Russia Officially Recognizes Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

A Major Eurasian Geopolitical Move

Two recent articles published on 8 & 9 July by RT, one setting the stage and the other opening the curtain on a new drama, provide some critical information about this move on the chessboard by Russia to better secure the Arc of Instability to its South. I suspect Russia’s move was discussed with its EAEU, BRICS and SCO partners over the last two weeks, and will be discussed further at the upcoming East Asia and Russia-ASEAN Summits. We see that NATO’s efforts along the Arc continue with what’s happening in Armenia and the attempts to regime change Iran—their efforts won’t stop until they’re made to stop. IMO, this move is also associated with Russia’s escalation in Ukraine. The Outlaw US Empire is weak and clearly indecisive, while the EU is in a similar state.

The first article was published on 8 July and was composed by political analyst Farhad Ibragimov who currently teaches at the Faculty of Economics at Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN). It appears his op/ed was written specifically for RT and is entitled “Russia took Afghanistan without firing a shot: In the post-American vacuum, Moscow doesn’t waste time.” The second article published today, 9 July, is by Valdai Club Program Director Timofey Bordachev, in what also appears to be an RT commissioned op/ed entitled “Russia seizes the initiative in Central Asia with bold Afghan move: By recognizing Afghanistan, Moscow confirms its central role in Eurasia.” I’ll reproduce the articles in chronological order:

When Russia recognized the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan last week, it didn’t just open a new embassy–-it opened a new geopolitical front. For the first time since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, a major world player has gone beyond informal contacts and embraced Kabul’s de facto rulers as legitimate partners.

On July 1, Taliban envoy Gul Hassan presented copies of his credentials to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko. Two days later, Moscow made it official: the Islamic Emirate was now recognized: diplomatically, politically, and symbolically.

The move followed a crucial domestic decision in April, when Russia removed the Taliban from its national list of terrorist organizations, a status that had persisted for more than twenty years. The Foreign Ministry framed the recognition as a pragmatic step toward security cooperation, economic dialogue, and regional stabilization.

In Kabul, the reaction was swift. The Taliban welcomed the Russian gesture as a possible catalyst for wider international engagement. They had reason to; despite harsh rhetoric, even the West has kept indirect channels open. But no one had dared take the leap. Until now.

This isn’t Russia’s first chapter in Afghan affairs. Back in 2021, it kept its embassy running while Western diplomats fled. And long before that, in 1989, Soviet troops withdrew from a decade-long war against the mujahideen, many of whom would go on to form the core of the modern Taliban. In that light, Moscow’s latest decision seems less like a departure and more like continuity by other means.

Security through realism

For Moscow, recognition is not just about diplomacy; it’s about security. With formal ties in place, Russia now has a channel for demanding real cooperation from the Taliban on issues that matter most: containing radical groups and protecting Central Asia’s fragile stability.

The urgency is not theoretical. In March 2024, a deadly terrorist attack on Crocus City Hall shook the Russian capital. According to official reports, the perpetrators were linked to Khurasan Wilayah–-a branch of ISIS that considers the Taliban too moderate and Russia an enemy [but was financed by Ukraine and probably orchestrated by MI6].

This incident shifted the calculus in the Kremlin. If the Taliban control the ground, then working with them–-however distasteful to some–-becomes a strategic necessity. In 2024, Vladimir Putin publicly referred to the Taliban as a partner in the fight against terrorism–-a signal that Moscow views them not as a problem, but as part of the solution.

Recognition is a way to formalize that logic–-to move from ad-hoc contacts to structured expectations. Russia is not simply offering legitimacy; it is also asking for responsibility.

Trade follows diplomacy

With recognition comes access, and Afghanistan has plenty to offer. Rich in lithium, rare earth elements, and untapped mineral wealth, the country has become a target for global economic interests. Now that formal ties are in place, Russian companies can enter the market with legal cover and diplomatic support.

But this isn’t just about minerals. It’s also about momentum. Russian exports are already flowing into Afghan markets, while Afghan agricultural products–-from dried fruits to herbs–-are showing up on store shelves in Russian regions. According to the Financial Times, Moscow is quietly building a trade corridor while others hesitate.

Geography does the rest. Afghanistan sits at a crossroads, a land bridge between Central and South Asia, offering future access to Pakistan, India, and the Indian Ocean. For Russia, this is about more than strategy. It’s about logistics. In an era of sanctions and shifting trade routes, every new corridor matters.

Recognition is Moscow’s ticket in, and it wants to be first at the table.

While the West hesitates, Russia builds

In Washington and Brussels, Afghanistan is still viewed through the lens of defeat–-a retreat, a failure, and a lingering embarrassment. Officially, the Taliban remain pariahs. Unofficially, backchannels are open. Diplomats talk, intelligence agencies coordinate. But no Western country has dared take the next step.

Russia just did.

Could this provoke new sanctions from the US or EU? Perhaps. But with Russia already under one of the harshest sanction regimes in modern history, the cost of further penalties is marginal. The ceiling has already been reached.

Instead, recognition gives Moscow first-mover advantage, both in Kabul and across the region. While others worry about headlines, Russia is shaping realities on the ground. It is doing so not just with gas and guns, but with memory: in Central Asia, Russia still carries weight as a former security guarantor and post-Soviet stabilizer. That credibility now returns to the table.

From war broker to regional architect

Russia has done this before. In 1997, it helped end a brutal civil war in Tajikistan by brokering a deal between warring factions. Those efforts are still remembered in Dushanbe, and they echo today.

Tensions between the Taliban and Tajik authorities remain high. But Russia, trusted by both sides and embedded in regional security structures, is uniquely positioned to mediate. The same applies to Afghanistan’s rocky relations with Turkmenistan, where border disputes and political distrust linger.

This is where recognition becomes more than a headline–-it becomes leverage. Moscow can now convene, propose, and shape talks that others can’t. While Western powers watch from afar, Russia is turning Afghanistan from a global problem into a regional process.

The ultimate play? Energy. With its early commercial footprint in Kabul and longstanding vision of an Eurasian energy corridor, Moscow sees Afghanistan not just as a risk to manage but as a bridge to build. [My Emphasis]

Russia is also aware of who made Afghanistan into “a global problem” that it had never been before. I’d expect China to soon follow Russia with recognition as it stands to benefit just as much from this move. Afghanistan has also been an observer member in several regional multilateral organizations and is thus already involved in regional activities. Outside of the scope of this article but also important is the changing attitude and geopolitical situation of Saudi Arabia regarding Iran and the greater Islamic world as Malaysia and Indonesia attain greater standing. IMO, The Taliban’s extremist form of Islam will moderate as it integrates with the region and wider Islamic world. Now for the next article which looks into the recognition’s wider geopolitical implications:

Russia’s recent decision to officially recognize the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan marks a pivotal moment in regional diplomacy. It not only breaks the diplomatic blockade imposed on Kabul, but also underscores Moscow’s ability to act independently and shape the rules of the geopolitical game. This is a major victory for Russian diplomacy in our strategic contest with the West.

Much is often made of a state’s economic or military strength, but global standing ultimately depends on a nation’s ability to influence international norms and set the agenda. Russia’s move to recognize the Taliban government is a prime example of such influence in action. It reaffirms our role as a central guarantor of Eurasian security and shows our willingness to act in our national interest regardless of Western pressure.

This recognition comes at a critical time. Afghanistan has spent the past four years in a state of political limbo. While few doubt the Taliban’s control over the country, the international community, still shackled to a Western-dominated order, has refused to acknowledge Kabul’s new reality. Yet for the first time in decades, the country has experienced relative peace.

The Western powers, for whom Afghanistan is a geopolitical theatre far from home, have viewed it not as a security concern but as a means of meddling near the borders of Russia, China, and India. Their interest has never been in promoting genuine stability. The United States, in particular, has sought to prevent the international recognition of the Taliban government while simultaneously engaging it when convenient. This classic Anglo-American playbook–-divide and manipulate-–was once used on continental Europe and is now deployed across Eurasia.

Russia’s decision breaks this game. It shows we can act unilaterally to reset the regional status quo, forcing others to rethink their strategies. It also opens the door to political and economic gains–-increased trade, closer ties with Central Asian allies, and a stronger regional role. But the most important dividend is geopolitical.

The US strategy has been clear: block Kabul’s reintegration into the international system. Washington has used issues like women’s rights and minority protections as pretexts to justify non-recognition, even while maintaining back-channel contacts with the Taliban. It has also ensured that Afghan representatives at the UN continued to reflect the interests of the old US-backed regime–-officials who, ironically, have voted for every anti-Russian resolution in the General Assembly since 2022.

That era is ending. Russia’s recognition is likely to be followed by that of other powers. The diplomatic siege of Kabul is broken, and Washington will be forced to recalibrate. For countries in Central Asia, long wary of engaging openly with Afghanistan due to a potential Western backlash, Moscow’s move offers political cover and encouragement. The long-discussed trans-Afghan railway project, for instance, proposed by Uzbekistan five years ago, now stands a real chance of materializing. It would transform regional trade and connect Central Asia to the Indian Ocean.

China, already active in Afghanistan, may also feel more confident in deepening ties with Kabul. Other regional players will likely follow suit. In doing so, they will bolster the region’s economic and security architecture, one increasingly defined by Eurasian interests rather than Atlanticist interference.

There are risks, of course. The least likely, but most dangerous, scenario would see opponents of Eurasian stability attempting to destabilize Afghanistan by funding anti-Taliban factions. But Russia’s move aims to pre-empt precisely such outcomes. By bringing Kabul into the diplomatic fold, we reduce the chances of external meddling.

It is worth stressing: for Russia, this decision is not about endorsing a specific political model. It is about recognizing geopolitical realities and acting in our own interest. The Taliban controls Afghanistan. Ignoring that fact serves no one’s security.

Looking ahead, the best-case scenario is that Russia’s recognition catalyzes broader international acceptance, paving the way for investment, infrastructure, and an improved standard of living in Afghanistan. The country would retain its political structure–-shaped by decades of conflict and foreign intervention–-but gain the tools to function as a stable, integrated member of the Eurasian order.

Washington may continue to pressure others to maintain the isolation of Kabul, but that pressure will now face real resistance. The balance is shifting. The longer the West clings to a failed strategy, the more it isolates itself from the emerging Eurasian reality.

In conclusion, Russia has made a bold move. It is not just about Afghanistan–-it is about asserting a world order that reflects multipolarity and respect for sovereign choices. Our friends in Central Asia, and eventually others across the Global South, will follow this lead. The age of Western vetoes over Eurasian affairs is coming to a close. With this recognition, Russia reaffirms its place not just as a regional power, but as a central architect of the post-Western world. [My Emphasis]

The map shows the geography but not the topography of the region which is very rugged as most readers are generally aware. The topography has dictated the fact of very poor agricultural opportunities for the entire region that’s often been the basis for conflict. The crazy jigsaw puzzle mapmaking by the Soviets made matters worse. The Russian Empire only managed to fully establish control over Central Asia just prior to 1914, a process that took over 200 years. If any lands of Russia could be considered colonies, the Stans would be them. Their histories are as fascinating as the spectacular beauty of their topography and they put up a valiant resistance to Russian encroachment.

The post-Soviet years proved very difficult but beginning roughly after the Sochi Olympics and during Putin’s term as Prime Minister, the economic relationship between what was the core and periphery began to change as new organizations were established to facilitate economic growth for the Stans’s benefits, not for the core as had been the case since Russia established its control. Political changes have also helped as the monolithic remnants of the Communist Party died off and were replaced by a new generation of more republican minded people. Much work remains, while it must be noted that Western sanctions on Russia have greatly aided the Stans. The same economic dynamic has the potential to aid Afghanistan where attaining food security is the #1 priority. Recognition should also bring help from the Islamic world in the educational realm for the Afghans need skilled workers and their own engineers to man the wave of development that will come. And with Afghans busy improving their nation, fewer will be enticed to become extremists.

I don’t expect much in the way of Russian investment flows since much is already dedicated to Russia and its established economic partners; however, much ought to flow in from China and the Gulf Cooperation Council, and perhaps some from ASEAN Islamic members Malaysia and Indonesia. Iran will also add some. The Afghan topography will slow development, but if food security can become reality, then that won’t matter as much as in years past. I don’t know the status of poppy cultivation, although I know its elimination was tied to the need to establish food security. Connecting the Stans economically will benefit them all and make the region better able to resist Western machinations.

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