Three More Items on West Asia

Crooke’s talk on the 12th with Judge Napolitano and Lavrov’s appearance at the special Moscow session on West Asia Valdai Club makes five items, the other three are Crooke’s SCF essay on the 12th, his Al-Mayadeen Column from today, and a report by Mohamad Hasan Sweidan published today by The Cradle.

Again, I suggest reading Crooke’s two written pieces before watching his talk. The column and Sweidan’s article will be reproduced below. Lavrov’s transcript’s in Russian, but what he delivers is almost 100% recap, while Sweidan’s essay provides a better picture of how Russian Palestinian policy has changed. But first a few remarks. As noted, Russian relations with Occupied Palestine are complex for a variety of reasons, the most important being the Constitutional duty Russia has towards its ex-pats that number about 2 million there. That means Russia cannot have an explicitly anti-Zionist policy, which the Zionists know about and use to their advantage. However, ever since Russia’s involvement within Syria, Russian policy was soured slowly by Zionist actions and its overt support for Daesh and other terrorist groups. The unfortunate knee-jerk framing of Hamas’s 7 October Al-Aqsa Flood liberation outbreak as an act of terrorism that swallowed the Zionist narrative uncritically made it difficult to condemn the Zionists Genocidal actions as such. Yet, those actions combined with the previous souring to generate a rethinking of policy that’s now slowly emerging and is being influenced by the Bigger Geopolitical Picture.

Crooke’s Al-Mayadeen column, “The Hands of the Regional Armageddon Clock Strike Eleven,” is short and brings us up to where things stood Sunday the 11th before the Zionists attacked Rafah. His SCF essay, “The World’s Gyre,” expands on the Outlaw US Empire policy dilemma that is briefly explained below. All bolded emphasis mine :

They must understand -- the Biden Administration can prevaricate, and utter more palliatives about Palestinian States and ‘Israeli regional integration’, but the Israeli government is leading Biden and his team down the ‘primrose path’ to a junction where the paths finally diverge where: 

Either the US goes ‘all the way’ with the ‘Great Victory project’ – attempting to sear a new Israeli deterrence into the Regional psyche (in Netanyahu’s telling)—or the US ‘bails out’ quick. (Maybe it is already too late for the latter). Netanyahu is on the verge of crossing Team Biden’s stated red-lines – an attack on Rafah.  

There is talk of the US preparing to withdraw all or part of its forces from Iraq and Syria in response to attacks by Iraqi Resistance forces, so senior US officials are reported to say. But is this the White House simply playing for time?  

The US edged to the brink of war with Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces when, last Wednesday, it killed three members of the Kata'ib Hezbollah forces, including a senior commander, Al-Saadi who represents the most senior figure to have been killed in Iraq since the 2020 drone strike that killed Al-Muhandis and Qassem Soleimani. 

The Iraqi Resistance essentially jointly announced that the assassination of al-Saadi was Iraq’s ‘7 October moment’, and that they were duly committed to driving the US forces out of Iraq. (Perhaps the US already passed the brink and is already over the ‘edge’). 

Or, has Team Biden ‘sensed the way the wind blows’, and concluded that it has no option but to continue its embrace of "Israel" -- wherever the path may lead -- and thus, it is time to remove its forces out of harm’s way pronto. i.e. before the next phase of war begins in earnest?

Netanyahu announced on Friday that he had instructed the IOF to present the cabinet with a plan both to evacuate Rafah’s civilian population (augmented by over one million refugees from the Strip’s North and Centre) in order to “destroy Hamas’s remaining battalions in the area”.

Yet, where are these threatened Palestinian civilians to go? Notes "Israel’s" leading liberal daily, Haaretz:

“They are already up against the border fence at the southern-most point of the strip. An Israeli incursion into Rafah will be an attack on the world's biggest displaced persons camp. It will drag the Israeli military into committing war crimes of a severity that even it has not yet committed. It is impossible to invade Rafah now without committing war crimes. If the Israel Defence Forces invade Rafah, the town will become a charnel house”.

According to Netanyahu, an assault on Rafah is critical to completing "Israel’s" stated war aim of dismantling Hamas. Earlier in the week, the PM rejected Hamas’s hostage proposals as “delusional”. And Security Minister Gallant said on Sunday: 

"We penetrated into the heart of the most sensitive places of Hamas [in Gaza] … All these things are the result of deepening and penetrating the heart of Hamas' capabilities. The more we deepen this operation, the closer we are to a realistic deal to return the hostages”.  

Many in "Israel", rather, regard a Rafah operation as the final abandonment of the hostages.

Reports indicate that in an effort to forestall a massive influx of refugees, Egypt has over the past two weeks stationed some 40 tanks near its border with Gaza, after having reinforced the border wall since the beginning of the war in Gaza both structurally and with surveillance equipment, and has warned "Israel" that the decades-long peace treaty between Egypt and "Israel" could be suspended if IOF troops enter Rafah, or if any Palestinian refugees (1.3 million of whom are perilously camped in the Rafah area) are forced southward into Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. 

Of course, "Israel" can simply use missiles to blow holes in the border wall (it has done so a number of times during the war thus far), enabling desperate Palestinian refugee families to flee into the Sinai. Resistance commentators are skeptical of Egyptian intentions, and question the point and purpose of Egypt deploying 40 tanks to the border.

In addition, Saudi Arabia issued a statement in the last days, warning of “the extremely dangerous repercussions of storming and targeting the city of Rafah in the Gaza Strip”, given the city being “the last refuge for hundreds of thousands of people”.

So, Team Biden finally has arrived at the eleventh hour: Its provocative attack on the Kata'ib  Hezbollah leader -- after the Kata'ib movement had suspended its military operations against the US at the request of the Iraqi government -- has put Team Biden on a path to war with the Iraqi Resistance forces. It is already at war with the forces of Ansar Allah -- and Hezbollah stands ready to escalate, too. There are clear signs that the Resistance Axis is thinking and preparing the next phase for the wider war.

What will Egypt do if "Israel" bombs Rafah and tens of thousands of Palestinians attempt to cross into Egypt? Well, CIA Director Bill Burns has been dispatched to Cairo … to discuss … a renewal of hostage negotiations!

The point is that few in Washington seem to little appreciate ‘how deep-in’ they already are. Or, the extent and speed at which their options are vanishing, and are ineluctably tied to the fortunes of Netanyahu and his far-right coalition government.

As we now know, Rafah’s been attacked. Hamas is reporting it wasn’t invited to the talks in Egypt. It also said there was no meeting between it and PLO, and that it’s policies toward Palestinian government and PLO are unchanged.

Now we move to The Cradle’s report, “Russia and Hamas: A Strategic Alliance of Convenience,” which I find to be the most important of the five as the other four don’t really offer anything new, just more of the same. All bolded italics emphasis mine:

In the past few years, Russia's expanding ties with the Palestinian resistance movement Hamas have contributed to the growing list of issues that muddy relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv. After Hamas' 27 October visit to Moscow following the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared the trip "sends a message of legitimizing terrorism against the Israelis." Yet Hamas officials have continued to flock to the Russian capital, most recently in late January. 

The Russian position on the war in Gaza

Since the onset of Israel's brutal military assault on Gaza, Russia’s official stance has been closer to the Palestinian position, evident by Moscow’s various UN Security Council activities: calling for a ceasefire, statements by Russian officials criticizing Israeli criminality, repeat meetings with Hamas in Moscow, and the country's official media’s focus on human rights violation in the Gaza Strip.  

Despite the long-term collaborative nature of Russo-Israeli relations, the Ukraine war has rejigged Moscow's geopolitical calculations significantly. Today, Russia views the Gaza war and its regional implications from the perspective of its competition with the US and, therefore, considers Israel a critical tool of American influence in West Asia. The Russian leadership considers the current conflict to be as much Washington’s battle as Tel Aviv's – a weakened Israel would mean the further disintegration of US power projection from the Levant to the Persian Gulf, a strategic Russian objective.

Although Tel Aviv and Moscow still retain common interests of value to both, it is the US–Russian strategic competition that currently holds the most sway over the Kremlin's decision-making. 

This can be seen in a flurry of harshly worded Russian statements criticizing Washington's role in prolonging and exacerbating the Gaza war. Russian President Vladimir Putin voiced the sentiments of most West Asians when he declared: “Many people would agree that this is a vivid example of the failure of US policy in the Middle East.” His Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov went the extra mile: 

The United States bears primary responsibility for this dramatic and dangerous crisis, since it has sought for many years to monopolize the settlement process and ignore relevant Security Council resolutions, and has now obstructed efforts to reach an appropriate solution.

There is no doubt that the events of the past two years in Ukraine played a major role in calibrating the Russian response to Gaza. During his recent interview with American journalist Tucker Carlson, Putin spent an inordinate amount of time unraveling the historical context behind Ukraine's existence as a state, before boldly declaring: "Ukraine is an artificial state created at Stalin's will and did not exist before 1922."

Of course, the Russian president understands that his invocation of Ukraine's weak historical justification for statehood allows him to adopt the same context-rich approach when discussing protracted conflicts in other regions. His history-based formula for tackling the root of conflict applies equally to the establishment of the Israeli state against the objections of Palestinians and their neighboring nations, which likely will play a role in Putin's position on how to move forward with the Palestine–Israel problem. 

In addition, as an extension of the Western axis, Israel has adopted official stances that are consistent with the interests of the US and NATO alliance in Ukraine. Since the 2022 onset of that war, Tel Aviv has issued statements that belied its professed attempts at neutrality. As then-Israel foreign minister Yair Lapid made clear: “The Russian attack on Ukraine is a serious violation of the international order, and Israel condemns the attack and is ready to provide humanitarian aid to the citizens of Ukraine."

Within West Asia, it was mainly Iran that voiced support for the Russian dilemma over Ukraine and its decision to launch a Special Military Operation. During Putin's July 2022 visit to Tehran, Iranian Leader Sayyed Ali Khamenei railed against western duplicity in international affairs, and charged Moscow's foes with opposing the existence of an “independent and strong” Russia. Khamenei further added if Russia had not sent forces to Ukraine, it would have faced a NATO attack later.

Russian relations with Hamas

Regarding events in Gaza today, it can be argued that the Kremlin finds itself edging closer to the positions of those states and actors who supported its Ukraine stance. When US officials attacked Iran for its support of Gaza, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stepped into the fray: 

We note attempts to blame everything on Iran and consider them completely provocative. I believe that the Iranian leadership takes a fairly responsible and balanced position and calls for preventing this conflict from spreading to the entire region and neighboring countries.

While Washington worked overtime to bolster the many false Israeli narratives of the 7 October events – even likening the Palestinian resistance to the terror group ISIS – Russia was instead busy receiving a stream of Hamas delegations to Moscow. 

Last week, when Hamas delivered its studied response to truce negotiators, it tellingly requested that Russia be included as one of the guarantors of a final agreement to stop the Gaza war – a clear reflection that Palestinians believe Moscow can play a positive role in the resolution of this conflict.

It should be noted that Hamas' visits to Russia and meetings with various Russian officials are nothing new. The Palestinian movement's relations with Russian leaders go back to 2006, when a Hamas political delegation arrived in Moscow weeks after its victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections. The current visits, however, differ considerably in that they come at a time when Washington and Tel Aviv have announced a common objective to destroy Hamas. It is notable that Russia is today avidly engaging Palestinian resistance groups who shattered the image of Israel's military invincibility on 7 October.

Since that eventful day, Putin's West Asia Envoy Mikhail Bogdanov has twice received the Hamas delegation headed by Musa Abu Marzouk, a member of the movement's political bureau – on 26 October and 19 January. Israeli officials were outraged, calling the Russian invitation "a reprehensible step that provides support for terrorism and legitimacy for the horrific actions carried out by Hamas terrorists." The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs also called on Moscow to expel Hamas officials immediately.

The harsh messaging from Tel Aviv is unlikely to make a difference. 

Russia's West Asian thrust

Most recently, Moscow invited the Palestinian factions to attend a Palestinian national meeting at the end of February.

Deputy Secretary-General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Jamil Mezher, told Sputnik on 13 February that the group received an invitation from Moscow to attend a Palestinian national meeting that includes all factions at the end of the month. 

The Kremlin has already made its calculations and decided, for strategic reasons, to insert itself into the contentious Palestinian–Israeli arena. And the region's Axis of Resistance offers that opportunity: 

First, Russia knows that it will not be able to impose itself onto an international resolution of the conflict other than through its relations with Hamas. Tel Aviv will not accept Moscow as a mediating party between it and Hamas - at least for now. 

Second, Russia’s reception of Hamas delegations carries a message aimed at Washington. In short, the Kremlin is prepared to edge closer to those who stand against US interests. Part of the division over the Gaza war is a reflection of the international division between the great powers. 

Third, a key part of Russia's relationship with Hamas is the result of Moscow's growing conviction that non-state actors in Gaza have a significant influence on the political reality in the region. From here, it can be said that Russia has a growing interest in forging and expanding relations with the forces of the regional Axis of Resistance, led by Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, and the Ansarallah movement in Yemen. The Russians were, after all, a decisive factor in securing a Syrian victory in the NATO–GCC war against its ally, and were instrumental in catapulting Iran into its seats at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the newly expanded BRICS.

It must be noted here that all five regional parties share Russia's global approach aimed at competing with US influence around the world.

Perhaps one of the most important aspects of the timing of Israel's war on Gaza is the “international clock.” Tel Aviv's assault on the besieged Strip came more than a year-and-a-half after the onset of the Ukraine war, when Kiev was foundering, and at a moment of transformation in the international system. This factor may be fundamental to understanding the Kremlin's stepped-up approach to events in West Asia. While Moscow knows that its current positions may adversely affect its relations with Tel Aviv, within the context of great power competition, the Russians are content to sacrifice part of their interests to achieve much larger strategic objectives. 

And so long as this Russian thinking holds, Hamas and other West Asian resistance movements see an opportunity to take advantage of global transformations to attract a superpower to their sides.

Is Russia on a “side”? Yes, just not on the side many think. IMO, Russia’s on two sides: Russia’s and Justice’s. And then there’s a third: History. Russia has very limited military alliances with the CSTO, CIS and Union State. BRICS+, SCO, EAEU, and many others are all political-economic associations, although the SCO has an anti-Terrorism aspect I’ve mentioned before that Russia might use to its advantage versus the world’s #1 Terrorist—The Outlaw US Empire and its NATO vassals. It’s odd that Syria’s omitted. Lavrov commented on the Astana project and said Geneva was no longer a neutral location given Switzerland’s abandonment of neutrality, a fact few seem to have noted.

The key again is what will the Outlaw US Empire do. As the Judge explains, Biden has a big domestic problem with a new poll saying, “86% of respondents said Biden should not run for a second term,” which prompted Crooke to agree that Biden might very well welcome a wider war to help him avoid his troubles. And then there’s the issue of money for both wars as the R controlled House has stated that the just passed Senate bill is already rejected and will not be voted upon. How that will affect the Zionists is unknown, although the Zealots IMO won’t be fazed at all since they are all for Genocide and believe they’ll be able to be able to remain in West Asia.

In closing, South Africa has petitioned the ICJ to do what it can to halt the Zionists attack on Rafah:

“The unprecedented military offensive against Rafah, as announced by the State of Israel, has already led to and will result in further large-scale killing, harm and destruction,” the South African Presidency said in a statement published on Tuesday, suggesting the ICJ take further “provisional measures” to restrain Israel.

The controversial military operation targeting the city Johannesburg described as “the last refuge for surviving people in Gaza “constitutes a “serious and irreparable breach both of the Genocide Convention and of the Court’s Order of 26 January 2024,” according to the statement. 

The ICJ’s order, issued in response to the genocide case filed by South Africa in December, saw the court command Israel to refrain from committing genocidal acts against Palestinians, specifically against killing or seriously injuring them or “deliberately inflicting… conditions of life calculated to bring about [their] physical destruction in whole or in part,” such as restricting aid deliveries. [Italics original]

Only the woefully deluded or outright Zionist Genocidal supporter would say the Rafah attack won’t harm anyone, and that would include the Outlaw US Empire’s Team Biden, which continues to stand on the wrong side of law and history.

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