Lukyanov: The Long Game: Why Russia Should Resist the Temptation to Start a "New Romance" with the United States
This essay was published in the Russian journal Profile on 24 February then translated, edited and republished in English by RT on 26 February as “Trump’s America is no friend – Russia must stay the course: Moscow must resist the illusion of a new romance with Washington.” In several previous translations, I’ve warned readers about RT’s manipulation during its editing that often alters the thesis of the original or adds other points not provided by the author. As Lukyanov’s title implies. his essay is a warning to beware the Outlaw U S Empire because its motives still aim at global control but via non-military means that it now lacks. So, continue to keep the goals of the Long Game front-and-center while critically examining short term possibilities. The reestablishment of relations with the Outlaw US Empire doesn’t imply those relations will automatically be friendly:
Announcing the start of a special military operation on the territory of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin listed the reasons that forced the use of force. In particular, he pointed to the enemy—"the entire so-called Western bloc, formed by the United States in its own image and likeness." "There is no need to be modest: the United States is still a great country, a backbone power," Putin said at the time. " All its satellites not only meekly and obediently agree, sing along with it on any occasion, but also copy its behavior, enthusiastically accept the rules proposed to it ..." This meant the readiness of the "collective West" (this concept became firmly established in our everyday life during the NWO [SMO]) to act against Russia at the behest of the hegemonic country.
In that speech, the passage about the structure of the West, frankly speaking, was not the main one, and the main news overshadowed everything else. And the whirlpool of further dizzying events swallowed up speculation about the nature of the opposing side for a long time. Moreover, the thesis about the "image and likeness" seemed to be fully confirmed. Europe and the Asian allies of the United States, despite serious losses, initiated a break with Russia. All the subsequent time, none of them even stuttered about the resumption of relations.
Three years later, the question "what is the West?" suddenly turned out to be almost the key to the outcome of this entire complex collision. Donald Trump's return to the White House had the effect of a powerful volcanic eruption or a tectonic shift. First of all, this applies specifically to the Western, transatlantic association, the ground of which is slipping from under its feet. More precisely, to develop this metaphor, one of the two "legs" of the community suddenly kicked the other in a big way. Apparently, to make it move in rhythm, but now to walk in the opposite direction. The "limbs" that received a kick are painful and bitter, but they are not allowed to calm down and recover, continuing to shower them if not with blows, then with offensive abuse.
How will relations between the shores of the Atlantic develop further? Vladimir Putin does not deviate from the version of three years ago: the Europeans, although they do not like Trump, "will stand at the owner's foot and gently wag their tails" because they are good for nothing else. But Stephen Walt, an outstanding American international affairs expert, believes that allies offended by the US president will come to their senses, group and find an effective way to resist. What is the probability of each of the scenarios? And what does this mean for Russia?
Good with evil
The speed and radicality of the actions of the team of the new owner of the White House is stunning. The most fervent of Russian talk shows are lost against the background of what the Trumpists and their leader say about Ukraine and Europe. The latter are shocked, since their own standard mantras about democracy and freedom are now turned against them, and even in a very harsh form. Trump seems to be in a hurry to knock out from under the Western structure the support that has supported it for decades.
The fact that it was the Ukrainian conflict that turned out to be the immediate reason for the dismantling work is paradoxical in its own way. Trump is not interested in Ukraine itself, he sees no point in the fact that America is drawn into this collision when Washington has a lot of much more important things to do (China, North and possibly South America, the Arctic North, and to some extent the Middle East). However, thanks to the efforts of the previous US president, what is happening in Ukraine has been elevated to the rank of a global battle between good and evil. The stakes, including propaganda ones, have been raised to the point that a smooth exit from the conflict with the previous approach has simply become impossible. Only up the spiral of military-political tensions–-it is no coincidence that the Biden administration until the last days directed everything it could to support the war.
Now everything has turned the other way. Since his predecessors/adversaries claimed that Ukraine is the most fundamental issue, then we will prove that it is just an empty malicious place. And, of course, not an entity whose opinion matters-–a country that lives at someone else's expense should simply do what the donor tells it. In Trump's view, Europe is a parasite that feeds on American money.
The Trumpists' attack on those who have always been considered the closest partners is discouraging, and in the mouth of the US president himself, it turns grotesque. Where does so much passion come from? In part, it can be attributed to the peculiarities of Donald Trump's general style: this is his usual manner of assertively creating an information flow. Throwing in a thesis that confuses everyone, including the incorrectness of the data, he does not explain it in response to perplexed questions, but simply repeats it over and over again almost verbatim, achieving an addictive effect. You see, for the twentieth time, the thought no longer seems so extravagant. But this is a tactic. Strategically, Trump's foreign policy, oddly enough, follows the principles of the liberal school of international relations in the sense that it, foreign policy, is a continuation of domestic policy.
Bismarck vs. the Pope
The fact that Trump and his associates, including natives of Silicon Valley led by Elon Musk, have set their sights on the Second American Revolution is said by them and some commentators. The practical task is to reduce the powers and prerogatives of the state, which have grown over the past century. The social system was not among the original ideas of the founding fathers but was gradually formed under the influence of public demands and the movement of the world in this direction. From the point of view of libertarians of various persuasions, this led to a drop in efficiency and a restriction of freedom. To the extent that the state arrogated to itself the right to regulate everything–-up to the imposition of the most absurd ideas of modern liberals ("identity politics", in which form completely defeated content, but at the same time turned into diktat).
The Joe Biden administration has become a symbol of this course within the United States, the decline of the previous policy was even expressed visually–-an incapable leader, urgently replaced by a blatantly incompetent successor. It was under Biden that the Western community, which had long been going through complex internal processes, again became "collective"–-the Ukrainian collision acted as a catalyst for unity. For Trump, Europe is not a component of the "collective West", but of the "collective Biden", especially since the European establishment passionately sided with the latter, the bone of his rival throughout the campaign.
The Trumpists responded in a mirror manner–-they began to interfere in European electoral processes, encouraging parties friendly to them. In such an unceremonious form, this has previously happened only in the post-Soviet space. Europe is confused, convinces itself of its ability to cope with everything without the Americans, but no one knows how to do it. In rhetoric, the Europeans are trying to follow the logic of Steve Walt, but in practice they act as described by Putin. However, simply submitting to the current Washington seems to be not enough. The United States is aimed at "regime change" in order to continue working with like-minded people. It is assumed that they will be the ones who will "wag their tails".
The above is, of course, a simplified scheme. The transatlantic conglomerate is a well-built fortification capable of withstanding serious blows. However, there has never been such a powerful attack on it, especially from within. The "collective West" may suffer fatally because of the desire to renew its support–-the United States. If the renovationists succeed, which is not yet guaranteed at all, Europe will have to adapt. What is happening to some extent refers to the concept of "Kulturkampf"–-the struggle of the Prussian government against the influence of the Roman Catholic Church after the unification of Germany. Globalist liberals on both sides of the Atlantic act as the Holy See, and populists (it is noteworthy that Vance and his associates use this concept, which until recently was abusive, in a positive sense) in the role of Bismarck.
The European problem is aggravated by the fact that a hypothetical refusal to participate in the "West" as it was formed after World War II (before which there was no single political West) promises to plunge into the unknown. In the modern world, even the largest European countries individually are not able to play a role that they would consider worthy of themselves. And fantasies about a Sino-European rapprochement against the background of the Russian-American entente, of course, have nothing to do with reality.
Majority and minority
The author of these lines has already written on the pages of "Profile" that the main international result of the special military operation was the emergence of a phenomenon that we usually call the world majority. The vast community of countries preferred to distance themselves from the conflict that broke out, they evaded the West's insistent demands to join the anti-Russian sanctions coalition and aimed at extracting benefits for themselves. This was an unpleasant surprise for the United States and showed that the international environment is now arranged differently. Russia has an opportunity to establish qualitatively different relations with the non-Western part of the world
Now we are witnessing the second consequence of the NWO within the Western world. And hypothetically, it also opens up opportunities for Russia. Such an ideological unison as now between Moscow and Washington has not been observed for a long time. In the past, when this happened, the common denominator was the American agenda, but now it is rather the opposite. Russia and the United States are demonstrating mutual courtesy, especially impressive in contrast to the recent balancing on the brink of real war. The desire to build on success is understandable, especially since the turn to constructiveness symbolically coincided with the round anniversary of the Yalta Conference. But let's maintain a sober approach.
A battle is going on inside the West, which is fundamentally important for its future. It turned out to be useful for one of the parties (America) to attract Russia. To some extent, this rapprochement corresponds to Russia's interests, the main thing is not to get drawn into someone else's confrontation. Here it is appropriate for Russia to take the position of the world majority-–we understand your problems, we are ready to cooperate, but only so far as possible. This is not even due to the fact that historically, Russia's involvement in Western political and ideological disputes has always backfired. First of all, the question is in relations with the rest of the world. And the general trend towards moving away from the long-term dominance of the West will continue, although the trajectory of movement may be very tortuous.
Trump's intention to make relations with allies as profitable as possible [for the Empire] is in preparatory work. The main one will begin at the next stage, when the United States will take on rivals of a large caliber, primarily China. In this situation, it will be important for Trump that Russia does not serve as a factor in strengthening Beijing, as he insisted during the 2016 election campaign. In his first term, everything went downhill for domestic American reasons, now Trump's ability to implement his intentions has increased. The current complete carte blanche is unlikely to last forever, but so far the degree of general inability to resist his pressure is impressive.
For historical and cultural reasons, Russia is more comfortable doing business with interlocutors in the West than with representatives of other regions. The experience of the last three years has shown how difficult it is to build ties with new partners. On the one hand, there is a different psychology of contacts, on the other hand, the entire world infrastructure is still adapted to the central role of the United States and the West, and alternatives are difficult to provide. So the temptation to turn to the "good old man" exists, and it is understandable. But you can't succumb to it.
Finale before the sequel
And the point, in general, is not in the eternal swing of relations between Russia and the West, and not in the changeability of fortune in elections. The direction of global transformation is more important. Russia's return to the path of its usual interaction with the West means cementing the Cold War scheme. This model locks Russia into the US/West, while the rest of the world will increasingly seek maximum diversification and evasion of binding relationships
Among the world majority, there is an idea of Russia as a subject primarily seeking recognition from the West, including through conflict. Accordingly, as soon as Western countries, having changed their anger to mercy, turn to Russia, it immediately turns away from all others, rushing towards new relations with the "partners of its dreams." How fair this assessment is is a separate question, but it is very common. If Moscow really behaves in accordance with this stereotype, it will be almost fatal for its future policy.
The Ukrainian collision, as I have already written about in these pages, is not a battle for the future world order, but the finale (let's hope) of the Cold War, which lasted throughout the second half of the twentieth century. A successful military-political and diplomatic end to the conflict will undoubtedly strengthen Russia's position in the coming period. But precisely as a significant and independent participant in the unfolding big and intricate game. Not for world order, but for the acquisition and use of comparative advantages for a long period of poorly regulated international politics. One in which there will be no "new division of the world", because it is impossible to consolidate it.
In the process of the game, everything will change. The West, which has entered a period of painful systemic transformation, moreover, not identical in its various components. Russia, which will have to reformulate goal-setting and expand the range of tools used. China, which has reached a level at which it is necessary to either "take profits" or enter a much riskier game. And so on.
Well, we have to repeat the banality. It is possible to play in such an environment only if there is a strong rear—resistant to any stresses of the state, in harmony with society. Without this, there will be nothing to play for. [My Emphasis]
Who “owns” the Europeans, Trump or the Empire’s Deep State? It’s assumed that the Deep State wants its war against Russia to continue and that’s what the Europeans are agreeing to do. So, it appears Putin’s assessment is correct. But it Trump really “in a hurry” as he and his team attack Europeans? Another assessment sees Trump is attempting to make all nations including Europe dependent on the Outlaw US Empire geoeconomically. That was recently explained during a Wolff/Hudson discussion that covers much ground. Although he misses much of the nuances, Lukyanov is correct about Trump’s domestic policy fueling his foreign policy—For MAGA to have any chance of success, the world must be made dependent on products made within the Empire: That’s the goal behind the demand that NATO members raise weapons procurement to 5% of GDP.
What is described as the “Second American Revolution” is actually Trump’s war on what’s known as the Deep State but is also known by political scientists as the Administrative State. Part of that effort involves reforming certain agencies like USAID, NED and others that have been very active in subversive attacks on governments via media and direct payments to friendly politicians and has produced evidence of massive corruption fueled by the Empire. What Trump wants to do is to rechannel those efforts to his allies, not those of the Bidensphere.
Indeed, maintain your sobriety as Team Trump’s vision of global relations is vastly different from Russia and its many friends. The main point of Outlaw US Empire dogma remains intact: Everything must benefit America, for Team Trump are Exceptionalists par exellance and will continue to seek hegemony as more so than Biden the UN Charter is to be ignored. Team Trump has its own version of the rules based order.
No new divisions means the end of the spheres of influence concept since all nations are to be treated as equals, which also means no hegemony. Those are two major points that both China and Russia enunciate at every opportunity, as does BRICS and other multilateral institutions. Yet, what’s perhaps the least understandable is the concluding paragraph. Here’s what RT wrote as a substitute:
In this unpredictable landscape, only nations with internal stability and strategic patience will emerge as winners. Russia’s path forward lies not in returning to the past, but in shaping a future where it stands as a sovereign force in an increasingly fragmented world.
I must admit RT’s substitution makes more sense, but was that the author’s intent? Perhaps he meant to be purposefully obtuse. Perhaps that was his way of protecting his musings, to show that in reality he’s groping in the darkness as are so many others?
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I would hardly call the US economy and society of today stable. Socially we are fragmenting as never before. Our education system, if you can even call it a system, is totally disfunctional and does not prepare students with the skills and requirements to function in a modern industrial economy, much less STEM. Our society, economy, and social system at this point is only focused on providing a constant stream of wealth to the top.005% of the population.
Thanks Karl, it is good to see what other Russian thinkers are saying. While it is good that relations with the US might be improving, it is also good that the Russians aren't getting carried away.
You can get the sense that the US attitude is more for show than substance, until something actually changes on the ground. I don't think that the US has any intention of surrendering its position of Global Hegemon and the feelers sent out towards Russia are a shadow play while they maneuver against China.
In this regard, I agree with Brian Berletic that everything that Trump does is towards taking control of the Deep State and sharpening its focus, not it's abolition, and that Trump's view of peace is everyone shutting up and doing as they are told, while he rakes in the cash. Time will tell.