A Chinese Potpourri

Feed your head

Over the past ten days, a number of excellent articles have appeared in the Chinese publication Guancha that merit attention but failed to be translated by me and circulated via the Gym. I intend to rectify that somewhat by providing the links and excerpts for readers to explore on their own, although data shows that’s only done by a very small percentage of readers. Nevertheless, China is continually exerting its diplomatic and economic weight in ways that those following geopolitics ought to be aware of. Daily a new engineering project is completed, or a scientific advancement is announced by Global Times or other English language Chinese media , which are easier to follow because translation isn’t required. Here are several examples: “NE China's first solar thermal power plant put into operation, marking a major breakthrough”; “China launches 'yisuan computing ark' full-stack platform to help solve software designing challenges”; “Beijing launches space computing innovation center, first in nation”; and one related to the first, “US working on ban targeting Chinese energy inverters, a move politicizing clean-energy supply chains, ignoring industrial, consumer interests: expert.” Those are just a few and perhaps I should include this editorial, “Who got slapped in the face by Fox News' apology?” from a few days ago that covered an important incident. What many see as a Tech War or Race between China and the Outlaw US Empire is becoming very tense as this article that also appeared at Guancha attests with this being the Global Times version, “More 'DeepSeek moments' ahead: Will US continue to build walls or learn?”, and is also becoming an important component of the geopolitical competition between the two states. Yet, besides the two behemoths, a forgotten term is being reborn as the Multipolar World continues to blossom, and that’s the Medium or Middle Power concept, which is how Iran is now being characterized as having become with its defeat of the Empire.

The discussion of that concept brings us to the first Guancha article:

On June 15, on Dragon TV's program "This Is China," Professor Zhang Weiwei, Director of the China Research Institute at Fudan University, and Professor Dai Weilai from the same institute provided an in-depth analysis.

Professor Weilai begins the discussion thusly:

Recently, the term "medium power" has been very popular in international public opinion, so today let's talk about it. When people talk about international affairs, they might think of a few "big shots": how the U.S. and China are playing games, how the Russia-Ukraine conflict will end, and whether the flames of war in the Middle East will continue. The world is ever-changing, as if it's always a 'card game' between great powers. But times have changed, and a group of "action-takers" has emerged on the international stage. They may not be able to decide which direction the great ship of the era is heading alone, but they can steer the "rudder" at critical moments. They are the "medium powers" collectively moving toward the "C" position….

What is a “medium power”? It is neither a larger small country nor a smaller large country. They stand between major global powers and generally small and medium-sized countries: economically strong, militarily confident, regionally significant, and internationally recognized. They are unwilling to be vassals in great power rivalry and hope to have more influence in global governance. In the language of ordinary people, they’re a group of “hardcore players” who have money in their pockets, possess goods, have a good temper, and love socializing.

Looking at today’s international stage, this active “key minority” can roughly be divided into four schools. The first category: skilled ‘geopolitical players,’ such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, India, and others. These countries are strategic hubs with “hard chips” in their hands. As a NATO ally, Turkey openly negotiates military cooperation with Russia. Looking at Saudi Arabia, it is officially a U.S. ally, but it has turned around and is negotiating cooperation with China and Russia, even making a high-profile entry into BRICS. Their logic is simple: not just picking sides, but focusing on benefits. Whoever brings development opportunities will be the “steering wheel” in that direction.

The second category is the “stubborn” “Global South” disruptors, such as Indonesia, Brazil, and South Africa. What they care about most now is “smashing the old rice bowl to reclaim the golden rice bowl.” Take Indonesia as an example: new energy batteries require nickel, a metal that accounts for over 60% of the world’s nickel reserves. In the past, Indonesia could only earn some hard-earned money by selling local specialties and raw materials, but in order to keep processing plants in China and upgrade industries, Indonesia braved enormous Western pressure in 2020 and announced a ban on nickel ore exports. Later, with the combined efforts of Chinese companies, Indonesia’s nickel ore processing industry took off overnight. In just six years, the export value of nickel products has increased tenfold. Brazil is no exception. As a rare earth powerhouse, it is striving to enhance its domestic processing capabilities. In short, they no longer want to be Western “raw material suppliers”; they want to be the strongest link in the industrial chain.

The third group is the “cross-sea tribe” relying on two ends, such as Canada, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. What are their biggest features? “Security depends on the United States, and our livelihood depends on China.” Take South Korea as an example: China has long been its most important export market, yet the U.S. insists on “decoupling and cutting supply chains” from China. This is not an alliance of sides; it is clearly forcing them to “cut off their own arms” to prove loyalty. But the problem is, while loyalty can be expressed, you can’t give up your “rice bowl.”

The fourth category is the awakening “limited autonomy faction,” mainly European “medium powers” like Germany and Spain. Although they are part of the Western camp, they no longer blindly follow the U.S. on key issues. For example, Spain dares to directly confront the U.S., openly opposing U.S. and Israel’s military actions against Iran, and even firmly refusing to use joint bases within Spain to take military action against Iran. They are sending a signal to the U.S.: Allies are not servants; why should I pay for your wishful thinking?

Why are these countries collectively “exploding” today? The reason is simple: not because they suddenly became stronger overnight, but because the old international order has already “leaked air.” In recent years, the U.S. has weaponized tariffs, technology, and finance, swinging the baton at the drop of a hat to sanction anyone. This made the world see that if you hand your fate over to someone else, they could “flip the table” at any moment.

This should serve as an appetizer to the entire discussion that reveals how China views the emergence and roles played by these states. Yes, they were always there but have now “exploded” because the hegemon is fading and they are freer to act; they are recovering their sovereignty, the key attribute Presidents Xi and Putin have emphasized since their February 2022 Joint Declaration. If events go as I anticipate, we shall soon see another example of these medium powers gathering together to ensure their mutual security that will generate a much larger global sea change as China’s proposed global initiatives begin to gain adherence and action.

One of the major geopolitical divides conjured up by the Collective West is the democracy good, authoritarian bad meme related to governance that I’ve addressed on several previous occasions. The second Guancha article is best described by the synopsis provided:

Is democracy the ‘only path’ to national development and human well-being, or just one among many methods of political governance? What exactly did those countries that did not blindly copy Western democratic systems but achieved economic takeoff and long-term social stability? As the binary narrative of “democracy–authoritarianism” increasingly struggles to explain the complex and diverse realities of the world, shouldn’t we re-examine those political practices that are simply categorized?

These questions may be clued to the experience of a witness with a unique perspective—Professor Zhang Weiwei, Director of the Institute of Chinese Studies at Fudan University. In his early years, he served as an English translator for Chinese leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng, and has long been engaged in international relations and comparative politics research, with a global footprint. Through dialogue with mainstream Western discourse, he gradually formed a systematic reflection on China’s development model. In his view, China’s experience shows that a country can fully achieve large-scale modernization and improve national well-being through self-correction and pragmatic governance, rooted in its own civilizational traditions, without needing to copy other countries’ political templates.

Recently, Professor Zhang Weiwei was invited to appear on a video podcast hosted by Gita Virjawan, Chairman of Indonesia’s Ancora Group and former Minister of Trade, where he explored the above topics in depth from his personal experiences.

The interview combines Professor Zhang’s bio with that of China as it grew and developed both of which are fascinating and include material you won’t find in standard Chinese history texts. The interview is rather long and covers a vast amount of material. This excerpt combines politics, economics and policy:

Gita Verjawan: Why did Deng Xiaoping decide to send a large number of students to study STEM rather than other majors at that time? It turned out to be a stroke of genius for China’s industrialization. I know most Southeast Asian countries fall short in this area, and perhaps only one or two are doing well. What was the basis for his judgment at the time?

Zhang Weiwei: I call China a “civilized country.” A civilized state is a fusion of ancient civilization and a modern state—China has integrated its ancient traditions with modern national forms. In this sense, since 1949, Chairman Mao, Deng Xiaoping, and other top Chinese leaders have always prioritized science and engineering education.

As early as the early 1950s, the slogan “Marching Toward Science” was proposed, and this tradition continues to this day. It can be said that today China may be the only country in the world where most high school students prefer to study science and engineering. The Cultural Revolution impacted education and science and technology. Deng Xiaoping said, “We must make up for these losses by sending students abroad.” It turned out this decision was crucial and successful.

This is also a combination of Chinese tradition. China has a long history. Confucius said, “Education for all, without discrimination”—over 2,500 years ago, China advocated education regardless of wealth or status, ensuring education for all. After 1949, education shifted toward science and engineering, a new tradition.

Gita Virjawan: There is a vivid element in Chinese culture—the spirit of hard work among the people. I often compare Silicon Valley to entrepreneurship, where entrepreneurship succeeds seems to be due to the perfect blend of academia (with several top universities) and entrepreneurial spirit. Although Shenzhen in China does not have a particularly dominant university, most of the entrepreneurs I met there had migrated from other cities in China. They might work eight or nine hours a day in Wuhan, but once in Shenzhen, they’re willing to work twelve, thirteen, or even fourteen hours a day, all to work cheaper, better, and faster. What do you think is why China has developed such a work atmosphere?

Zhang Weiwei: This is China’s internal competition, also known as “involution,” which is quite intense. First, a typical example is the college entrance exam. The college entrance exam is a fair test for everyone, and your score will determine which university you attend. After the reform and opening up, opportunities have become more diverse. Going to university is just one path; other paths to success are everywhere. Many Chinese entrepreneurs do not have high education levels but are very successful, including quite a few who have invested in Indonesia. Their entrepreneurial spirit is inseparable from Chinese cultural tradition. Clearly, the Chinese are one of the hardworking peoples in the world, and all words related to “diligence” in Chinese are positive.

As for innovation, I strongly oppose Western propaganda that claims Chinese people lack innovation ability and only memorize by rote. I said, this must be realistic. China, or rather Chinese civilization, led Europe for thousands of years before the early 19th century. For almost most of the time, China was the world’s largest economy, with thousands of inventions made by the Chinese people.

Western media are always full of stereotypes about China, the Islamic world, and Russia—fear of China, fear of Iran, fear of Russia. Of course, they say whatever they want, but in the end, they realize that China is a country with enormous innovation potential, with new innovations emerging every day.

A new paradigm shifting from “democracy and autocracy” to “good governance versus bad governance.”

Geeta Virjawan: I can give one or two examples, the most prominent being electric vehicles and aerospace. China currently has 99 electric vehicle brands, which not only reflects the true democratization of the market but also means fierce competition among peers. I think Western countries need to better understand this because in the US, the number of electric vehicle brands is very limited, and the competition is far less intense than in China. But this intense competition precisely drives deeper and more intensive technological innovation.

Next, I want to focus on the comparison between China and Southeast Asia. Over the past 30 years, China’s economy has grown about tenfold, while Southeast Asia has only grown 2.7 times. There are four clear supporting factors behind this: first is infrastructure, and second is education—China has about 3,000 universities with 40 to 50 million students, while Southeast Asia has 10,000 universities but only 25 million students. Moreover, China has far more universities in the global top 20 than Southeast Asia (the latter has only two, both in Singapore); Third is governance, that is, the combination of power and talent. China adheres to meritocratic appointments rather than nepotism, but paradoxically, many democracies today increasingly favor nepotism rather than actual ability; Finally, competitiveness: I measure by the number of business licenses issued per 1,000 adults: China issues 10, while Southeast Asia only issues 1.

Based on the above analysis, I hope you will continue to explore and discuss how countries around the world, especially Southeast Asia, can learn from China’s successful experience and accelerate their own development.

Zhang Weiwei: Chinese-style modernization is indeed unique in many aspects. On the political level, I summarize it as a “party of total interests.” From the perspective of civilizational evolution, since 221 BC, China has been largely governed by a unified ruling group; otherwise, a “hundred nations” civilization would have collapsed. Behind the unified ruling group was the institutional support for selecting and appointing capable people, namely the “Imperial Examination System” originating during the Sui and Tang dynasties, dating back about 1,500 years. It did not require family background; as long as one passed the exam, one could be promoted to minister or even prime minister. China was the earliest country in the world to invent the civil service examination system.

As for today’s Chinese political system, if the Western model is called “elections,” then in my view, the Chinese model should be called “selection + election,” but selection always takes precedence, based on the actual performance of cadres at different levels of governance. Take the seven members of China’s top leadership as examples: most have served as Party secretaries or governors in three provinces and have governed over 100 million people before taking their current positions; President Xi Jinping himself has governed Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai (municipalities), governing over a population of over 100 million and an economy larger than India’s, then serving as Vice President for five years before finally becoming the top leader. This process is extremely strict, and it is clear that China has the most capable leadership in the world.

Economically, China implements a mixed economy, officially described as a “socialist market economy,” meaning the market and government play complementary roles, and planning and the market are organically integrated. Take the development of the internet as an example: the government is responsible for building digital infrastructure, such as 4G and 5G networks. No matter how remote the village, as long as people live there, 5G must be accessed, regardless of cost. This is the mission of socialism. Private enterprises make full use of these world-class digital infrastructures, ensuring that even remote mountain villages in Tibet or Xinjiang have better WiFi signals than in the central areas of many Western cities.

President Xi’s economic philosophy emphasizes that supply also creates demand. With top-tier digital infrastructure and high-speed rail and expressways, vibrant new economic forms have naturally emerged, such as TikTok and electric vehicles. Electric vehicles themselves are also products of a mixed economy and national planning. As early as twenty years ago, China laid out the electric vehicle industry in the “Eighth Five-Year Plan.” Since then, every five-year plan has been adjusted, and private companies like BYD have risen rapidly, with hundreds of domestic electric vehicle companies fiercely competing. The winning company naturally gains international competitiveness.

As a civilized country, China’s massive market allows it to test multiple technological routes simultaneously, unlike relatively large economies like Japan, which can only bet on hydrogen energy; China can simultaneously experiment with lithium batteries, hydrogen energy, and other technologies, ultimately focusing on the optimal solution and mobilizing more resources from both the state and private sector for support—a comprehensive strategy that small economies find difficult to afford.

At the social level, we encourage active interaction between the state and society rather than confrontation, which is closely tied to Chinese cultural traditions. We believe that such positive interaction leads to better outcomes than mutual confrontation.

There appears to be no culture wars within China whose goal is divide and rule aimed at favoring an oligarchy which the West conflates as democracy. Since my university courses on China in the late 1990s, I’ve referred the Communist Party of China as its newest dynasty, which is reflected in the history related by Professor Zhang. I don’t know if he’s been asked if he thinks that’s a proper description, but I’d certainly ask if given the opportunity. The main topic of the interview is addressed and begins thusly:

Gita Virjawan: So do you think that this harmony between the state and society precisely reflects the people’s accountability to the leadership, which in turn promotes the democratization of public goods? In contrast, in some democracies today, we see that accountability seems to focus more on a specific class structure, resulting in a deficiency in the distribution of public goods. Is this observation reasonable?

Zhang Weiwei: In terms of theoretical construction, I proposed years ago that the long-standing paradigm of Western political science is the so-called “democracy vs. autocracy” opposition, and based on this, it encourages “color revolutions” and regime changes, forcibly implementing Western political systems. I believe this approach is completely wrong and outdated. We must shift from “democracy vs. autocracy” to a new paradigm of “good governance vs. bad government.”

Whenever I debate with Western scholars, they ask if Chinese people dare to discuss democracy, but I say this is true democracy. In Chinese cultural tradition, we distinguish between “Dao” and “Shu”; “Dao” is the overall goal, while “Shu” is the specific method. In contrast, in the Western “democracy vs. authoritarianism” paradigm, democracy is defined by themselves, based on Schumpeter’s 1942 formula for voting leaders. From China’s perspective, it is merely procedural democracy, at best a form of democracy, not the whole. What we must first establish is the “Dao,” that is, what is the goal of democracy? The answer is good governance, the country must keep its word, and leaders must respond to the needs of the people.

This brings us back to the three criteria proposed by Comrade Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s for judging the quality of a political system. First, can political stability be ensured? Without stability, there is no economic development, and thus no better life for the people; Second, whether it can continuously improve people’s living standards and maintain unity among the people. Unity is extremely important for a large country like China, which had a population of 1.2 billion at the time; now it is 1.4 billion, which has always been a core issue; Third, whether productive forces can sustain their development, and as a Marxist concept, productive forces encompass advanced science and technology.

This approach starts from the “Dao” and starts from the overall goal, then combines Chinese traditions and institutional arrangements to design formal democracy. Take the government work report delivered by the Premier of the State Council during the National “Two Sessions” every March as an example: almost every sentence he spoke was directly related to the livelihoods of millions of people, with very concrete content—what was promised last year and how much was fulfilled this year—all are clear. In contrast, the U.S. President’s State of the Union address is more of a campaign rhetoric, while China’s government work report is extremely pragmatic, and the difference between the two reflects the quality of decision-making.

Back in 2012, Zhang Weiwei had an article, “Meritocracy Versus Democracy,” published by the NY Times that’s a very short version of several longer talks he’s given on this topic. Zhang also wrote The China Wave: Rise of a Civilizational State that was published in English in 2012.

One of the major points of contention generated by the West is the false narrative of China stealing western technology. The reason its false is that technology transfer was agreed to with the relocation of many Western businesses to China beginning in the late 1990s. And you just read about Chinese educational STEM policy being a priority that is very obvious nowadays. This third Guancha article is related to that issue, “China’s technology is moving too fast, putting the U.S. in a dilemma.” This issue has roiled the US Congress and tech corporations for many years now and is becoming more heated thanks to Trump’s Trade War aimed at China that he began in his first term, continued in his second and was soundly defeated by China thanks to China’s planning and anticipation. This is the shortest of the Guancha articles and begins thusly:

Once upon a time, the U.S. was most worried about China catching up to itself in the tech sector; Now, what troubles the U.S. more and more is that China is running too fast.

On June 23 local time, The New York Times published an article lamenting that the competitive landscape of technology between China and the US has undergone profound changes. In fields such as batteries, solar energy, rare earths, and even biomedicine, China is no longer a catcher but is becoming one of the world’s most advanced sources of technology.

Faced with the leading advantage of Chinese companies, the U.S. has fallen into a “conflicted” mindset: it fears being left behind by China and wants to use world-leading technology, but also worries that excessive dependence on China could have negative consequences. [My Emphasis]

The well-known substack writer Warwick Powell writes at Guancha using the pen name Bao Shaoshan and continues the tech topic with our fourth article, “In the face of the U.S. ban, we must establish a “Digital Westphalia,” that deals with the Outlaw US Empire restricting many of its US located AI corporations’ ability to market their products fearful they’ll be compromised, while China has an opensource policy. He begins with this preface:

Not long ago, the U.S. government issued an order to Anthropic: to suspend access to its flagship models, Fable 5 and Mythos 5, to all foreign nationals. Regardless of whether you are in the U.S. or if you are a foreign employee hired by Anthropic, they are completely prohibited.

Anthropic’s response was straightforward—this kind of nationality-based access blocking is practically ineffective, and forcing it would only mess things up, so they simply shut down these two models for all users worldwide.

In the public statement, Anthropic’s dissatisfaction was barely hidden. They say the whole thing started with a non-universal “jailbreak” demo involving code vulnerability identification—and that capability has long existed in other models. They argued that this directive lacked transparency, technical basis, and even less reasonable, affecting hundreds of millions of users. What’s even more intriguing is that this incident made it clear to the public: even companies like Anthropic, which are so tightly tied to U.S. interests, cannot escape the awkward internal pull of policy tugs.

Almost back-to-back times, China’s Zhipu AI (an international brand Z.ai) released its latest flagship model, GLM-5.2. This model has a solid 1 million token context window, strong programming capabilities, and strong long-range agent capabilities. More importantly, they plan to use the MIT license to release model weights, making them fully open source, allowing developers worldwide to use them and adapt them however they want.

The coincidence of these two events is not a coincidence, but a true microcosm of two paths for AI development. The US line emphasizes controls and export restrictions, treating technological nodes as weapons; On China’s side, the approach is openness, rapid iteration, and customized sovereignty, relying on material foundations to support resilience. The two lines together form a grand picture in the process of taking shape—I call it ‘Digital Westphalia.’ The foundation of this order is national sovereignty, relying on open protocols, interoperability standards, and a solid technological foundation—not on anyone’s external hegemony or a monopoly by any particular company. [My Emphasis]

How this develops will impact all nations since AI will go global. This essay hasn’t appeared in English at Mr. Powell’s substack, although there are many important works available there covering a very wide range of topics.

The fifth and final Guancha article is another “This is China” episode where “Professor Zhang Weiwei, Dean of the China Research Institute at Fudan University, and Mr. Jin Zhongwei, founding editor-in-chief of Observer Network, conducted a new round of in-depth discussions around the ‘conclusion of the end of history,’ [Fukuyama’s thesis] meticulously analyzing the logical essence of the two sets of Eastern and Western knowledge systems behind this debate.” What follows is a portion of the intro by Zhang Weiwei I hope will induce readers to read the recap of the debate Zhanng had with Fukuyama over his End of History thesis and much more:

Many netizens also mentioned the debate I had with Fukuyama on June 27, 2011, about the Chinese model. They summarized my views as five political predictions: “The Arab Spring will become the Arab Winter,” “Populism will destroy Western democracy,” “If the American political system is not reformed, it may elect a leader worse than George H. Bush,” “World culture will not converge,” and “The end of history’s conclusion,” and pointed out, “Looking back now, everything came true!”

Indeed, time is the best judge. In fact, over the years, Fukuyama has followed the “end of history” approach, sticking to the crude binary paradigm of “democracy vs. authoritarianism,” which has led to repeated misjudgments about major events such as the COVID-19 response, the direction of the Ukraine conflict, and the Trump-Harris campaign. Our judgment of these events is much more accurate than his.

I’d be remiss if I neglected to introduce Gym readers to Einar Tangen and his substack where he focuses on Chinese and East Asian developments. He’s appeared on several of Glenn Diesen’s podcasts where I discovered him as another font of knowledge well worth heeding. His most recent article is “China’s Strategic Yuan Internationalization,” while “China From Deng, to Jiang, to Hu, to Xi: Wang Huning the Intellectual Architect of China’s Rise” is a very important essay as its title suggests. And of course there are other writers putting forth their own efforts. Meanwhile, the news cycle continues to be fueled by events like this: “The US Trade Representative threatened Canada: If you are good with China, I will not be with you,” which is usual Outlaw US Empire behavior regardless who’s in power: “According to a report by the South China Morning Post on July 2, the United States confirmed on Wednesday that it will not renew the North American trade agreement. U.S. trade officials blame Canada for trying to curry favor with China.” Oh the horror, a nation acting in its own interest!

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