Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov's interview with Editor-in-Chief of International Affairs magazine Alexander Oganesyan

Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov had a chat with the Editor-in-Chief of International Affairs magazine Alexander Oganesyan on Friday the 15th of December 2023. The following translation’s from Russia’s MFA site. Ryabkov gives further reinforcement to Russia’s stance about negotiations with the West over anything, not just Ukraine, that further backs statements made by President Putin yesterday.

Question: Sergei Alekseevich, today there is no shortage of talk about the need for a "new Western strategy for Ukraine." The voices of a number of politicians and analysts in the United States are becoming more and more decisive, calling for Kiev to be persuaded to strategic realism and even to sit it down at the negotiating table. But the question arises: how realistic is what the unexpectedly enlightened "peacekeepers" are calling for?

Ryabkov: I am not very inclined to be encouraged by such signals, not because I am subject to historical pessimism, but simply because we have observed certain vibrations before, at least among US political analysts, as to whether the "collective West" and its wards in Kiev are moving in the right direction. But this did not lead to any changes in the official line of Washington and the capitals it led. Most likely, this time more time will be needed so that the current deviations from the mainstream can be taken more seriously and substantively analyzed in relation to the situation. But the main thing is not even this, but the fact that changing the current, extremely hostile course of the United States and its satellites towards Russia requires not political science "get-togethers" or the publication of alternative views in the media, but a deep awareness by policy-making circles in "Greater Washington" and, of course, in the Biden administration, of the simple fact that the anti-Russian line, including in its Ukrainian interpretation, is doomed to fail. And that a huge strategic mistake was made from the very beginning, when they set a course for defeating Russia, for waging a hybrid war "to the last Ukrainian," as it is now customary to say in the West. And the recognition of this fact, which is initially obvious to us, can be the starting point for a real correction of their course.

And palliatives, some half-measures, which some venerable, authoritative political scientists and experts on Eurasian affairs in Washington and Europe are talking about, from our point of view, will not lead to stabilisation of the situation. On the contrary, they will become the forerunner of a new, possibly even more acute crisis, because Kiev will undoubtedly turn such schemes in its favor and, with massive support from the West, will regroup, will again commit provocations and crimes, and will again begin to pose threats to the security of our country. This cannot be allowed.

Question: The November issue of Foreign Affairs published an article by highly respected political scientists who held major positions in the US State Department, such as Robert Haass and Charles Kupchan. Both authors predicted that Ukraine's "counteroffensive" would lead the situation into a "bloody stalemate." So, what do "America's best minds" offer? Quote: "The best way out of this situation is a two-step strategy aimed at first strengthening Ukraine's military capabilities, and then, when ... the peak of hostilities will pass, take Moscow and Kiev out of the battlefield and sit down at the negotiating table." Your comment?

Ryabkov: At the outset, I would like to emphasise that Ukraine has never been of independent value to the Americans, neither before nor after the start of the special military operation. It is a means of suppressing the trend of Russia's international rise, countering the strengthening of our international positions and the development of our economy. The special military operation has become a pretext for launching a reckless and all-encompassing sanctions, propaganda, political, and now open war in its hybrid forms on a scale that has not been practiced by Russia's enemies so far. If there had been no Ukraine, they would have come up with something else.

In fact, in recent years, we have been heading towards just such a sharp clash. In my understanding, it has a civilizational scale. By and large, the question is whether the current crisis will be able to accelerate the formation of a multipolar world, where the historical West will occupy a solid, significant, but still limited place, or whether this historical "collective West" will be able to temporarily prolong the illusion of its own domination in international affairs through its own blood – not its own, but the blood of other peoples.

Now let's talk about the subject that R. Haas and C. Kupchan touched upon. Sometimes one is struck by the speculative nature of the schemes promoted by even the most profound researchers and good experts in Russian affairs. Two-stage, for example, in the case of a rocket, is well designed and calculated on a computer. But no linear, even the most sophisticated, schemes can be applied to such issues as the denazification of Ukraine, the protection of the Russian, Russian-speaking population, the return of historically Russian territories to the bosom of the Motherland, and everything related to this. In addition, he is not ready to assess whether those responsible in Washington, those on whom the official US policy depends, are able to take seriously what these political analysts are proposing, at least among themselves behind closed doors. Moreover, we are not ready to discuss what the official line of the Russian side may be with regard to such constructions. There's just no subject here.

By and large, political scientists do not have a very good dialogue with American representatives, precisely because in all their approaches there is an unwillingness to admit the obvious fact, namely, that Russia has had, has and will always have fundamental national interests. And we cannot neglect them for the sake of conjuncture and certain circumstances. We have defended them and will continue to protect them. The historical predetermination of what is happening is clear to us. And for the Americans, all this can be reduced to some kind of games in the style of situational analyses, which, probably, is still being done by senior students of political science faculties at leading universities. This is the sin of the approach of political scientists from the United States. He is detached from life. Although, perhaps, it is outwardly attractive, and, probably, the number of reposts, mentions of this publication is high and flatters the authors. But this has very little to do with life.

A lot has changed since February 2022. We can see what happened to the Ukrainian so-called "counteroffensive" advertised in the West. New regions are steadily and irreversibly entering our socio-political and state fabric, as well as the structure of our society. Many other things have also changed, so the starting point for a solution sometime in the future will be very different than before. And we will not make concessions. The special military operation will end in complete success, and the goals set for it will be achieved.

Question: Could anything change dramatically if Donald Trump returns to the White House? And could you interpret his statement that if he became president, he would put an end to the crisis in Ukraine the very next day?

Ryabkov: I believe that this is more of a figure of speech than evidence that he has a plan that is effective and workable. There can be no magic solutions, magic wands are not applicable here. And we have seen that during Mr Trump's tenure in the White House, the US policy towards Russia was very tough. Trump far surpassed his predecessor Obama in the number of waves of sanctions that were applied to Russia during his period. There have been some dangerous excesses during Trump's tenure in the White House, such as threatening tweets on behalf of the US president about some American missiles that are about to fly. But such things are not to be trifled with. This is very serious. These are destabilizing signals.

There are no signs that if he wins the upcoming elections, something will change in a favorable direction in terms of the approach to Russia, and in general, the US policy towards Russia will become more sensible and responsible. By and large, there is nothing to build positive forecasts on, although someone just wants to believe in the best.

Let's wait for the American elections. There is still a long way to go. And it is not known how the election campaign will unfold. It is already demonstrating high tension and acuteness. It is clear that there will be surprises. We are nothing more than observers who try not to miss important points for our own understanding of what is happening. We do not influence the election process in any way and have never tried to influence it. And it is absolutely outrageous what was done by politicians and functionaries of the Democratic Party in previous periods, when Russia was accused of some kind of interference in the internal affairs and electoral processes in the United States – by definition, this could not happen. Then the empty accusations burst, exposing the hostile nature of the attitude of all these figures towards Russia. They are using the mythical "Russian threat" to achieve their own domestic political goals. I do not rule out that something similar may happen in the future.

Question: Obviously, there is an anti-Russian consensus between the Democrats and the Republicans, but doesn't the attempt to block funding for Ukraine indicate a certain sobriety of views in Republican circles?

Ryabkov: I admit that some politicians, publicists and experts may have an epiphany. But the inertia of the U.S. state machine and the determination of all those who set the tone to prevent Russia from gaining the upper hand will prevail, at least in the foreseeable future. At the same time, the public show around the inter-party struggle in Congress is repeated on various materials with a certain periodicity. All this circus about each time such a "painful" approval of another "financial patch" for the budget: ah, again the American federal government is on the verge of stopping! Oh, how are we going to live?! However, everyone around them understands that they will again come to an agreement at the last moment, again raise the "ceiling" of the national debt by a certain number of trillions, shifting their current problems to future generations of Americans. This performance will continue as it has been going before. But there are no more gullible and naïve people in this circus who would sit in the gallery and watch with interest how the magician pulls a hare out of his hat by the ears. This is all in the last century, everyone is already tired of it.

Question: It seems that the Ukrainian "impasse" is not the only one in US foreign policy. Can we say that the process of negotiations on the limitation and control of nuclear weapons is in the stage of "deep freeze" and is Russia interested in "unfreezing" it today?

Ryabkov: Not only are there no talks, but there is even a systematic dialogue on this issue. Negotiations are a special genre and a special format. They require a detailed agenda agreed upon by the parties. They require the systematization of even intermediate results. In fact, according to the classics, each day of official negotiations ends with a protocol, which is then signed by the parties, so that there is no ambiguity about what happened and how it happened and what the prospects for moving forward are. Delegations need to be clear about where to proceed. This correct practice is a thing of the past. There are no periodic, or even episodic meetings on specialized topics with the participation of experts, with the participation of representatives of departments. The reason for this is clear. The Americans have unilaterally stopped the dialogue with us.

Recently, however, they have returned to this topic, signaling that it seems to be worth returning to it. For our part, we told them a long time ago, even before their appeal, that outside the general context of bilateral relations, which are literally in ruins as a result of the extremely irresponsible policy of the American side, we are not ready to resume the relevant discussions. Moreover, there are no elements of novelty in the American approach to these subjects. This is their next attempt to play one goal, i.e. ours. We are not ready for such games.

We have experience, even if it is not the most recent, of reaching agreements with the United States that were based on the only permissible basis – a strict balance of interests and the absence of unilateral advantages on the part of the American side. This experience cannot be erased. But today there is simply no format or subject for bilateral discussions with the United States on this topic. This, however, does not mean that we are moving away from discussing issues related to strategic stability at other multilateral venues. There is, for example, the Nuclear Five, and there is a certain exchange of views, including with US representatives. There is work on the sidelines of relevant international organisations. And as the international community moves forward, for example, towards the next Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, I think the relevant efforts will continue, including within the framework of the current coordination of the Russian Federation in the Nuclear Five.

Question: Recently, there was a discussion about nuclear weapons testing. Can you comment on how we view this problem now?

Ryabkov: The Russian Federation has withdrawn its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). This was done in order to align our international legal and political status with that of the United States. For many years, we believed that Americans would follow our example (and, to date, the example of more than 170 other countries). But the overall security situation has changed radically, and we can no longer remain in the position of a country that has fully acceded to a treaty that has not entered into force because the United States (and, looking at them, some other countries) has not ratified it. We have called on the Americans countless times to reconsider this destructive position. But the administrations in Washington that have succeeded each other for more than twenty years have either given encouraging signals, or the Trump administration was simply proud of the fact that they were not going to join the CTBT. These "juggling tricks", also from the circus repertoire, eventually began to bore us.

Now the situation in the world is such that, by and large, there is no time for jokes, especially with such issues. Therefore, we have drawn the necessary conclusions. At the same time, they did not withdraw their signature under the contract. We continue to cooperate with the provisional technical secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. We are completing the creation of the Russian segment of the international monitoring system within the framework of the CTBTO. But what will happen next is entirely a question for the United States.

As for nuclear tests, I can say that if the United States resumes them, they will receive the same response from our side. Of course, they have recently repeatedly signaled that they have no such intentions and that they are even ready to show some transparency with regard to their training ground. But today there are no intentions, and tomorrow they may appear.

We remember, for example, what is written in the Russia-NATO Founding Act regarding the "lack of plans, intentions and reasons" to deploy significant combat forces in Central and Eastern Europe. NATO cynically trampled on this commitment. Both the plans and intentions of the Western group led by the United States are purely aggressive and belligerent. We do not judge by words, but by deeds, and we ourselves must be ready at any moment. And, I would add, in combat readiness in the literal sense of the word, if necessary. Such an approach is fully applicable to the topic of the resumption of nuclear tests. If the Americans believe that it makes sense for them to try to test our strength in this area, they are mistaken. They will get a completely new situation if they only allow themselves, abstracting from a sober assessment of the situation, to follow the path of further destabilization and escalation.

Question: The late Henry Kissinger, a legend of US foreign policy, once said that being America's enemy is dangerous and being its friend is fatal, in other words, deadly. Did you know Henry Kissinger personally?

Ryabkov: I did not know him personally. Although I attended a number of events with his participation, and once I even sat on the presidium when the late Henry Kissinger was awarded a diploma and the mantle of an honorary doctor of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Academy. At that time, he spoke not only as his official opponent, but at least with comments on his doctoral lecture at the Diplomatic Academy. Now it seems that it was not even in another era, but on another planet.

Henry Kissinger symbolizes what America once formulated as "realpolitik." I would simply call it a sensible approach to international relations – not pro-Russian or pro-Chinese at all, but profoundly pro-American. Kissinger was an extraordinary thinker and practitioner in diplomacy. There are probably no such people in America today. At least they are not in plain sight. There was a great loss, and it is no coincidence that both President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov sent their condolences to his widow.

I think, of course, that there is a certain amount of posturing in this paradoxical phrase you mentioned. But there is also some truth in the fact that recklessly putting one's interests at the mercy of Washington is, at the very least, irresponsible, and, in the grand scheme of things, risky. But, for example, the part of modern Europe that is part of the EU and NATO does not care at all about the fatal risk to itself that its complete subordination to America entails. By the way, I don't understand why we have become so accustomed to equating the European Union with the word "Europe." For me, Europe starts from the Ural Mountains and ends somewhere near Cascais and Estoril behind Lisbon.

The modern political class in the European Union, due to its inferiority and the extremely low level of decision-makers, is simply unable to declare that American diktat and American suppression are a direct disadvantage of European interests. However, what can we say about it? If I continue to develop this topic, of course, there will be those who, in the traditional manner, will again begin to promote reproaches, as they formulate it, that the Russians are trying to sow discord on both sides of the Atlantic, drive a wedge, and so on.

We've heard enough of it, excuse me, to the point of yawning. There is nowhere to drive wedges, even if we wanted to, because the closeness of the ranks and the stick, barracks discipline in the Western circle determine everything. They hide behind arguments about their community of values, about the inadmissibility of giving free rein to authoritarian regimes, about the importance of continuing the global work of promoting freedom and human rights. But what they are really promoting is becoming more and more like a denial of the very foundations on which normal human relations are built.

The question was put correctly by Dr. Henry Kissinger. If you always obey the will of the suzerain, the will of the American hegemon, then you can lose everything. Just put everything in the hands of the Americans. But that's their choice. If it's more convenient for them, for God's sake.

Question: Can we say that the short-lived era of globalization is coming to an end? If so, what are the signs of deglobalization, or perhaps a qualitatively different globalization?

Ryabkov: You say deglobalisation. Our American colleagues have coined the term "compartmentalization" in relation to arms control. In my opinion, our world will probably not be able to completely disperse to its corners, to its closets and live without communicating with each other, at least because of modern technologies and their all-encompassing scale. But politically and economically, as recent practice shows, I fully admit the construction of new walls and barriers.

How effective it is is another question. But, for example, from the point of view of security, there is no way out. I recall a time when there were certain discussions about whether it was necessary to follow the path of creating our own space systems for global positioning. We, the Russian Federation, took up the groundwork created in Soviet times quite early and created GLONASS. In the absence of GLONASS, the current situation would look completely different.

I think all countries that have sufficient technological potential are forced to act in the same way. The Chinese have created their own system. Yes, all this leads to the fact that there are more and more satellites in orbit. In some places, there is nowhere for the apple to fall, and this also needs to be addressed, but collectively, on the basis of a balance of interests.

Question: There is an opinion that with the departure of the "decrepit" hegemon, as President Vladimir Putin put it, the world will disintegrate "into alliances and alliances" and will not be able to adequately respond to the large-scale global challenges of the time. Do you agree with this point of view?

Ryabkov: I think that the world will become multipolar or polycentric. Some Western researchers believe that the world will be "non-polar." That is, it will be a world of a certain chaos, in which, along with manifestations associated with new technologies, up to artificial intelligence, with a "green" agenda, the law of the strongest will dominate.

We believe that it is necessary to move along the path of civilizational maturation and the formation, if you like, of the Westphalian model-2.0. That is, a model in which equality and mutual respect of states is put at the forefront. It is clear that achieving this is extremely difficult, if not unbearable, given the period of severe crises and trials that the international community is going through now. But there is simply no alternative.

Multipolarity presupposes that interaction will proceed strictly on the basis of equality and consideration of each other's interests. This also applies to "civilizational states". Russia is one of them. This also applies to all members of the international community who do not look back at their "hegemons" when they work for the common good and, above all, for the benefit of their peoples, look for partners where it is convenient and profitable for them, and at the same time do not fear that they will be beaten on the wrist with sanctions, threats and blackmail.

Q: Washington has repeatedly expressed concerns about China's growing nuclear potential. Did the United States manage to make any progress on the bilateral nuclear agenda with Beijing during the recent Sino-US summit?

Ryabkov: We closely followed President Xi Jinping's important meeting with President Joe Biden in San Francisco on the sidelines of the recent APEC summit. In the security sphere, I would like to note the agreement between the two leaders to resume military contacts. As for strategic stability and arms control, shortly before the summit, the parties held a round of consultations at the expert level.

We proceed from the premise that they discussed issues that are directly related to the work in the nuclear five format. And if both sides have an interest in this and are attentive to the topics on the relevant agenda, we can only welcome it.

Question: We have discussed the BRICS issue more than once, and I have expressed the opinion that it would be a good idea to give this association a more definite and mutually binding status for its members. You diplomatically rejected this approach. But I must confess that perhaps many of us come from the old bloc mentality with a rigid internal discipline of mutual obligations. The advantages of the latter were obvious in the conditions of the Cold War, the bipolar and then the unipolar world. But one gets the impression that the new generation of associations and communities needs more openness and inclusiveness, and this may be the key to their future resilience and productivity?

Ryabkov: BRICS is a very special and, in my opinion, unparalleled community of states, which in a historically short period of time, a little more than 15 years, has turned from an experimental format into a significant and, frankly speaking, increasingly important factor in international affairs. Network diplomacy is the toolkit of BRICS. Although we are aware of the difficulties of ensuring the functioning of the BRICS mechanism in the absence of the Secretariat, I would like to remind you that the volumes, even in terms of mutual communication between the participants and the number of documents, continue to grow.

We believe that it is at least premature to refocus on the institutional consolidation of BRICS, let alone giving some structures a supranational character. First of all, we need to go through the stage of integration of newcomers into BRICS. Let me remind you that at the summit in Johannesburg in August of this year, six countries received invitations.

At the recent meeting of the BRICS Sherpas and Sous-Sherpas in South Africa, everyone except Argentina was represented. But Argentina has not officially said no. We are calmly and patiently waiting for the official response of the new authorities of that country to the invitation they have. There is no emergency here, there is no rush. In general, BRICS is a structure of a benevolent approach and mutual respect for each other. You see, in the good sense of the word, family. That's what BRICS is all about.

I am very glad that those of the states invited in Johannesburg that have already confirmed their readiness to join the association share this attitude.

Institutionalization and the creation of a legal framework are carried out in segments. There are already several agreements within the framework of BRICS, they are legally binding. Now, by the way, there is a question of how to ensure that newcomers are connected to such agreements. Not an easy topic in itself.

The second issue that confronted us on the eve of the start of Russia's presidency of the association was the fulfillment of the leaders' instructions to develop a category of so-called partner states. Many countries from different parts of the world have signaled their interest in rapprochement with BRICS, up to and including full-fledged membership. This needs to be worked out in a constructive manner.

Question: In other words, the trend of BRICS expansion continues?

Ryabkov: There are quite a few people who want to join BRICS today, more than two dozen. This is in addition to those countries that have already officially announced that they are ready to join the association on January 1, 2024. So far, there is no experience of the functioning of the enlarged BRICS. These are the questions that will have to be answered during Russia's presidency.

We have prepared an extensive calendar of events, which we shared with all participants in Durban (South Africa), where the aforementioned Sherpa meeting took place. The key event will be, of course, the association's summit in Kazan next autumn. A dozen and a half ministerial meetings are scheduled in different cities of Russia. In general, the BRICS tradition suggests that the host country, the chair country, acquaints other participants with its life and the diversity of regions.

BRICS is a platform that is not only and not even so much a metropolitan one. I think that Kazan will actually become the capital of BRICS in the coming year. In addition to the summit, a whole series of events is planned, including ministerial meetings and the BRICS Games. The Russian chairmanship is determined to show the BRICS people Murmansk, Vladivostok, Yekaterinburg and much more.

Question: In conclusion, Sergei Alekseevich, what would you wish the readers of International Affairs magazine in the New Year?

Ryabkov: This is a simple wish. Peace and the blue sky above your head. Of course, wishes for fulfilled hopes and the implementation of plans. We, the Foreign Service and specifically the people working in the direction of BRICS, in the direction of developing relations with the "global majority", are entering the New Year firmly convinced that we are moving in the right direction. The strength of the Russian Federation's position is undeniable. The authority of our country is unshakable. This is how it will continue to be! [My Emphasis]

Quite a number of important emphasized points mostly dealing with the relations between Russia and the Outlaw US Empire. As you read, Ryabkov is more direct than Lavrov. Despite his faults, there’s a reverence that was shown to Kissinger before his passing that even his disparagers admit he was the last of a certain Western diplomatic type. And when reading the words of many Russians and Chinese, there’s a lament that any sort of honest conversation with the West is currently impossible—the pouring of cold water on the hope that a Trump victory would somehow alter the course of relations was very realistic. There’s currently lots of speculation that Modi’s India will act like a 5th Column within BRICS and SCO to the benefit of the Empire. But no questions were asked about Russian-Indian relations. Can the BRICS+ become a strong enough family to dissuade India from going against its own interests? What else will happen before 2024 begins?

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