Agree with all that, last sentence in particular. I think Ritter may be correct as to Hezbollah's capability, but it's quite possible Hezbollah won't bother taking Israeli territory. What would they do with it other than to move some of their missile batteries forward to better target the rest of Israel? But if they do that, they don't h…
Agree with all that, last sentence in particular. I think Ritter may be correct as to Hezbollah's capability, but it's quite possible Hezbollah won't bother taking Israeli territory. What would they do with it other than to move some of their missile batteries forward to better target the rest of Israel? But if they do that, they don't have the same degree of pre-made bunkers like they've built in southern Lebanon. And as I suggested, it would be much better not to try and thus avoid getting exposed to the US Air Force.
The real problem, as Nasrallah is painfully aware, is that if the US Air Force gets involved along with the Israeli Air Force, the population of Beirut (from the Israelis) and southern Lebanon (from the US) will be killed in the thousands. Nasrallah definitely wants to avoid that for political reasons in Lebanon. But he may not have a choice - especially if Israel starts it, which looks increasingly likely, as Crooke says.
I think what the Israelis are doing by threatening a Lebanese invasion or air campaign is to trade on that concern and try to convince Nasrallah to ratchet down his operation in the north. But Hezbollah has to keep that operation going to tie down Israeli forces that would otherwise be in Gaza. So both Israel and Hezbollah are stuck between a rock and a hard place. The Israelis really don't want to engage Hezbollah and Hezbollah doesn't want Lebanon bombed but also not see Hamas lose, so both are waving hands.
If Crooke is right, we'll see in January or February. Supposedly Biden has told Netanyahu to wrap it up by end of year - which I don't believe for an instant, that's just CYA on Biden's part - but Netanyahu I'm pretty sure will not. So if it's still on in the next two months, it will widen.
Agree with all that, last sentence in particular. I think Ritter may be correct as to Hezbollah's capability, but it's quite possible Hezbollah won't bother taking Israeli territory. What would they do with it other than to move some of their missile batteries forward to better target the rest of Israel? But if they do that, they don't have the same degree of pre-made bunkers like they've built in southern Lebanon. And as I suggested, it would be much better not to try and thus avoid getting exposed to the US Air Force.
The real problem, as Nasrallah is painfully aware, is that if the US Air Force gets involved along with the Israeli Air Force, the population of Beirut (from the Israelis) and southern Lebanon (from the US) will be killed in the thousands. Nasrallah definitely wants to avoid that for political reasons in Lebanon. But he may not have a choice - especially if Israel starts it, which looks increasingly likely, as Crooke says.
I think what the Israelis are doing by threatening a Lebanese invasion or air campaign is to trade on that concern and try to convince Nasrallah to ratchet down his operation in the north. But Hezbollah has to keep that operation going to tie down Israeli forces that would otherwise be in Gaza. So both Israel and Hezbollah are stuck between a rock and a hard place. The Israelis really don't want to engage Hezbollah and Hezbollah doesn't want Lebanon bombed but also not see Hamas lose, so both are waving hands.
If Crooke is right, we'll see in January or February. Supposedly Biden has told Netanyahu to wrap it up by end of year - which I don't believe for an instant, that's just CYA on Biden's part - but Netanyahu I'm pretty sure will not. So if it's still on in the next two months, it will widen.