Ryabkov's TASS Interview

The transcript is dated today, 9 June but the interview took place on the 6th. I tried to find the entire interview at TASS, but it wasn’t fully published, which was very annoying given the importance of Ryabkov’s words. So, lets jump on them:

Question: I cannot help but ask about Ukraine's attack on Russian airfields. Kyiv began to declare that a huge number of aircraft were allegedly destroyed.

Ryabkov: We must follow the data and information that was disseminated through the channels of our Defence Ministry. And there is nothing close to this.

Question: Can this attack affect the strategic balance, specifically with regard to parity with the United States in strategic aviation?

Ryabkov: The equipment in question, as also stated by representatives of the Defence Ministry, was not destroyed, but damaged. It will be restored. Draw your own conclusions from this. Plus, the nomenclature that we are talking about now is not necessarily fully covered by certain agreements. As for the New START (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty), as you know, we have suspended it.

Question: Have you discussed this issue with the United States?

Ryabkov: We have asked the Americans relevant questions. In general, we can say that they boil down to why there is no reaction. If you imagine the consequences of encroachments on such objects, why do you remain silent and why do you allow yourself to provide criminals with relevant data, without which nothing like this could happen.

Question: Since Russia updated its nuclear doctrine, Russian territory has been subjected to record-breaking drone attacks, and there have been statements by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz that there are no longer any restrictions on the range of weapons transferred to Kiev. Is there a feeling that European capitals are directly trying to provoke the Russian Federation into some kind of severe reaction? Does Washington see this and is it trying to influence its allies in any way?

Ryabkov: A number of leading European states are gradually turning into the main obstacle to peace. The EU and NATO leaders are tirelessly inciting Kiev to continue hostilities, pumping it with weapons, equipment and promises of more, developing and undertaking various sabotage and provocations, and planting information designed to disrupt the negotiation process. At the same time, Brussels "strategists" are not abandoning their attempts to convince US President Donald Trump to return to the policy pursued by his predecessor Joe Biden. And that policy implied unconditional support for Ukraine and further escalation. It is through this prism that we perceive the statements and actions of the German Chancellor, including the words about lifting restrictions on missile strikes by the Armed Forces of Ukraine against Russia.

This is one of the actions deliberately directed against the aspirations of those who are looking for a political settlement. Everyone is well aware of our principled position on the decision taken in November 2024 by the United States and a number of Western countries to give Kiev permission to use their long-range systems for strikes deep into Russian territory. We have repeatedly emphasised that the use of such weapons is impossible without the direct participation of military specialists from the countries that produce these systems. I am referring to the receipt of satellite reconnaissance and surveillance data, the introduction of flight tasks, and so on. In November last year, President of Russia Vladimir Putin clearly indicated that the targets for destruction during further tests of our latest missile systems will be determined based on threats to the security of the Russian Federation.

Question: Donald Trump is making an emotional swing when he talks about the prospects for a peaceful settlement around Ukraine. Just now, he positively assessed the results of the second Istanbul meeting. Prior to that, the American president threatened to distance himself from the settlement process altogether if he did not see any progress on this track until a certain time and also threatened Russia with heavy sanctions in this case. Will such a scenario generally close the opportunities for normalizing relations with the United States, or will everything depend on the scale of support for Ukraine?

Ryabkov: The return to the White House of Donald Trump, who declares his commitment to a political and diplomatic settlement of the Ukrainian crisis, has given rise to cautious optimism in terms of potential normalisation of relations with the United States, but also in a broader sense. It was in this vein that the presidents of Russia and the United States held four telephone conversations. On our part, gratitude was expressed for the support of the United States in resuming direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, interrupted by the Ukrainian side in 2022. But President of Russia Vladimir Putin also reaffirmed the basic premise that it is necessary to eliminate the root causes of the conflict as part of political and diplomatic efforts. Otherwise, long-term peace will not be ensured, and in concrete terms, it is necessary to exclude any opportunity for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to take advantage of the pause for a respite and regrouping of forces. The principled position that was voiced by the President of Russia at a meeting with the leadership of the Foreign Ministry almost a year ago is well known in Washington, and it cannot be changed by threats of sanctions. The previous US administration had the opportunity to make sure of this.

It is strange that hotheads in the US Senate, who have lost the remnants of common sense, do not reckon with this reality. We are open to honest negotiations based on taking into account Russia's interests and mutual respect, but we do not flatter ourselves. We will continue our efforts to achieve the goals of the special military operation. Thus, the decision and choice is up to Washington, to Donald Trump.

Question: Let's move on to the topic of arms control and the prospects for resuming dialogue with the United States on this issue. We said that this requires a change in Washington's position on Ukraine. Has such a moment come? Have there been any prerequisites for resuming the dialogue?

Ryabkov: To begin with, I would like to give an explanation of our position. It is not so, let's say, monosyllabic, as it follows from your question.

In order to resume a full-scale and constructive strategic dialogue with the United States, including arms control issues, a reliable general political or, rather, military-political foundation is required, primarily in the form of a stable normalisation of our bilateral relations.

In turn, the main and non-alternative element of such normalisation should be Washington's readiness to show respect for Russia's fundamental interests. Given the nature and genesis of the Ukrainian crisis, provoked by the previous US authorities and the West as a whole, this conflict naturally acts as a test, a test that tests Washington's seriousness about improving our relations. The American side requires practical steps aimed at eliminating the root causes of fundamental contradictions between us in the field of security. Among these reasons is the expansion of NATO. Without resolving this fundamental and most acute problem for us, it is simply impossible to settle the current conflict in the Euro-Atlantic area.

It seems that Washington is still aware of the multi-layered nature of the current situation and therefore is in no hurry to put forward hasty initiatives on arms control. In any case, we have not received any specifics on this matter from the American side.

Question: Now to the topic of the Golden Dome. It seems that Donald Trump is returning the United States to the era of Ronald Reagan with Star Wars and the new Strategic Defence Initiative. Shortly before that, the United States tried to accuse the Russian Federation of militarizing space. Now the plans to create a "Golden Dome" absolutely clearly indicate that the United States itself is going to do this. Can we say that an arms race is now inevitable in outer space, and does the Russian Federation have the appropriate counter-space capabilities to neutralize this threat?

Ryabkov: The steps taken by the Trump administration to develop the US Golden Dome for America missile defence system, which provides for a significant strengthening of the arsenal of means for conducting combat operations in outer space, including the deployment of interception systems in orbit, are a direct path not only to the militarisation of outer space, but also to its transformation into an arena of armed confrontation.

Such actions by the United States provoke an escalation of tensions and an arms race in outer space, exacerbate mutual distrust and create serious obstacles to cooperation between states in the peaceful use of outer space. All this is fraught with the most serious negative consequences for international security.

In order to counter Washington's steps to deploy weapons in outer space, together with like-minded countries, we are making efforts aimed at the early start of negotiations on the development of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, abbreviated as PAROS, prohibiting the deployment of any type of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against or with the help of outer space objects. We consider as its basis the Russian-Chinese draft treaty on this matter submitted to the Conference on Disarmament, as well as the substantive report of the Group of Governmental Experts on PAROS that functioned in 2023-2024, which was approved by consensus. In this regard, we assign an important role to the international initiative launched by Russia to ensure that UN member states adopt political commitments not to be the first to deploy weapons in outer space, which has already been joined by 37 countries.

Question: A follow-up question. Moscow says the Golden Dome blurs the line between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons. Does this make it pointless to return to the New START Treaty or at least to its relative similarity? What will the world come to if the Russian Federation and the United States do not work out a document to replace the New START Treaty by the end of the year?

At the same time, Presidential Aide Yury Ushakov said that Russia and the United States had recently discussed the New START issue. What was the conversation about? Did the parties simply record the divergence of positions? And is there any prospect of continuing contacts on this topic?

Ryabkov: There are no grounds for a full-scale resumption of the New START Treaty in the current circumstances. And given the fact that the treaty completes its life cycle in about eight months, the talk about the realism of such a scenario is increasingly losing its meaning.

We have repeatedly voiced a set of necessary prerequisites for restarting the New START Treaty. As an obstacle on this path, it is enough to mention once again the Russian-US relations that are simply in ruins, the need for a sustainable improvement of which we have already discussed today. There are other problems as well. In general, the United States will need to return to the practical application of the principles on which the treaty is based and which are reflected in its preamble in one form or another. First of all, I mean the principles of indivisible security, equal and mutually beneficial interaction, as well as the readiness to take into account the inextricable link between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons.

The last of these elements, namely the relationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive ones, is directly related to the aforementioned Golden Dome for America project. Its conceptual basis and its ideology, as they say now, in fact completely negates the interdependence of strategic offensive arms and missile defence that I emphasized. Of course, deeply destabilizing programmes like the Golden Dome, and the United States is implementing a number of them, create additional insurmountable obstacles to the constructive consideration of any potential initiatives in the field of nuclear missile control, when and if it comes to it. And this is not just our opinion. In particular, this is stated in the joint Russian-Chinese statement on global strategic stability of May 8.

As for what the world will be like without the New START Treaty and what are the real prospects for launching talks to develop an agreement to replace it, I would not like to speculate at this stage. The approaches of the Russian side in this regard will, if necessary, be nuanced by the decision of the country's leadership and on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the evolving situation in the field of international security and strategic stability.

Question: Under the previous administration, the United States deployed Typhon systems on the island of Bornholm, the Philippines and Guam. Plans were announced to deploy intermediate-range missiles in Germany from 2026. Is this course maintained under Donald Trump, or has Washington moved away from the dangerous line in this matter? Is the Russian Federation's moratorium on the deployment of intermediate-range missiles still in effect?

Ryabkov: At the moment, we do not see any fundamental changes, let alone U-turns, in US plans for the further forward deployment of ground-based intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in various regions of the world. On the contrary, the practical steps taken by the US military to implement the relevant programme convince us that such activities will only increase. Our own position on this matter has been voiced repeatedly and in all the necessary details. The reality is that Russia's restraint in the post-INF Treaty has not been appreciated by the United States and its allies and has not been reciprocated. As a result, we have clearly and openly stated that our implementation of the previously imposed unilateral moratorium on the deployment of ground-based intermediate-range missiles is approaching its logical conclusion. Our country is forced to respond to the emergence of new and very sensitive missile threats. Decisions on the specific parameters of such a response are up to our military and, of course, the leadership of the Russian Federation.

Question: Now to the bilateral dialogue with the United States on mutual irritants. How is it going now? Is there a clear time frame when the number of diplomatic missions will be restored and consular services will be provided to Russians at the US embassy? Is there a plan for the next round of talks on this topic?

Ryabkov: In accordance with the instructions of our presidents to normalise the activities of the diplomatic missions of Russia and the United States, two rounds of bilateral expert consultations were held to eliminate irritants in order to improve the conditions for the functioning of the diplomatic missions of both countries. In practical terms, we managed to coordinate and exchange notes on unhindered financing and guaranteed transfers of funds denominated in US dollars for the diplomatic missions of the two countries. There has been some progress in visa processing, which in the previous conditions sometimes lasted up to one and a half to two years.

At the same time, there are a number of long-standing problems where no noticeable progress has yet been achieved. For example, it is difficult to talk about easing the notification regime for employees of Russian foreign missions to travel outside the permitted 25-mile zone around the location of a diplomatic or consular mission. The Americans initially opposed the discussion of the issue of returning illegally confiscated Russian diplomatic property, but as a result of the painstaking work of our negotiators, they agreed to think about a roadmap on this issue.

To put it mildly, the Russian proposal to resume direct flights between our countries is not yet enthusiastic, but we do not abandon our efforts to involve the American side in a substantive dialogue on this issue as well. So there are a lot of worries about clearing the accumulated rubble. The timing of the next round of consultations on irritants is still being discussed.

Question: Relations between the United States and the EU are in the process of being reformatted. Reportedly, the Pentagon is allegedly considering the possibility of withdrawing up to 10,000 troops from Eastern Europe. What is Moscow's attitude to this? Is there any reason to think that the United States will really reduce its presence in the region? How will this affect security in Europe?

Ryabkov: Time will tell what the United States and the European Union will eventually agree on. The Brussels group of leaders and functionaries of the supranational structures of the European Union, who set the tone, is imbued with an ideology hostile to Russia. And it is not my business to understand the nuances of the approaches of certain participants in these discussions. But I would like to remind you that the proposals we addressed to Washington and Brussels in December 2021 included the imperative of legal, legally binding and long-term guarantees of the non-expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance to the east, as well as the requirement not to deploy strike weapons near the Russian borders. There were other components as well. I am just saying that our position in this regard is unchanged. In any case, the reduction of the NATO contingent in Eastern Europe would probably benefit the security of the entire continent.

Question: How do you assess the likelihood of a new deal between Iran and the United States? Despite the intensity of contacts, the positions of the parties so far seem incompatible. Do we discuss this story with both sides? Do they plan to ask us for help in negotiations?

There was information in the media that Israel, against the will of the United States, was still considering the possibility, and very seriously, of striking at Iran's nuclear infrastructure. Are we warning the Israeli side about the consequences of such a step?

Ryabkov: Of course, we are closely following indirect contacts between Iranian and American representatives. The very fact of such contacts is a serious shift in the general context of the rather tense events around the Iranian nuclear program in recent years. The previous US administration entered the White House under a promise to "return America to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)." Unfortunately, as it happened on other occasions, she did not keep her word.

Today, we note Washington's much more serious focus on concluding an agreement with Tehran on mutually acceptable terms that would make it possible to avoid a crisis by eliminating suspicions and prejudices regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the Islamic Republic of Iran. As far as we can judge, the parties continue to move along the path of dialogue. Of course, as in any talks, especially such complex ones, there are pitfalls and sharp corners. However, judging by the statements from Tehran and Washington, there is still a possibility of achieving the desired result. Let's see how the discussion of the ideas put forward by the parties will proceed. We are not weakening our efforts aimed at facilitating an energetic search for the necessary negotiation solutions. I think they are quite achievable with due reliance on international law, the principle of equal and indivisible security, as well as with a carefully calibrated balance of interests and step-by-step movement that makes it possible to strengthen and build trust through compliance with the agreements reached. I would like to believe that the United States, as well as Iran, is fully aware of this.

We firmly believe that a long-term settlement can be achieved through purely political and diplomatic means. Contrary to Western speculations, the Iranian nuclear programme has been and remains under the close control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Even according to statistics, Iran is the most inspected state among all members of the Agency. The same cannot be said about the non-nuclear states within the meaning of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which have a much more developed nuclear fuel cycle. At the same time, the Iranian side cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the subversive course and gross violations of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 by the United States and European countries, which led to a reduction in the scope of the Agency's verification activities in Iran in terms of voluntary transparency measures provided for by the JCPOA.

We categorically reject any options in line with military strikes on Iran's nuclear infrastructure. This would inevitably lead to irreversible consequences, including humanitarian and radiological ones. It is necessary to do everything possible to prevent such an escalation, which will in no way bring us closer to a denouement. In 2015, when the JCPOA was signed, the international community categorically rejected the path of war. And in the current conditions, the only true option is to make the most of the resources of diplomacy without hinting at the possibility of military solutions.

Question: Finally, the final question: when can we expect new contacts between Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and US Secretary of State Mark Rubio, I mean in person? Is it possible to organise a meeting as soon as the parameters of the Ukrainian settlement are agreed?

Ryabkov: The foreign ministers are in constant contact. They have already held seven telephone conversations and had a face-to-face conversation in Riyadh in February. Of course, what is happening with regard to Ukraine and the search for a settlement leaves its mark on our bilateral agenda at virtually all levels. We are interested in maintaining a stable line of communication on all issues on the bilateral agenda. As we understand it, Washington does not deny the need for this either. As for your question about a new face-to-face meeting, this will be determined by the decisions of the presidents, and, of course, by the specifics and acuteness of the topics discussed. [My Emphasis]

The fact that Russia’s diplomatic properties still haven’t been returned and its diplomatic abilities within the Outlaw US Empire remain grossly restricted flies in the face of the posture Trump announced during his presidential campaign and reflect his lack of control over basic policy matters. Furthermore, there appears to be zero sense of urgency to resolve this clearing of the “rubble” impeding the basic development of trust within Russian-American relations. And as Ryabkov noted in several of his replies, trust is a very important ingredient in dialog and arriving at any type of agreement. IMO, his characterization of US Senators is correct, but he needs to expand that to most of the US Congress. Given the fact that the Outlaw US Empire has repeatedly failed to obey the treaties it signs, I would expect a sense of futility to be present within Russia’s leadership, particularly given the intense anti-Russian animus of the US Congress that’s completely out-of-step with public opinion, and thus its unwillingness to ratify any treaty that Russia might be able to get Team Trump to agree with. If I’m a Russian closely watching what the enemy is doing and then hearing what Ryabkov said, I’d be very pessimistic. Any Russian born before 1985 will know the West has never been Russia’s friend. Those few born during the 1990s and its anarchic upheavals within Russia will have a similar POV, although they never directly experienced Soviet times. For many, I would say from their POV the Cold War never ended since the aggression never really stopped. So, the domestic politics Team Putin encounter on the issue of American relations is very different as there’s no question that the Outlaw US Empire remains an enemy state. Ryabkov’s observation that there was “no reaction” from Trump about any of the events of May 31-June 1 followed by what’s happened in the following few days can’t help but be seen in a negative light by Russia. IMO, Russia’s response must be to go hard on the battlefield since that’s the only language its enemies seem to understand.

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