussia were largely compromised. At the same time, they undoubtedly represented a diplomatic victory for the USSR and objectively met the interests of the Polish people. From the point of view of security, Poland received ideal borders. In addition, in exchange for the economically backward agricultural eastern regions, it was provided with developed industrial areas in the west and excellent ports on the Baltic coast.

It is important to understand that the declarations about the abstract plans for the fragmentation of Germany, which the Anglo-Saxons made during this period, were not sincere. By the time of the Crimea Conference, the West had already matured intentions to use the German state – in whatever form it was formed – in the interests of the post-war containment of the USSR. The Soviet leadership, in turn, understood this and drew the appropriate conclusions.

In the course of the work of the new commission on the future of Germany, formed in accordance with the decision of the Crimea Conference, Great Britain advocated the preparation of a project for joint actions of the Allies. The Soviet side sent a letter to A. Eden, who headed the commission, explaining that the USSR understood the decision of the Crimea Conference on the dismemberment of Germany not as a mandatory plan, but "as a possible prospect for putting pressure on Germany in order to protect it in the event that other means prove insufficient." For the orientation of the Soviet ambassador in London, F.T. Gusev, in a telegram from V.M. Molotov dated March 24, 1945, it was especially noted that "the British and Americans, who were the first to raise the question of the dismemberment of Germany, now want to shift the responsibility for the dismemberment onto the USSR in order to denigrate our state in the eyes of world public opinion. In order to deprive them of this opportunity, it is necessary to make the above-mentioned proposal."9 As a result, by a letter from the Soviet government, the question of the division of Germany was removed from the agenda of the commission.

The position of the USSR on this issue was also set forth in Stalin's Address to the People on May 9, 1945: "The Soviet Union is triumphing in victory, although it is not going to dismember or destroy Germany."

In the text of the Declaration on the Defeat of Germany, signed by the four commanders-in-chief in Berlin on June 5, 1945, there is also no mention of the possible partition of Germany, and in the Potsdam Agreement it refers to Germany as a single economic whole.

The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference (July 17 – August 2, 1945) was the last stage of joint actions of the heads of state of the anti-Hitler coalition. On the question of the western Polish borders, the Soviet delegation had to endure an extremely sharp struggle. Since the British and Americans failed to establish a government they wanted in Poland, they were not interested in strengthening it and transferring new lands to it. Nevertheless, the USSR successfully defended its position. In the Protocol of the Berlin Conference of the Three Great Powers of August 1, 1945 (as well as in the Report on the Berlin Conference of the Three Powers of August 2, 1945), in the section "The City of Königsberg and the Adjacent Area" it was recorded: "The Conference considered the proposal of the Soviet Government that, until the end of the solution of territorial issues in the course of a peaceful settlement, the part of the western border of the USSR adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Danzig bays to the east - north of Braunsberg - Goldap to the junction of the borders of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia.”

The Conference agreed in principle with the proposal of the Soviet Government to transfer to the Soviet Union the city of Königsberg and the surrounding area, as described above. However, the exact boundary is subject to expert research.

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain declared that they would support this proposal at the conference in the forthcoming peace settlement."11

In the same documents the following was stated: "The Heads of the Three Governments have agreed that, pending the final determination of the western frontier of Poland, the former German territories situated east of the line running from the Baltic Sea just west of Swinemünde and thence along the Oder River to the confluence with the West Neisse River and along the West Neisse River to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that part of East Prussia, which, in accordance with the decision of the Berlin Conference, was not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and including the territory of the former Free City of Danzig, should be under the administration of the Polish state and in this respect they should not be considered part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany."12

The main success of the Potsdam Conference was its resolutions on the German question – in fact, it was decided to consider the German state, taking into account the changed borders, as a single economic and political entity. However, serious disagreements have emerged with regard to the restoration of centralized control of the country.

Immediately after the end of the war, Germany was divided into four zones of occupation. In accordance with the Declaration on the Defeat of Germany, the supreme power in the country was temporarily assumed by the governments of Great Britain, the USSR, the United States and France, each acting in its own zone of occupation. Berlin was also divided into four sectors. The city was governed by the inter-Soviet four-way commandant's office. Moreover, at first, the United States, England and France recognized the supreme authority of the Soviet military administration in Germany over the German capital, which was considered the center of the Soviet zone of occupation.

The division of Germany into occupation zones did not yet fix the split of the country, but predetermined it. The mechanism of general management – the Allied Control Council – did not last long. Two centers of power were formed in the form of military administrations of the western occupation zones and, separately, the Soviet zone. The uncoordinated political, legal, economic, and social measures carried out by the Allied Powers in their zones actually led to the gradual formation of two opposing German state formations. In other words, the former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition actually finally abandoned plans to create a single German state in the foreseeable future.

In the West, the administrative apparatuses, which at first functioned separately, have essentially turned into a single structure. In the conditions of the Cold War, which began in the first post-war years, they sought to preserve the military-industrial potential of Germany. In violation of earlier agreements, Western countries did not dismantle military production in Germany and did not carry out demonopolization. Many military units were not disbanded and were retained as combat-ready army units.

Gradually, the zones of occupation of England, the United States and France united into a common territory, on which parliamentary elections were held on August 14, 1949, contrary to the agreements initially worked out by the Allies, and on September 20, 1949, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany was created.

The formation of the Federal Republic of Germany radically changed the situation. In response, on October 7, 1949, the German People's Council, with the consent of the Soviet authorities, proclaimed the creation of the German Democratic Republic and assumed the duties of parliament. Thus, in place of the defeated Nazi Germany, two German states were formed.

Berlin, divided into four sectors after the war, was divided into two parts. The American, British and French sectors formed an independent political unit – West Berlin, where the direct rule of the Western occupation authorities was legally preserved. The Soviet sector turned into the capital of the GDR. In Europe, a unique situation arose when the country was divided into two states that belonged to opposite socio-political systems.

The USSR reacted to American initiatives – the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan – with a desire to bind the Eastern European states more firmly to itself. International relations have finally entered the phase of the Cold War. Instead of becoming a bridge between East and West, Germany has become an arena for a global confrontation between the two systems.

The situation with Austria developed according to a different scenario. On April 9, 1945, the USSR, guided by the provisions of the above-mentioned Moscow Declaration of the Allies in the anti-Hitler coalition on the independence of Austria of October 30, 1943, issued a special statement. It stressed that "the Soviet government does not pursue the goal of acquiring any part of Austrian territory or changing the social system of Austria," and also spoke of its intention "to contribute to the liquidation of the regime of the German fascist occupiers and the restoration of democratic orders and institutions in Austria."13

The priority of Soviet policy towards Austria was its separation from Germany and the creation of reliable barriers to a new Anschluss in any form. In accordance with the agreement of July 4, 1945 between the governments of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain and the Provisional Government of France on the control mechanism of the Allies in Austria, the Allied Commission on Austria was established consisting of representatives of four states. The main tasks of the commission were to finally separate Austria from Germany, to ensure the creation of a central Austrian administrative apparatus and conditions for the free election of the Austrian government.

The agreement of July 9, 1945 on the zones of occupation in Austria and the administration of the city of Vienna provided that the country within the borders of 1937 was divided for the purposes of occupation into four zones, one of which was assigned to the USSR, the United States, Great Britain and the Provisional Government of France. Vienna was occupied jointly by the armed forces of the four powers, and the city was to be administered by the inter-allied commandant's office.

In the course of the Soviet-Austrian negotiations held in Moscow on April 12-15, 1955, the parties reached an agreement on the most important issues related to the draft of the State Treaty on the Restoration of an Independent and Democratic Austria. In the Moscow Memorandum, Austria declared its intention not to join any military alliances, not to allow the construction of military bases on its territory and to pursue an independent foreign policy. The Austrian side stressed that Vienna will make a corresponding statement of permanent neutrality in a form that imposes an international obligation on it.

In April-May 1955, the Soviet government took steps to coordinate the draft treaty with the Allies. As a result, the four powers agreed to delete the article on the numerical limitation of the Austrian armed forces. Some fundamental provisions previously disputed by Western participants (on the dissolution of Nazi organizations, on the property of the United Nations, etc.) were adopted in the form that the Soviet Union had long proposed. Vienna's request to delete from the preamble of the treaty the paragraph containing an explicit reference to Austria's responsibility for participation in the war was granted. The Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain and France did not object to Austria following the course of neutrality indicated in the Soviet-Austrian memorandum. On May 15, 1955, the State Treaty on the Restoration of an Independent and Democratic Austria was signed, which entered into force on July 27, 1955.

In accordance with the provisions of this treaty and the Soviet-Austrian agreement of April 15, 1955, the Soviet Union in August 1955 transferred to Austria more than 400 German enterprises in the eastern part of the country - factories, oil fields, shipyards, warehouses. By September 20, 1955, all Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Austria. The United States, Great Britain and France also withdrew their armed forces, ending the occupation of the country.

Austria, for its part, adopted a law on its permanent neutrality on October 26, 1955. On December 6, 1955, in response to Vienna's appeal, the governments of the USSR, the United States, Great Britain and France announced their recognition of its permanent neutrality in the form defined in the law. Thus, the process of restoring the sovereignty and independence of the Austrian state within the borders as of January 1, 1938 was completed.

The post-war settlement in Europe (and the resolution of the German and Austrian issues was a significant, if not a key part of it) became an example of successfully linking the interests of states on the basis of mutual respect and goodwill. Although not everything was achieved.

On January 25, 2023, at a meeting with students of higher educational institutions on the occasion of the Day of the Russian Student, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin noted that "the Soviet Union, and Russia, as the successor of the Soviet Union, acted as the guarantor of the Constitution of the Republic of Austria and the guarantor of the neutral status of the Republic of Austria." The head of state also recalled that the USSR "legally formalized the end of the occupation" of Germany: "After all, after World War II, Germany was, as you know, divided into four sectors: American, British, French and Soviet. So the Soviet Union formalized the termination of this occupation status, but the United States did not. Strictly speaking, formally and legally, there are American occupation troops on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. But in fact, it is: there are a lot of them there.

“And German politicians themselves say that after World War II, Germany has never been a sovereign state in the full sense of the word... They are talking about it directly, this is direct speech. Therefore, much of what is happening has such deep roots, certain foundations."

Modernity, of course, is rooted in the past, and what is happening in the world today always has its causes and historical foundations. Today, we have come to a point where the issue of reconstructing the world order and adapting it to multipolar geopolitical realities is once again on the agenda. It is therefore important to draw the right lessons, and the post-war settlement of the German and Austrian question undoubtedly provides rich factual material for this.

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1. Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Fund 048. Op. 11zh. p. 64. File 1. L. 20

2. Op. cit. From: Soviet-English Relations during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: Documents and Materials: in 2 vols. / Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. T. 1. 1941-1943. Moscow, Politizdat Publ., 1983. P. 182.

3. Op. cit. From: USSR and the German Question. 1941-1949: Documents from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation – Die UdSSR und Die Deutsche Frage, 1941-1949: Dokumente aus dem Archiv für Außenpolitik der Russischen Federation : in 2 vols. Vol. 1. 22 June 1941 – 8 May 1945 Moscow: International Relations, 1996. Pp. 198-199.

4. Ibid. P. 207.

5. Cited. From: USSR and the German Question. T. 1. Pp. 287, 292-293, 295, 299.

6. Op. cit. From: Soviet Union at International Conferences of the Period of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945: Coll. The Crimean Conference of the Leaders of the Three Allied Powers – the USSR, the USA and Great Britain (February 4-11, 1945). Moscow, Politizdat Publ., 1979. P. 277.

7. Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Fund 06. Op. 9. p. 43. File 640. L. 34

8. The Soviet Union at International Conferences... Vol. IV. The Crimean Conference... P. 280.

9. The USSR and the German question. T. 1. P. 626. The full title of the document is the Declaration on the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Power in Relation to Germany by the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the Provisional Government of the French Republic (editor's note).

10. The Soviet Union at International Conferences... Vol. VI. Berlin (Potsdam) Conference of the Leaders of the Three Allied Powers – the USSR, the USA, Great Britain (July 17 – August 2, 1945). Moscow, Politizdat Publ., 1980. P. 471.

11. The Soviet Union at International Conferences... Vol. VI. Berlin (Potsdam) Conference of the Leaders of the Three Allied Powers – the USSR, the USA, Great Britain (July 17 – August 2, 1945). Moscow, Politizdat Publ., 1980. P. 471.

12. The Soviet Union at International Conferences... Vol. VI. Berlin (Potsdam) Conference... With. 473.

13. The situation in Austria. Statement of the Soviet Government on Austria // International Documents of the Period of the Great Patriotic War. Vol. V. 1945 (January – September 3). Moscow, 1946. P. 117. [My Emphasis]

It must be noted that in May 1945, Churchill ordered the drawing of a plan called Operation Unthinkable whose aim was ‘to impose "the will of the United States and British Empire upon Russia".^[2] "The will" was qualified as "a square deal for Poland,"‘ according to UK National Archives that remained classified until 1998, but whose contents were disclosed to some extent by the spy Guy Burgess. That the plan was unthinkable because undoable is acknowledged, but it was only the first of many post-war plans to turn the Cold War Hot. Clearly during the course of the war, the US & UK had differing ideas about the end war that went from complete dismemberment of Germany to rearming it as an ally against the USSR. If Stalin had known what was in store for the future, would the Red Army have halted where it did or would General Paton have gotten his wish to fight the Russians? And if so, where would the Russians have stopped. If Russia had occupied all of Germany, would we have the same situation that we have now? And based on the above, who had the greater honor: Russia, UK or USA? Lastly, what lessons can be drawn for the SMO end game? IMO, Russia won’t allow any other entity to formulate the outcome.

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