German Military Going Against its Parliament: Intercepted Conversation

RT’s editor in chief Margarita Simonyan posted the audio of this conversation to her Telegram then provided the Transcript of the conversation of high-ranking officers of the Bundeswehr dated 02/19/2024 at her VK site. This was made known to my by the following Q&A directed to Lavrov at today’s Antalya Diplomatic Forum. First we’ll read that interaction, then the entire translated transcript of the conversation:

Question (retranslated from English): The media have published a conversation between German officers about how they plan to blow up the Crimean Bridge. Can you comment on this?

Sergey Lavrov: I read today what was posted on social media and announced by Margarita Simonyan with reference to relevant sources. On the one hand, it's amazing. On the other hand, no.

I have already mentioned that we know for certain about the participation of military personnel from NATO countries, who are sometimes disguised as mercenaries, sometimes as people who do not belong to the armed forces of the alliance.

There are some interesting things about this conversation. German generals discussed how to "more cunningly" supply Ukraine with long-range weapons (mentioned TAURUS) for an attack on the Crimean bridge and ammunition depots. And to make sure that they are not noticed, because German Chancellor Olaf Scholz allegedly does not like this, and the Americans and the British are already there. There was a conversation about whether it was possible to guide missiles remotely without being in Ukraine. One of the generals said it would still be a direct involvement. They know what they're talking about. In one of the exchanges, it is said that there are "guys from the United States in civilian clothes."

I don't know what to call it, but the face of our NATO colleagues is completely down. Let's see how they will communicate with their population.

And now for the entire transcript that begins with her header:

On February 19, 2024, the following conversation took place between the head of the operations and exercises department of the Bundeswehr Air Force Command Graefe, the BBC inspector of the Bundeswehr Gerhartz and the employees of the Air Operations Center of the Bundeswehr Space Command Fenske and Frostedte.

Gerhartz: Greetings, everyone! Grefe, are you in Singapore now?

Graefe: Yes.

Gerhartz: Okay. We have to verify the information. As you have already heard, Defense Minister Pistorius intends to carefully work out the issue of supplying Taurus missiles to Ukraine. We have a meeting with him. Everything needs to be discussed so that we can begin to work on this issue. So far, I do not see that the moment of the beginning of these deliveries has been indicated. It wasn't like the chancellor said to him, "I want to get information now and tomorrow morning we'll make a decision." I've never heard anything like that. On the contrary, Pistorius assesses the whole unfolding discussion. No one knows why the Federal Chancellor is blocking these deliveries. Of course, the most incredible rumors appear. Let me give you an example: yesterday I received a phone call from a journalist who is very close to the Chancellor. She had heard somewhere in Munich that the Taurus missiles would not work. I asked her who had told her that. She replied that someone in military uniform had told her so. Of course, this is a low-level source of information, but the journalist latched on to these words and wants to make a story out of it under the headline: "Now we know the reason why the chancellor refuses to send Taurus missiles - they won't work." It's all stupidity. Such topics are available only to a limited circle of people, but we see what nonsense is spreading in the meantime, they are talking complete nonsense. I want to coordinate this issue with you so that we do not move in the wrong direction. First of all, I have questions for Frostedte and Fenske. Has anyone talked to you about this? Did Freuding contact you?

Frostedte: No. I only talked to Graefe.

Fenske: It's the same thing, I've only talked to Graefe.

Gerhartz: Maybe he'll come to you again. I will probably have to participate in the hearings of the budget commission, because there are problems related to the increase in prices for converting the infrastructure for the F-35 in Büchel. I've already conveyed my recommendations through Frank that we should have slides to visualize the material. We showed him a test presentation, where Taurus missiles were installed on a Tornado carrier or on another carrier required by the mission. However, I have little idea of it. It is necessary to remember that this is a half-hour meeting, so you should not prepare a presentation for 30 slides. There should be a short report. It is necessary to show what the missile can do, how it can be used. It is necessary to take into account, if we make a political decision on the transfer of missiles as assistance to Ukraine, what consequences this may lead to. I would be grateful if you could tell me not only what problems we have, but how we can solve them. For example, when it comes to delivery methods... I know what the English do. They always transport them in Ridgback armored vehicles. They have a few people on the ground. The French don't do that. They are supplying Q7 missiles with Scalp missiles to Ukraine. Storm Shadow and Scalp have similar specifications for their installation. How are we going to solve this problem? Will we put MBDA missiles in their hands with Ridgback? Will one of our people be seconded to the MBDA? Grefe, please tell us what our position is on this issue. Messrs. Fenske and Frostedte, please report on how you see the situation.

Graefe: I'll start with the most sensitive issues, the existing criticism of supply. Discussions are taking place almost everywhere. There are a few of the most important aspects here. First of all, there are delivery times. If the Chancellor now decides that we should supply missiles, they will be transferred from the Bundeswehr. Good, but they won't be ready for use until eight months later. Secondly, we cannot shorten the time. Because if we do that, there could be a misuse, a missile could fall on a kindergarten, there would be civilian casualties again. These aspects must be taken into account. It should be noted during the negotiations that we will not be able to do anything without the manufacturer. They can equip, re-equip and deliver the first missiles. We can catch up a little bit, but we shouldn't wait until we have 20 pieces, we can transfer five at a time. The delivery time of these missiles directly depends on the industry. Who will pay for it? Another question is what weapons systems will these missiles be attached to? How should the interaction between the company and Ukraine be maintained? Or do we have some kind of integration?

Gerhartz: I don't think so. Because the manufacturer TSG has said that they can solve this problem within six months, it doesn't matter if it's a Sukhoi or an F-16.

Graefe: If the Federal Chancellor decides to go for it, then there should be an understanding that it will take six months just to produce the fasteners. Thirdly, theoretically, we may be affected by the issue of education. I have already said that we are cooperating with a missile manufacturer. They teach the maintenance of these systems, and we teach the tactical application. It takes three to four months. This part of the training can take place in Germany. When the first missiles arrive, we need to make a quick decision on mounts and training. Perhaps we will have to turn to the British on these issues and take advantage of their know-how. We can provide them with databases, satellite images, and planning stations. Apart from the supply of the missiles themselves, which we have, everything else can be supplied by industry or IABG.

Gerhartz: We need to imagine that they can use aircraft with mounts for Taurus missiles and for Storm Shadow. The British were there and equipped the planes. The systems are not so different, they can be used for the Taurus as well. I can tell you about the experience of using the Patriot complex. At first, our experts also calculated long terms, but they managed to cope with it in a matter of weeks. They were able to get everything up and running so quickly and in such numbers that our staff said, "Wow. We didn't expect that." We are now fighting a war that uses far more modern technology than our good old Luftwaffe. All of this suggests that when we plan deadlines, we shouldn't overestimate them. And now, Messrs. Fenske and Frostedte, I would like to hear your opinion on possible deliveries to the Ukraine.

Fenske: I would like to talk about the question of training. We have already studied this issue, and if we deal with personnel who already have the appropriate training and will be training at the same time, it will take about three weeks to learn the technique and only then proceed directly to training in the Air Force, which will last about four weeks. So it's much less than 12 weeks. Of course, all this, provided that the staff has the appropriate qualifications, training can be carried out without resorting to the services of interpreters, and a couple of other points. We have already spoken with Ms. Friedberger. If we are talking about combat use, then in this case, de facto, we will be advised to support at least the first group. It's difficult to plan, it took about a year to train our staff and we are now trying to reduce that time to ten weeks and hope that they will be able to race off-road in a car designed for Formula 1. A possible option is to provide scheduled technical support, theoretically this can be done from Büchel, provided that a secure connection with Ukraine is created. If it were affordable, then the appropriate planning could be carried out further. This is the main scenario at least - to provide full support for the manufacturer, support through the customer support service, which will solve problems with the software. Basically, everything is the same as it happens in Germany.

Gerhartz: Wait a minute. I know what you're saying. Politicians may be concerned about the direct closed connection between Büchel and Ukraine, which could become a direct involvement in the Ukrainian conflict. But in this case, we can say that the exchange of information will take place through the MBDA, and we will send one or two of our specialists to Schrobenhausen. Of course, this is a ruse, but from a political point of view, it may look different. If the information is exchanged through the manufacturer, it is not linked to us.

Fenske: The question will arise as to where the information is coming from. If we are talking about information about targets, which ideally includes satellite images that provide a maximum accuracy of three meters, then we must first process them in Büchel. I think that, regardless of this, it is possible to somehow organize the exchange of information between Büchel and Schrobenhausen, or it is possible to work out the possibility of transferring information to Poland, to do it where it is possible to reach by car. This issue needs to be considered more closely, options will certainly appear. If we are supported, then in the worst case, we can even travel by car, which will reduce the response time. Of course, we will not be able to respond within an hour, as we will need to give our consent. In the best-case scenario, it is not until six hours after receiving the information that the planes will be able to carry out the order. To hit certain targets, an accuracy of more than three meters is enough, but, if you need to clarify the target, you need to work with satellite images that allow you to simulate it. And then the response time can be up to 12 hours. It all depends on the goal. I haven't studied this issue in detail, but I believe that this option is possible. It is only necessary to say that we should think about how to organize the transfer of information.

Gerhartz: Do you think we can hope that Ukraine will be able to do everything on its own? After all, it is known that there are many people in civilian clothes who speak with an American accent. So it's possible that they'll soon be able to use it themselves? After all, they have all the satellite images.

Fenske: Yes. They get them from us. I would also like to briefly touch upon the issues of air defence. We should think carefully about having equipment in Kyiv to receive information from the IABG and the NDK. We have to provide them with that, so I have to fly there on February 21, we need to plan everything optimally, not like with Storm Shadow when we planned the checkpoints. We need to think about how to fly around or fly below the radar's field of view. If everything is prepared, then the training will be more effective. And then it will be possible to return to the question of the number of missiles. If you give 50 pieces, they will be used up very quickly.

Gerhartz: Exactly, it won't change the course of the war. So we don't want to hand them all over. And not all at the same time. Maybe 50 in the first tranche, then maybe there will be another tranche of 50 missiles. This is perfectly understandable, but all this is big politics. I guess what's really behind it. I've heard from my French and British colleagues that these Storm Shadows and Scalps are actually the same as the Winchester rifles - they may ask, "Why should we deliver the next batch of missiles, since we have already delivered them, let Germany do it now?" Perhaps Mr. Frostedte has something to say on this subject?

Frostedte: Let me add a bit of pragmatism. I want to share my thoughts on the characteristics of Storm Shadow. We are talking about air defense, flight time, flight altitude and so on, I came to the conclusion that there are two interesting targets - the bridge to the east and the ammunition depots, which are located above. The bridge in the east is hard to reach, it's a fairly small target, but the Taurus can do it, ammunition depots can also hit. If you take all of this into account and compare it to how many Storm Shadows and HIMARS were used, then I had a question: "Is our goal a bridge or military depots?" And I've come to the conclusion that the limiting factor is that they usually only have 24 charges...

Gerhartz: That's understandable.

Frostedte: It makes sense to annex Ukraine to the TTR. This will take a week. I think it's appropriate to think about task planning and central planning. It takes us two weeks to plan tasks, but if you are interested in it, you can do it faster. If we look at the bridge, I think that Taurus is not enough and we need to have an idea of how it can work, and for that we need data from satellites. I don't know if we will be able to prepare Ukrainians for such a task in a short time, and we are talking about a month. What would a Taurus attack on the bridge look like? From an operational perspective, I cannot estimate how quickly the Ukrainians will be able to learn to plan for such actions and how quickly integration will take place. But since we are talking about a bridge and military bases, I understand that they want to get them as soon as possible.

Fenske: I would like to say one more thing about the destruction of the bridge. We have been working intensively on this issue and, unfortunately, have come to the conclusion that the bridge is similar to a runway due to its size. Therefore, it may not require 10 or even 20 missiles.

Gerhartz: There is an opinion that the Taurus will succeed if you use the French Dassault Rafale fighter.

Fenske: All they can do is make a hole and damage the bridge.

And, before we make important statements, we must ourselves...

Frostedte: I'm not pushing the idea of a bridge, I'm pragmatically trying to understand what they want. And what we have to teach them, so it turns out that we will need to indicate the main points in the images when planning these operations. They will have goals, but here you should take into account that when working on small goals, you need to plan more scrupulously, and not parse pictures on the computer. In the case of confirmed goals, everything is simpler and it will take less time to plan.

Gerhartz: We all know that they want to destroy the bridge, that it ultimately means how it is guarded, not only because it has an important military-strategic significance, but also because it has a political significance. Although they now have a land corridor as well. There are certain concerns if we have a direct connection with the Ukrainian armed forces. Therefore, the question will arise - is it possible to use such a trick and send our people to the MBDA? Thus, there will be a direct connection with Ukraine only through the MBDA, which is much better than if such a connection exists with our Air Force.

Graefe: Gerhartz, it doesn't matter. We need to make sure that there are no formulations from the very beginning that make us a party to the conflict. Of course, I am exaggerating a little, but if we tell the minister now that we will schedule meetings and go by car from Poland so that no one notices, this is already participation, we will not do it. If we are talking about a manufacturer, then the first thing to ask MBDA is if they can do this. It doesn't matter whether our people then do it in Büchel or in Schrobenhausen, it's still participation. And I don't think that should be done. At the very beginning, we identified this as the main element of the "red line", so we will participate in the training. Let's say that we will prepare a "road map". It is necessary to divide the learning process into parts. The long track will be designed for four months, we will train them thoroughly, including working out the option with a bridge. The short one will be designed for two weeks so that they can use the missiles as soon as possible. If they are already trained, we will ask if the British are ready to take them up at this stage. I believe that such an action would be correct - just imagine if the press found out that our people were in Schrobenhausen or that we were driving cars somewhere in Poland! I consider this option unacceptable.

Gerhartz: If such a political decision is made, we have to say that Ukrainians should come to us. First of all, we need to know whether such a political decision is not a direct participation in the planning of tasks, in which case the training will take a little longer, they will be able to perform more complex tasks, that it is quite possible that they already have some experience and use high-tech equipment. If it is possible to avoid direct involvement, we cannot participate in the planning of tasks, do it in Büchel and then send it to them - for Germany this is a "red line". You can teach them for two months, during which time they will not learn everything, but they will be able to do something. We just have to make sure that they are able to process all the information, work with all the parameters.

Graefe: Seppel said that it is possible to make a long and short road map. It's about getting results in a short time. And if, at the first stage, the task is to hit ammunition depots, and not such complex objects as bridges, then in this case you can proceed to an abbreviated program and get a quick result. As for the information from the IABG, I don't think this problem is critical, because they are not tied to a specific place, they have to do the reconnaissance themselves. It is clear that efficiency depends on this. This is exactly what we said, that this should be taken into account when transferring missiles. This has not yet been decided. But that's the way it is.

Gerhartz: And that's going to be the main point. There are ammunition depots for which it will not be possible to conduct short training due to very active air defense. This will need to be seriously addressed. I think that our people will find a solution. It is only necessary that we be allowed to try first, so that we can give better political advice. We have to prepare better so that we don't fail because y KSA may have no idea where the air defense systems actually are. Ukrainians have such information, we have data from radars. But when it comes to precise planning, we need to know where the radars are installed and where the fixed installations are located, and how to get around them. This will allow you to develop a more accurate plan. We have a super tool, and if we have the exact coordinates, we can apply it accurately. But there is no reason to say that we can't do it. There is a certain scale where the "red line" is drawn politically, there is a "long" and a "short" path, there are differences in terms of using all the potential, which over time the Ukrainians will be able to better use, because they will have practice, they will do it constantly. I don't think I personally should attend the meeting. It's important to me that we present a sober assessment and not add fuel to the fire, as others do, supplying Storm Shadow and Scalp.

Graefe: I mean, the longer it takes them to make a decision, the longer it will take us to implement it. We need to divide everything into stages. Start with the simple first, and then move on to the complex. Or can we turn to the British, can they support us at the initial stage, take care of the planning? We can force what lies in our area of responsibility. The development of mounts for missiles is not one of our tasks, Ukraine should solve this issue with manufacturers on its own.

Gerhartz: We don't want to get into trouble because of the budget commission. This may make it impossible to start construction work at the Büchel airbase in 2024. Every day now counts in the program. [My Emphasis]

The German parliament voted by an almost 3:1 ratio against supplying Ukraine with the Taurus missile system while narrowly approving a more modest appropriation of weapons and funds. And the media now knows about this arrangement. There’re several acronyms I’m not familiar with to which I apologize to readers. The vote took place on 22 February 2024, was one of several and is reported by German media here. Clearly, the conversation anticipated a yes vote but also seems to have an option to follow in case the vote was no, which it was. However, there’s a lot of very revealing and damning info provided above. The admission that supplying the Taurus missile won’t alter the conflict’s outcome renders the missile a terrorist weapon as we know the Ukie Nazis will use it to target civilian targets like the Kerch Bridge, which they admit will only damage it.

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