Pavel Ilyichev's Interview with Rossiya Segodnya About DPRK Issues

Ilyichev is Director of Russian Foreign Ministry's Department of International Organizations

Hard to find a photo Pavel. Good to see that other MFA members are being interviewed by Russian media as they often have more specific details to offer as you’ll read in this interview done on 9 July with Rossiya Segodnya. I remain perplexed that Ryabkov’s interview hasn’t been published by MFA, but that wouldn’t be the first time.

After Putin’s Summit with Kim Jong-Il in Pyongyang, the questions of removing the UNSC sanctions regime has arisen anew that both Russia and China participated in to what IMO is now their regret as the Outlaw US Empire would have placed more of its own sanctions anyway. That rapprochement in Russia/DPRK relations is now happening is a good thing that I hope China will follow, although similar actions have yet to occur. I’m certain many readers will want to know what’s happening as do I, so this interview is most welcome. There’s some historical background provided by Pavel that was new for me:

Question: The Kremlin previously announced the need to revise the sanctions regime against the DPRK. Does Russia plan to raise this issue during its presidency of the UN Security Council? Are there any consultations between the UN Security Council members on this issue? Is it possible to reach a consensus, taking into account the fundamental differences between the members of the Security Council?

Answer: The need for radical changes in the approaches to the UN Security Council sanctions regime against the DPRK is long overdue. In principle, the Council's sanctions are not at all needed to punish states and "starve them out". They are designed to help achieve a political and diplomatic settlement. In Korean cases, the sanctions "medicine" has shown its complete unsuitability, and even with a bunch of poisonous side effects.

The situation around the Korean Peninsula has been brought to a dangerous impasse with an incessant escalation of tensions. The main responsibility for the current situation lies with the United States and its allies in the region, who are stubbornly following the path of confrontation and provoking Pyongyang. At the same time, they, in fact, put at their service the UN Security Council's sanctions restrictions as an "eternal" means of pressure on an opponent who does not submit to their will, strengthening them with illegal unilateral coercive measures. The "price of the issue" in the form of the life and health of ordinary Koreans, of course, does not bother them - in the worst traditions of colonial practices.

Such an unreasonable policy of the "collective West" can lead to serious consequences. We are not interested in the growing hotbed of tension on our Far Eastern borders. Therefore, we suggest that the parties break the "vicious circle" of mutual provocations and accusations, abandon the desire to resolve problems by force or threats, and start reaching agreements. And the easing of sanctions restrictions could be a catalyst for such processes. We will continue to try to convince the other members of the UN Security Council of this, and not only during Russia's presidency of the Security Council. We do not predict quick returns, but the international situation is a "queen" famous for its inconstancy, and what seemed unattainable yesterday is now perceived as a "window of opportunity".

Question: How exactly, in Moscow's opinion, should the sanctions regime against the DPRK be revised? Should sanctions be eased unilaterally or only if the DPRK first fulfills certain conditions? What conditions can we talk about?

Answer: Keeping the sanctions unchanged makes no sense, and this is obvious to all sensible politicians who are not blinded by ideological hatred of the DPRK state system. For so many years, these measures have not improved the security situation in the region at all. The details of such a revision should be worked out by the members of the UN Security Council. Within the framework of this process, it would become clear in which direction one could count on more promising progress. In our opinion, a number of economic measures could be canceled now. This would give an impetus to the development of the national economy of the DPRK, fill the country's external relations with new useful content, and improve the well-being of its citizens. Politically, the easing of sanctions shackles would help revive the atmosphere of trust, which had been undermined by a long period of ever-increasing pressure, and would give diplomacy a real chance. At the same time, putting forward new conditions will only alienate Pyongyang, which remembers well the dishonest play of the Americans "behind the fog" of words that are not backed up by clear guarantees.

Question: Will Russia continue to submit reports to the UN Security Council Committee 1718 on the implementation of its sanctions against the DPRK, despite the fact that Moscow previously opposed the extension of the mandate of the Committee's group of experts?

Answer: As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia takes a very serious and scrupulous approach to the work of this body responsible for maintaining peace and security. Nothing depends on the extension or non-renewal of the mandate of the group of experts in this regard. We will continue to do what we believe is in line with the tasks set by the UN Security Council on the Korean track. We are not interested in contributing in any way to the multiplication of existing challenges. We can only note with regret that not everyone is guided by the same logic.

Question: In Moscow's opinion, how did the termination of the work of the Sanctions Committee's group of experts affect its effectiveness?

Answer: The Panel of Experts was designed to assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate on the basis of the principles of objectivity and impartiality. Instead, it has become an obedient tool for realizing the anti-Pyongyang ambitions of the United States and its allies. The analysis of the reasons for the situation around the Korean Peninsula turned out to be very "lopsided" by experts. The topic of provocative military activity of the Americans in the region was completely taboo for them. They considered the problem of the negative humanitarian consequences of the sanctions tangentially, and these UN "experts" did not consider the illegal unilateral restrictive measures against the DPRK worthy of attention at all. They devoted all their energy to accusations against Pyongyang, as a rule, without bothering themselves with any evidence, but simply replacing it with information dictated from Washington. In this form, this sanctions team could no longer exist. Due to the "totality of merits" it was liquidated. We see the desire of some international players, who have lost their obedient puppet, to fill this "niche" bypassing the UN Security Council with their own funds, but from a legal point of view, these attempts are insignificant. At the same time, the Committee continues to function. The absence of a group of experts does not prevent it from dealing with the tasks prescribed by UN Security Council resolutions. The good thing is that its members will not be distracted by unnecessary scribbling, which with the same dubious success can be published after the already established authorship of "the United States and other concerned."

Question: What is the chance that the UN Security Council will still be able to reach a consensus on the adoption of a new resolution that would establish a chronological framework for the sanctions and at the same time resume the work of the group of experts of the Sanctions Committee? What concessions on the issue of establishing the duration of sanctions is Russia ready to make in order to reach a consensus in the Security Council?

Answer: We do not see the need to necessarily link the issues of establishing a timeline for sanctions and resuming the activities of the group of experts. They are not very comparable. The first is an element of the UN Security Council strategy, which can become a turning point in big politics in Korean affairs, and the expert mechanism is just one of the "cogs" in the implementation of this policy, and even then it is clearly of an auxiliary nature. At the same time, you are right: when there were discussions around the relevant draft resolution of the UN Security Council, we did talk about it, encouraging our colleagues to look for a compromise. We are ready to return to this conversation now if there is a common interest in mitigating changes in the sanctions parameters. However, this is apparently still a long way off. The leading Western countries, led by the United States, do not abandon the idea of taking revenge for their historic failure in the Korean direction. You can see that they sacrificed a group of experts in order not to change anything regarding the sanctions themselves. Nevertheless, we hope that the Council will eventually come to an understanding of the urgent need for a fundamental change in its approach to this problem.

Question: Will Russia seek to ensure that the UN OCHA [United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs] revises its Global Humanitarian Assistance Plan for this year and includes the DPRK in it due to the fact that the country is gradually opening its borders after the pandemic? How does Russia assess the prospects for the return of UN humanitarian agencies to the DPRK today?

Answer: The Global Survey, which you mentioned, is one of the most important tools for humanitarian planning and donor fund-raising. OCHA publishes it annually. The document is based on data on humanitarian needs in focus countries, which are collected by UN agencies working on the ground and working closely with national governments. This approach allows the UN to conduct the most complete assessment of the existing needs, as well as to form an appropriate appeal to donors and report to them on the expenditure of funds in the future. This is the key to the effectiveness of humanitarian efforts.

As you know, the UN country team, which includes humanitarian agencies, was forced to leave the DPRK in early 2021 due to pandemic restrictions on movement around the country imposed by Pyongyang and relocated to Bangkok. The new UN Resident Coordinator in the DPRK, Italian Joe Colombano, appointed with the consent of Pyongyang on March 1, and all members of the mentioned team (it includes representatives of WHO, WFP, UNDP, UNICEF, UNESCO, FAO and UNFPA) are still working "remotely" from Thailand.

Obviously, in such conditions, it is difficult for the UN to conduct a qualified assessment of the humanitarian needs of the DPRK and attract donors. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the humanitarian situation in the DPRK deserves the attention of the UN OCHA Global Review. We hope that all interested parties will take the necessary steps to this end. At the same time, we regularly draw attention to the humanitarian situation in this friendly country during relevant meetings of the UN Security Council.

We cannot fail to note the fact that humanitarian plans for the DPRK, despite their relative "inexpensiveness" compared to calculations for other countries, are chronically underfunded. In 2020, of the $107 million requested by the UN. Only 29.5% of the funds were raised.

By the way, an important factor in the weak effectiveness of the work of humanitarian organizations in the DPRK is the negative consequences of sanctions pressure on Pyongyang, primarily from the United States. The unilateral sanctions of Washington and its "satellites" that contradict the UN Charter, along with the declared but in fact ineffective humanitarian exemptions, actually nullify the efforts of humanitarian workers, significantly limiting their capabilities. At the same time, it is not in the tradition of UN agencies to openly criticise Western donors. Nevertheless, a clear position of the UN on this issue, in addition to demonstrating the true independence of its staff, would help to strengthen confidence in humanitarian workers.

In any case, the imperative of the work of the UN in any country should be not only to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to meet the urgent needs of those in need, but also to promote the sustainable development of the state with unconditional respect for its national priorities. [My Emphasis]

Yes, that’s what the UN should and was designed to do, but its efforts have never been able to be fully implemented and indeed have been impeded as a matter of Western policy.

As you read Putin’s visit to DPRK, Russia used an assortment of carrots which was hinted at during Kim’s visit to Russia the previous year. That DPRK has military products Russia might use in its SMO is hyped to no end by BigLie Media, but there’s zero evidence of such supplies being provided. And even if that were so, there’s nothing illegal about such trade.

From a practical perspective, the Outlaw US Empire will never allow any of the sanctions against DPRK to be lifted just as it’ll never lift its illegal Cuban embargo that’s universally condemned annually at the UNGA. And as a practical observation, global relations will never become harmonious until the Outlaw US Empire dies, which doesn’t require the end of the USA.

Overtime, I would expect the DPRK to loss its very outward martial nature provided similar steps were taken by RoK. Another required step are negotiations to end the state of hostilities that can lead to the demilitarization of the Korea that I’m certain the Outlaw US Empire will do its utmost to nix. So, IMO, the best course of action for DPRK is to mitigate its militarism and devote more resources to developing its people who will then further promote the strength of the nation. Yeah, sounds simple, but I suspect there’s a caste within the DPRK’s governing party that will resist that too.

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