Service to Readers: Russia's position at the 78th session of the UN General Assembly

A new category of reference items for readers

At the top of her weekly briefing today, Ms. Zakharova announced Lavrov will arrive in New York tomorrow for the 78th session of the UN General Assembly that also begins tomorrow. Apparently, there were no visa hassles this year as in years past. She also announced the existence of an online document spelling out "Russia's position" at the affair. This is clearly a Reference Document similar to Russia’s new foreign policy objectives that was published earlier this year. As a service to readers, this type of document will be translated and republished here so a more complete informing can be accomplished. As with this document, most will be long and contain much content. They’ll be announced in the same way—Service to Readers—so those who wish to skip them can do so. Currently, there are about a dozen to be posted, one of which will follow this one before the next article about Amur is released. It will also be easier for them to be referenced in future articles, for example, as the five major Initiatives put forward by Xi Jinping have yet to be properly parsed and discussed. And now for Russia’s position at the 78th UNGA:

1. The main goal of the 78th session of the UN General Assembly is to reaffirm the central coordinating role of the world Organization in world affairs and strengthen the multipolar system of international relations. The UN rightfully remains a unique platform for frank and equal dialogue aimed at developing collective solutions to global problems, taking into account different opinions, as well as creating a truly fair architecture of the world order.

2. We invariably advocate the strengthening of the multilateral foundations of international relations and the world economy on the basis of universal international legal norms, primarily the provisions of the UN Charter, with an emphasis on strict respect for the sovereign equality of states and the inadmissibility of interference in their internal affairs. It is important not to allow the UN to be subordinated to a narrow group of Western countries seeking to replace the universally recognized principles of interstate cooperation with non-consensus constructions. We oppose the legitimization of the concept of a "rules-based world order", which provides for the imposition of rules, standards and norms, the development of which does not imply the equal participation of all interested states. It is advancing in opposition to collective approaches based on the UN Charter and poses a serious threat to the stability of international relations.

3. The Kiev regime's eight-year ongoing war against the population of Donbass and Ukraine's deliberate sabotage of the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements forced Russia to take measures to protect civilians in the region. The special military operation (SVO) launched in 2022 is being carried out in strict accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and will be carried out until threats to the security of our country are eliminated.

Ukraine's Western allies contribute to the escalation and prolongation of the conflict by supplying Kyiv with heavy weapons, providing financial and technical assistance, recruiting and sending mercenaries. The weapons of NATO countries are used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine to strike at civilian infrastructure and civilians in Donbass. Thus, the West actually becomes an accomplice in hostilities and is responsible for the crimes of the Kyiv regime.

Violations of international humanitarian law and terrorist attacks by Ukraine are carefully recorded, the perpetrators of them will be punished. By its actions and rhetoric, Kiev demonstrates a complete lack of interest in a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Russia has never rejected a diplomatic solution to the crisis and is ready for negotiations, taking into account the situation on the ground and the legitimate interests of our country.

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions became part of Russia as a result of the free expression of the will of their population in September 2022 in accordance with the UN Charter and the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States. This document guarantees the territorial integrity of those States whose "Governments represent, without distinction as to race, creed or colour, the whole people living in the territory". It is obvious that the Kiev authorities, who for years have been persecuting a significant part of their population precisely on national, religious, linguistic and cultural grounds, do not meet this criterion.

The recognition of referendums in the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions, the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics, as well as the admission of Crimea to Russia following the will of its inhabitants in 2014 is a prerequisite for reaching agreements on a comprehensive settlement of the situation in Ukraine.

We are seriously concerned about the growing tendency of the UN General Assembly to go beyond its competence, which has resulted in a series of confrontational anti-Russian resolutions adopted since February 24, 2022 in connection with the situation in Ukraine in violation of paragraph 1 of Article 12 of the UN Charter. Trying to qualify the NWO as "aggression" in non-consensus resolutions, demand its termination, compensation for damage, etc., the UN General Assembly acts beyond its competence and arbitrarily assumes the functions of the UN Security Council.

5. The responsibility for the prevention and resolution of conflicts, overcoming their consequences lies primarily with the states involved. International assistance, including through the United Nations, can be provided only with their consent and in accordance with the Charter of the Organization. Mediation, good offices, and even more so preventive diplomacy must be based on impartiality and unconditional respect for the sovereignty of States.

6. The goal of the reform of the UN Security Council is to increase the representation of developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America in the Security Council without compromising its effectiveness and efficiency. We consider Brazil and India to be natural candidates for permanent seats on the Council in the event of a decision to expand it in both categories of membership. The optimal size of the reformed Security Council is "just over twenty members" (low twenties). The search for an optimal reform model that enjoys maximum support should continue in the current format of intergovernmental negotiations. Translating the discussions to a textual basis before agreeing on the basic parameters of reform is counterproductive. The prerogatives of the permanent members of the Council, including the right of veto, are not subject to audit.

7. We support realistic initiatives to optimize the activities of the UN General Assembly within the framework of the Working Group on its Revitalization. We focus on debugging working methods, streamlining an overloaded agenda, and strengthening multilingualism. Innovations should be rational and correlate with the needs of the time. The redistribution of powers of other statutory bodies, including the Security Council, in favor of the General Assembly is unacceptable.

8. We support the development and strengthening of cooperation between the United Nations and regional and sub-regional associations in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. It is necessary to further build up constructive cooperation between the UN and such structures as the CSTO, the SCO, the CIS, BRICS and the EAEU. The relevance of this task is evidenced by the adoption at the 77th session of the UN General Assembly of biennial resolutions on cooperation through the UN-CSTO and the UN-CIS, which state steady progress and positive dynamics in strengthening relations.

9. We categorically reject the distortion of history and the revision of the results of World War II. We attach particular importance to the annual draft resolution of the UN General Assembly "Combating the glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance." We emphasise the relevance of this document, taking into account the tragic consequences of the Kiev authorities' policy of encouraging Nazi ideology in Ukraine and indulging it on the part of their Western curators.

10. We proceed from the fact that there is no alternative to the political and diplomatic settlement of crises in the Middle East and North Africa. We consistently advocate the resolution of existing conflicts peacefully, without external interference, taking into account the interests of all parties involved and on the basis of the provisions and norms of international law.

11. One of the main priorities in the Middle East region is the settlement in Syria. Achieving lasting and long-term stabilization and security in the country is possible only through the full restoration of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Damascus over the national territory. An important task on the ground is also the continuation of the fight against international terrorist groups recognized as such by the UN Security Council.

The main challenge, especially after the earthquake of February 6, 2023, remains the degradation of the humanitarian and socio-economic situation in the Syrian Arab Republic against the backdrop of tightening unilateral sanctions and a chronic shortage of funding for international humanitarian programs. We call on responsible members of the international community to stop politicising purely humanitarian issues and to provide assistance to all Syrians in need without discrimination and preconditions, in coordination with Damascus, in accordance with the norms and guidelines of international humanitarian law.

On the political track, we are in favour of promoting a Syrian-led settlement process with the assistance of the UN, as provided for by UN Security Council Resolution 2254. We support the relevant efforts of the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen, which should not go beyond the mandate set by the Security Council.

12. We believe that one of the foundations for establishing peace and security in the Middle East is the revival of the Middle East settlement process with the solution of the Palestinian problem as its central element.

We attach key importance to preventing the escalation of violence between Palestinians and Israelis and providing large-scale humanitarian assistance to the victims and those in need in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. We call on the parties to exercise restraint, renounce unilateral steps and provocative actions, as well as respect for the special status and inviolability of the Holy Places of Jerusalem. We are in favour of restarting direct Palestinian-Israeli negotiations on all final status issues on a universally recognised international legal basis, including the two-state formula.

13. We note with concern the stalling of the political process in Libya and the continuing split among the leading internal political forces. We are convinced that there is no alternative to an inclusive dialogue, taking into account the concerns of all Libyan parties. We are in favour of the speedy re-establishment of unified state institutions and the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections.

14. We note the positive dynamics of the situation in Yemen against the backdrop of regional normalization. We are convinced that the restoration of a comprehensive truce will contribute to a sustainable political settlement in the country. We insist on the need to work with all parties to the conflict through the mediation of the UN. We are providing assistance to the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Yemen Hassan Grundberg. One of the key tasks is to help the Yemeni people overcome the largest humanitarian catastrophe.

We oppose the broad interpretation of the UN Security Council sanctions resolutions on Yemen. Restrictive measures should be used to promote a peaceful settlement, not to fan political turbulence in the region. We note with concern that some foreign naval presences are unscrupulously manipulating the decisions of the Security Council during inspections of ships in nearby waters.

15. We consistently support the efforts of the Iraqi leadership to normalize the socio-economic situation in the country in the long term, as well as to counter the terrorist threat. We note the need for consistent focused work to eliminate differences between the various ethnic and religious components of Iraqi society within the framework of a national dialogue. We stress the unacceptability of turning Iraq into an arena of regional confrontation.

16. We consistently pursue a policy of promoting national reconciliation and settlement in Afghanistan, as well as maintaining stability and turning it into a state free of terrorism and drugs. We are seriously concerned about the growing influence of ISIS and the threat of its terrorist activity spilling over into Central Asia.

We stand for sustainable and pragmatic interaction between the international community and the Taliban de facto authorities. We are convinced that the development of dialogue with Kabul is in the interests of security and economic development of the entire region.

We will continue to work within the framework of well-established multilateral platforms, such as the Moscow format of consultations, the mechanism of Afghanistan's neighbouring countries, the regional Quartet (Russia-China-Pakistan-Iran), as well as through regional organisations, primarily the CSTO and the SCO. We are taking steps to create a new format of the regional "five" with the participation of Russia, China, India, Iran and Pakistan.

We believe that the United States and its allies, who are responsible for the critical situation in Afghanistan after their 20-year presence, should bear the main costs of the country's post-conflict reconstruction.

We attach great importance to the activities of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, primarily in the context of increasing humanitarian support for the local population, creating conditions for the speedy unfreezing of Afghan assets and mobilizing donor funds for the revival of the national economy.

17. The priority in the efforts for the comprehensive normalization of Azerbaijani-Armenian relations is the implementation of the trilateral statements at the highest level of November 9, 2020, January 11 and November 26, 2021, including the unblocking of trade, economic and transport links in the region, the delimitation/demarcation of the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as assisting the parties in agreeing on a peace treaty.

18. We are seriously concerned about the destructive consequences of attempts by the United States and its allies to increase pressure on the DPRK, including through large-scale military exercises. We reject the desire to further tighten the UN Security Council sanctions regime. We consider this idea not only erroneous, but also inhuman from the point of view of negative humanitarian consequences for ordinary North Koreans. Condemning the provocative military activity in the region, to which Pyongyang is forced to respond, we call for breaking the vicious circle of escalating tensions. The only effective way out of the impasse is to resume political and diplomatic dialogue in order to reduce the level of confrontation and achieve a long-term settlement of the situation around the Korean Peninsula, as well as building a solid security system in Northeast Asia, taking into account the legitimate interests of all states in the region, including the DPRK. We are consistently promoting relevant initiatives together with China.

19. We believe that there is no alternative to preserving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). We are committed to continuing cooperation within the framework of the Vienna negotiation process aimed at eliminating the negative consequences of the US unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal in violation of its obligations under Security Council Resolution 2231. We believe that the continued attempts by Washington and its allies to increase pressure on Tehran and further aggravate the situation are counterproductive instead of promoting the full functioning of the JCPOA as soon as possible.

20. We are in favour of resolving the Cyprus issue on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, which provide for the establishment of a bicommunal bizonal federation on the island with common international legal personality, sovereignty and citizenship. At the same time, the final settlement model must be approved by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots without external pressure. The imposition of arbitrary time frames is unacceptable. We believe it is necessary to involve the permanent members of the Council in the discussion of the external aspects of the Cyprus issue, as well as to replace the existing system of guarantees from the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey with guarantees from the Security Council. The resumption of a full-fledged negotiation process would be facilitated by the early appointment of a special envoy or special adviser to the UN Secretary-General, who must be approved by the Council and accountable to it.

21. The guarantee of the sustainable functioning of the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina is respect for the equality of the two entities and the three constituent peoples in full compliance with the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. In this regard, we consider it necessary to abolish the Office of the High Representative (EaP) as soon as possible. The post of the EaP remains vacant, as K. Schmidt does not have the appropriate approval from the UN Security Council.

22. The situation in Kosovo must be resolved on the basis of Security Council Resolution 1244. An agreement between Belgrade and Pristina will be viable only if the parties come to an agreement on their own, without imposing ready-made recipes from outside. We oppose the idea of adjusting the mandate of the UN Mission in the province and reducing its budget, as well as for maintaining an open format and frequency of meetings on Kosovo issues in the UN Security Council.

23. The consistent implementation of the provisions of the Final Peace Agreement, with an emphasis on the careful implementation of its sections on agrarian reform and ethnic issues, remains the only basis for a settlement in Colombia. The physical safety of social activists, former rebels and the most vulnerable is even more urgent.

We welcome the Six-Month Non-Aggression Pact with the ELN, signed on June 9, 2023 following the third round of peace talks in Cuba between the Government of Colombia and the National Liberation Army (ELN). We consider the agreements reached to be an important step towards achieving a comprehensive peace in Colombia.

24. We advocate a balanced and depoliticized approach in addressing the situation in Myanmar and finding ways to normalize the humanitarian situation in Rakhine State. Despite the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 21 on Myanmar on December 2022, 2669, we continue to believe that the situation in this country can only be discussed in the Council in the context of the Rohingya refugee issue. It is more appropriate to consider the human rights issues prevailing in the document within the framework of specialized forums, including the Third Committee of the General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Council.

25. We believe that Africans themselves should play a leading role in preventing crises and resolving conflicts in Africa, with the support of the international community. We are in favour of strengthening the UN's partnership with the African Union and the continent's sub-regional organisations. We intend to continue to actively contribute to the political settlement of crises in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Somalia, Mali and the Sahara-Sahel region as a whole, as well as in other hot spots in Africa. We oppose attempts to denigrate our cooperation with African countries. We welcome the efforts of Africans to address the root causes of conflicts, restore state institutions and reform the security sector. We support the continent's policy of getting rid of the colonial past. We consider unacceptable the attempts of a number of countries to promote neo-colonial approaches on the African continent.

The UN Security Council sanctions regimes against a number of African countries need to be revised, especially with regard to the arms embargo. Often, these measures do not correspond to the current situation and, while not conducive to peace processes, only constrain the actions of governments in the fight against illegal armed groups.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a bilateral partner of Bangui, we continue to promote the process of stabilization and national reconciliation in the Central African Republic on the basis of the Political Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation of February 6, 2019 in the interests of a long-term settlement of the protracted conflict in the heart of Africa. In accordance with international law, we are helping the country's authorities to strengthen their national security capacity. We are open for interaction with all players on the ground, international and bilateral partners of Bangui. The preservation of the Security Council sanctions regime against the Central African Republic, which hinders the strengthening of the republic's security, is losing its relevance every day. The question of its complete abolition is ripe.

We are closely following the security situation in Mali against the backdrop of the UN Security Council's decision to curtail the UN Stabilization Mission in Mali (June 30, 2023). We are satisfied that the Council has unanimously responded to the relevant appeal of the Malians, who are ready to assume full responsibility for ensuring the security of their country. We are in favour of an orderly and organised withdrawal of the Blue Helmets in close cooperation with the host country. Russia will continue to provide support to Bamako on a bilateral basis, including increasing the combat capability of the armed forces, training military and law enforcement officers, as well as providing humanitarian assistance.

We support regional efforts to resolve the ongoing armed conflict in Sudan between the regular army and the Rapid Reaction Force since April 15, 2023. We categorically oppose attempts from the outside to impose politicised solutions on the parties to the conflict and exert pressure on them, including through the use of illegitimate unilateral sanctions measures. We are convinced that a sustainable solution can only be found by political and diplomatic means with the participation of all interested Sudanese parties. Despite the complexity of the current situation in Sudan, we are confident that we must continue to move towards curtailing the UN Security Council sanctions regime operating in Darfur. These restrictions were imposed a long time ago and, as experience has shown, have hardly contributed to the normalization of the situation.

26. The relevance of the UN General Assembly Special Committee on Decolonization (C-24) will not only continue until the issues of decolonization of the 17 Non-Self-Governing Territories are finally resolved, but also increase in the future in proportion to changes in the global agenda towards a further departure from the unipolar system led by the former Western metropolises.

27. UN peacekeeping should be carried out in strict compliance with its basic principles and the UN Charter. Efforts should be aimed at promoting a political settlement and national reconciliation. The use of new technologies should not overshadow the main tasks of peacekeeping. Intelligence in peacekeeping should be used exclusively to ensure the safety of peacekeepers and the protection of civilians. Expanding the mandate of peacekeepers, including through the authority to use force, is possible only by decision of the Security Council, taking into account the specifics of a particular country.

We are convinced that the UN General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping (S-34) should retain its leading role in developing the general parameters of peacekeeping. We consider it counterproductive to try to circumvent this platform, including through the UN Security Council.

We see good prospects for involving the CSTO in UN peacekeeping. The CSTO has come a long way in improving its peacekeeping potential. The member states of the Organization demonstrate their readiness to develop participation in UN peacekeeping efforts not only in a national capacity, but also "under the flag" of the CSTO.

International support for peacebuilding and peacekeeping should be provided only at the request of the host Government and with a view to building the capacity of States. Replenishment of the Peacebuilding Fund through assessed contributions is possible with increased transparency and accountability on its expenditure, as well as the receipt of appropriate mandates from UN intergovernmental bodies.

28. Sanctions are an important auxiliary tool of the UN Security Council to suppress activities that pose a threat to international peace and security. They cannot be used as a means of punishment. They should be metered and targeted in nature with a limited duration, taking into account political, socio-economic, human rights and humanitarian consequences. Regular reviews of sanctions regimes should be undertaken. If the situation is rectified, it is impossible to delay the easing of outdated restrictions until they are completely abolished. Attempts to use international sanctions for the purpose of unfair competition, economic strangulation and destabilization of "undesirable regimes" are unacceptable. It is unacceptable when the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council are supplemented by unilateral coercive measures, especially with extraterritorial effect. We are in favour of fixing this requirement in the relevant Security Council resolutions. We propose to extend the scope of the institution of the Ombudsman of the Security Council Sanctions Committee 1267/1989/2253 on ISIL and Al-Qaida to all subjects of the Council's sanctions list.

29. We stand for the consolidation of the international community in the fight against terrorism with the central coordinating role of the UN without politicization, double standards and "hidden agendas" based on the UN Charter, relevant universal conventions and protocols, thematic resolutions of the UN Security Council, as well as the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. We consider it important to make active use of the tools of the UN Security Council's auxiliary anti-terrorist bodies, in particular the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the ISIL and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committees, as well as the Taliban.

We support the activities of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNCT), including through Russia's voluntary contributions. We advocate the need to increase the share of the UN regular budget in the financing of the UCT. We believe that initiatives with an emphasis on building the capacity of the national counter-terrorism institutions of recipient countries should remain the core of the Office's programme and project activities.

30. We advocate the intensification of work to block the ideological, material, financial and personnel support of terrorists, as well as the strengthening of cooperation between countries in countering foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), bringing them to criminal responsibility on the basis of the principle of "either extradite or prosecute".

We are hindering the Westerners' policy of eroding the international legal counter-terrorism base, both by excessively emphasizing human rights and gender issues that are secondary in the context of counterterrorism, and by promoting controversial concepts of "countering violent extremism" and combating "racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism/terrorism."

We focus the attention of the international community on the dangerous growth of right-wing extremist threats, especially manifestations of aggressive nationalism and neo-Nazism. We emphasize the mendacity and double standards of the collective West, when, against the backdrop of indiscriminate accusations of Russia's "aggression", it prefers not to notice the facts of open state support for terrorism by the neo-Nazi Kiev regime it created, which turned Ukraine into a new international terrorist cell. The United States and its allies are actively using the terrorist Ukrainian government as a springboard and an instrument of armed struggle against Russia. We call on Western countries and their allies to stop political sponsorship and pumping weapons into Ukrainian neo-Nazi formations that are actively using terrorist methods and strengthening ties with transnational organized crime and terrorist groups, including in the transportation of FTFs and arms trafficking. We point out that this process leads to an escalation of risks in the field of anti-terrorist security in Europe and in the world as a whole.

31 The global drug problem has worsened during the coronavirus pandemic and continues to pose a serious threat to the safety and well-being of populations. We are in favour of equal attention to its three interrelated elements: drug demand reduction, drug supply reduction and the strengthening of international anti-drug cooperation based on the principle of common and shared responsibility.

Strict compliance by all states with the three relevant UN conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988 is the key to the effective functioning of the global drug control system. We consider attempts to destabilise it, including the legalisation of drugs for recreational purposes, as a threat to our country's national security. The principle laid down in the conventions of restricting the use of drugs exclusively for medical and scientific purposes is the best way to realize the human rights to life and health. We advocate for building a society free from drug abuse by promoting a healthy lifestyle and protecting children and young people from illegal drugs.

Countering the illicit use of drugs should not limit the availability and accessibility of narcotic drugs in medicine if they are proven to be effective for the treatment of specific diseases.

32. We stand for the consolidation of international efforts in the fight against criminal challenges and threats with the central coordinating role of the UN, without politicization and double standards, on the basis of conscientious, mutually respectful and equal cooperation between states.

We believe that attempts to politicize the work of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (CTOP) are destructive.

We attach great importance to the proper observance of the guidelines and parameters of the CTOP review mechanism, which is designed to be of a technical nature, to be impartial and to promote constructive interaction between states in the effective implementation of the Convention.

33. We support the implementation of international anti-corruption cooperation with the central coordinating role of the world Organization and on the basis of the UN Convention against Corruption (CPC). We express our firm commitment to the intergovernmental, technical and impartial nature of the Convention's mechanisms. We strongly condemn any attempts to politicize the work of the Conference of the States Parties to the CPC. We attach great importance to the implementation of the political declaration of the UN General Assembly Special Session against Corruption, especially with regard to the need to address gaps in international law governing asset recovery.

34. We support the preservation of the central role of the UN, in particular the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG), in the global negotiation process on international information security (IIS). It is important to prevent the establishment of opaque and controlled mechanisms imposed by Western countries instead of the OEWG. To uphold the strictly interstate nature of universal decision-making on IIS.

The Group's priority should be to make the rules, norms and principles of responsible behaviour in the information space legally binding. We call for the development and adoption of a universal international legal treaty aimed primarily at strengthening cooperation in conflict prevention in the use of ICTs. As a prototype of such a document, we, together with like-minded people, presented the concept of the UN Convention on the Provision of IIS.

We intend to submit to the First Committee of the 78th session of the UN General Assembly the 25th anniversary Russian draft resolution "Achievements in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security". We will reflect in it the results of the activities of the OEWG in 2023, taking into account the creation of a global intergovernmental register of contact points for the exchange of information on computer attacks / incidents. We call on all countries to support our project.

The formation of an international legal regime is also a priority for us in relation to the problems of combating information crime within the framework of the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly. We consider it necessary to conclude a universal agreement aimed at countering the use of ICT for extremist, terrorist and other criminal purposes, as well as building mutually beneficial international law enforcement cooperation in this area. The basis for such a tool can be a comprehensive convention on combating information crime being developed under the auspices of the UN (it is planned to be adopted during the 78th session of the UN General Assembly).

35. We have consistently advocated the strengthening of existing and the development of new treaty regimes in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation (ACDC) on a consensus basis. We assign a central role in this process to the UN and its multilateral disarmament mechanism. We are pursuing a policy of increasing the efficiency and coherence of the work of its key elements – the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the UN Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament.

36. We strictly abide by our obligations under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We are in favour of its entry into force as soon as possible. We call on the eight countries on which the launch of the treaty depends to sign and/or ratify the CTBT without delay. We believe that the position of the United States, which has become the only state that has officially refused to ratify it, is a key destructive factor for the Treaty. Washington is taking consistent steps to resume nuclear testing, including increasing the readiness of the nuclear test site in Nevada and allocating significant allocations for its maintenance. We encourage Washington to reconsider its approach to the CTBT.

We resolutely suppress insinuations about the possible resumption of nuclear tests by our country. Russian President Vladimir Putin's statement of February 21, 2023 clearly states that Russia will not be the first to conduct a nuclear test. We will take this step only in response to a similar action on the part of the United States. We intend to continue to adhere to the voluntary moratorium on nuclear tests that we introduced in 1991.

37. Russia has always advocated the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Recently, the Treaty has been subjected to serious tests. There is a growing number of disagreements among States parties on issues related to the implementation of its provisions. This is happening against the backdrop of the breakdown of the existing system of arms control agreements. In such circumstances, ensuring the sustainability of the Treaty is a priority for maintaining stability on a global scale.

Unfortunately, the 10th NPT Review Conference (2022) ended without the adoption of a final document. The radicalization of positions, the intentions of a number of participating states (primarily Western countries) to promote their own political attitudes and saturate the draft document with formulations that have nothing to do with strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, led to the impossibility of its consensual approval.

At the same time, we are not inclined to talk about the "NPT crisis". The Treaty continues to be fully operational and remains one of the cornerstones of the global international security architecture and non-proliferation regime.

A new NPT review cycle will soon be launched. Russia is ready for comprehensive cooperation on this platform for the implementation of the goals and objectives laid down in the Treaty. At the same time, we are convinced that reaching consensus for the sake of consensus, efforts to agree on a final document at all costs is a path that will only lead to weakening the work to strengthen the NPT. In the event of a repetition of the situation at RC-10, we are ready to continue to block any attempts to politicize the review process.

We invariably support the right of states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays a crucial role in the realization of this right. Attempts to politicize the work of the Agency or to expand the scope of its activities beyond the framework of the Charter, thereby destroying the credibility of this important international body, are categorically unacceptable.

We believe that the work of the Agency should maintain a balance between all the statutory activities of the organization. We support the IAEA's efforts aimed at the global recognition of the atom as a climate-neutral energy source.

We are in favour of preserving the objective, depoliticised, technically sound nature of the Agency's verification mechanism, the safeguards system, which is based on agreements concluded between states and the IAEA.

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) passed into Russian jurisdiction when, following the results of the referendums, the DPR, LPR, Kherson and Zaporozhye regions became part of the Russian Federation as new subjects.

The issue of stopping Ukrainian attacks on the ZNPP, which pose a threat to its safety and the risks of a man-made accident with radiation emissions, remains relevant.

Ukraine has blocked all initiatives of the IAEA Director General aimed at strengthening the safety of the ZNPP. Kiev did not support the five theses on ensuring the safety of the plant voiced by IAEA Director General Rodrigo Grossi on May 30 during a meeting of the UN Security Council. In general, Grossi's recommendations create the basis for the IAEA Secretariat to finally announce the information it has about the Ukrainian attacks on the ZNPP, as well as openly condemn such reckless actions by Kiev.

For our part, we have always supported the proposals of the IAEA Director General aimed at strengthening the nuclear safety of the plant. We have never deployed and do not plan to deploy military contingents and military equipment intended for offensive operations on the territory of the ZNPP. Only those forces that are necessary for its protection, as well as for the elimination of the possible consequences of Ukrainian attacks, are located at the ZNPP. We intend to continue to ensure the protection of the plant in such a way as to prevent Kyiv and the collective West from creating threats to the safe operation of the ZNPP.

38. We systematically support regional efforts on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As an observer, we participate in the UN Conference on the Establishment of a Zone Free of Nuclear and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. We believe that the elaboration of a legally binding agreement on the establishment of such a zone would be in the interests of all regional States. We note that the United States remains the only member of the "nuclear five" that has so far ignored this important forum.

39. Sharing the noble goal of building a world free of nuclear weapons, Russia has consistently made a significant practical contribution to the solution of this goal for decades. However, in the context of the total hybrid war unleashed against us, our country has reached the limits of its ability to reduce nuclear weapons. Further progress on this track will be possible only if Western countries abandon their anti-Russian line and should be conditioned by the involvement of all countries with military nuclear potential. At the same time, we believe that there should be no artificially imposed schedules and unverified measures divorced from modern realities. Progress in this direction should be seen as part of a comprehensive process of general and complete disarmament, as enshrined in Article VI of the NPT, in its entirety.

We understand the motivations of the proponents of the "shortest path" to a nuclear-weapon-free world, but we are convinced that progress is possible only on the basis of a realistic, balanced and step-by-step approach that contributes to the strengthening of international peace, stability and security for all States. We do not believe that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) meets these criteria and can be a framework for the implementation of practical measures to reduce nuclear weapons.

In this regard, we do not see an opportunity for ourselves to support such radical initiatives as the TPNW. The elaboration and persistence of such an instrument seems to be a premature and counterproductive step, since at this stage it only provokes a deepening of the contradictions between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States and can cause irreparable damage to the fundamental regime of the NPT. We do not believe that the TPNW establishes any universal standards or contributes to the development of customary international law.

For Russia, the possession of nuclear weapons at this historical stage is the only possible response to specific external threats that are only growing. The security situation is deteriorating as a result of the destructive attempts of the United States and NATO to secure military superiority. This is expressed, among other things, in their course towards the military-political and military-technical development of the post-Soviet space with the transformation of Ukraine into an anti-Russian bridgehead. The situation is further aggravated by further steps by Western countries to engage in a military confrontation with Russia in an attempt to inflict a "strategic defeat" on our country.

Under these conditions, the immediate renunciation of nuclear weapons would sharply weaken the reliability of our strategic deterrence and, consequently, national security. Moreover, such a move would be capable of provoking a further escalation of the current crisis up to a direct military clash involving the world's major powers. Against this background, nuclear deterrence inevitably retains an important role in our doctrinal guidelines. At the same time, they strictly determine the circumstances in which Russia reserves the right to a nuclear response, such as the use of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction against us and our allies, as well as large-scale aggression when the very existence of the state is threatened.

At the same time, we are firmly convinced of the immutability of the postulate that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and it should not be unleashed, which was reaffirmed by the leaders of the five nuclear powers in January 2022 in a joint statement. It is imperative that each of these States demonstrate its commitment to the statement in its entirety. It is necessary to prevent any armed conflict between the countries possessing nuclear weapons, and the contradictions between them must be resolved in a timely manner through a constructive and mutually respectful dialogue aimed at preventing an arms race and reducing strategic risks.

40. The decision to suspend the START Treaty by our country is primarily due to the consistent US policy of political and economic strangulation of Russia and the deliberate weakening of its security. Thus, there is a fundamental change in circumstances and the undermining by Washington of the fundamental principles and understandings on which the New START Treaty is based. At the same time, the United States continues to defiantly ignore the relationship between offensive and defensive strategic weapons enshrined in the Treaty, and also violates quantitative restrictions on strategic offensive arms of the parties to the Treaty, which is of fundamental importance for the implementation of its object and goals. A serious blow to the Treaty was the assistance from the American side to the attacks of the Kyiv regime on Russian strategic facilities declared under the New START Treaty.

In order to maintain an acceptable level of predictability and stability in the nuclear missile sphere, Russia will continue to comply with the quantitative restrictions on strategic offensive arms provided for by the Treaty within the term of the Treaty. In addition, we will continue to participate in the exchange of notifications with the United States on the launches of ICBMs and SLBMs on the basis of the relevant bilateral agreement of 1988.

The decision to suspend the New START Treaty can be reversed only if the United States shows political will and makes the necessary efforts for a general de-escalation, elimination of violations and creation of conditions for the resumption of the full functioning of this Treaty. In determining its future fate, it will also be necessary to take into account the factor of the combined nuclear arsenal of the United States, Great Britain and France, which, together with other NATO allies, are increasingly acting as a united anti-Russian front on nuclear affairs.

Since the termination of the INF Treaty in August 2019, Russia has pledged not to deploy ground-based intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in order to maintain predictability and restraint in the nuclear missile sphere until similar American-made missiles are deployed in the respective regions. These measures remain relevant, but the Russian moratorium is under increasing pressure due to destabilizing US military programs, including plans to deploy missile systems previously banned under the INF Treaty.

Progress towards disarmament directly depends on the situation in the field of international security and strategic stability, which in modern conditions continues to be negatively influenced by such factors as the unrestricted deployment of a global missile defense system, combined with the build-up of high-precision non-nuclear weapons for the tasks of "global" and "disarming" strikes, the prospect of launching strike weapons into space, the growth of imbalances in the field of conventional weapons, the expansion of military alliances and attempts to create new blocs, the destruction and emasculation of the arms control architecture, as well as illegitimate sanctions pressure as part of hostile hybrid activities.

More broadly, attempts by all means to slow down the emergence of a more just, polycentric world order lead to an increase in interstate tension and conflict potential. Against this background, it seems relevant to set the fundamental task of forming a new, more stable and viable architecture of international security and global strategic stability based on mutually acceptable rules of coexistence, guaranteeing the necessary basic level of security for all and excluding the achievement of a decisive military-strategic superiority by one of the parties. An integral part of it is a comprehensive settlement of the unacceptable military-political situation in the Euro-Atlantic region caused by the destabilizing actions of the United States and its allies.

As a matter of principle, Russia remains open to cooperation with all interested parties in the relevant international formats on overall de-escalation, comprehensive strengthening of security and stability, and minimisation of strategic risks, including through the use of arms control instruments. However, this is possible only on the basis of equality and genuine consideration of Russia's interests.

41. Russia is the initiator of the development of important multilateral agreements in the field of ACRN - on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and the fight against acts of chemical and biological terrorism. We believe that a constructive dialogue on these issues will make it possible to begin in-depth (including negotiation) work at the UN. In promoting these initiatives, we strictly adhere to the principles of equality and consensus, which ensure a balance of interests.

Traditionally, we will submit to the First Committee of the 78th session of the UN General Assembly draft resolutions on the no-first-in-class placement of weapons in outer space (NPOC), transparency and confidence-building measures in relation to outer space activities, as well as further practical steps on PAROS. The globalization of the NPOC initiative is a significant but intermediate stage on the way to concluding an international treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space on the basis of the Russian-Chinese draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects.

42. In the field of international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, we proceed from the indisputable nature of the central and coordinating role of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). We view as counterproductive attempts to dilute the mandate of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space by artificially transferring the issues of space debris on its agenda and managing orbital traffic to parallel, purely disarmament UN platforms within the framework of the concept of so-called responsible behaviour in outer space.

We believe that it is important for the adoption by consensus of the resolution "International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space", which approves the report of the 66th session of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. We believe that potential attempts to "uncover" a draft that is traditionally adopted without a vote for politicised reasons are dangerous.

We continue to advocate the need for legal certainty in the delimitation of outer space and airspace, including in the context of establishing the spatial limits of states' sovereignty over their territory and ensuring their national security, as well as creating conditions for the long-term sustainability and safety of aircraft flights. We call for the establishment of an effective space traffic management system based on regulation and monitoring through the development of legally binding rules of conduct by the international community.

43. We support the strengthening of the conventions on the prohibition of biological and toxin, as well as chemical weapons, the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

We are seriously concerned about the growing trend towards the "privatization" of specialized international organizations by the Euro-Atlantic allies led by the United States, a striking example of which is the unacceptable situation in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Under the guise of anti-Russian and anti-Syrian rhetoric, since 2018, NATO and EU countries have finally abandoned the practice of reaching consensus on key issues on the OPCW agenda laid down in Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), replacing it with voting on the basis of bloc discipline. The result of this purposeful work was the empowerment of the Technical Secretariat (TC) of the Organization with "attributive" functions in violation of the procedure for amending the Convention provided for by the CWC (Article XV). In fact, in pursuit of the goal of replacing the legitimate government of Bashar al-Assad, which Washington dislikes, the "collective West" has undermined the integrity of the Convention and destroyed the technical nature of the OPCW's work.

44. We attach great importance to UN Security Council Resolution 1540 as one of the basic international instruments in the field of non-proliferation, aimed at preventing WMD and WMD materials from falling into the hands of non-state actors. We hope that the spirit of cooperation will be maintained at this UN venue.

45. In the context of the situation in Ukraine, we are deeply concerned about the undermining by Western countries of global efforts to combat the illicit flow of weapons and violations of their obligations in the field of arms control. The unrestrained "pumping" of weapons to the Kiev regime by NATO member states, which themselves recognize the lack of opportunities to track its further movement, sharply exacerbates the risks of these weapons, including those of a particularly sensitive nature, falling into criminal structures and terrorist groups and their uncontrolled spread in Europe and the world as a whole.

46. We advocate the creation of a specialised universal structure under the auspices of the United Nations to address the full range of issues related to the fight against maritime crime in different regions.

We continue to work actively with our partners in the Horn of Africa, including at the Contact Group on Illicit Activities at Sea.

We note the convergence of our approaches to the fight against piracy, as well as our joint commitment to the preservation and further development of the Contact Group.

Taking into account the annual increase in the number of pirate and robbery attacks on ships in the waters of the Gulf of Guinea, we are interested in continuing Russia's participation in the events of the Forum for Maritime Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea, a useful expert format for interaction and coordination of anti-piracy operations.

We note the activities of the Global Maritime Crime Programme supervised by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). We intend to increase financial assistance to the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea from the annual voluntary contribution of the Russian Federation to the UNODC in order to increase the combat capability and technical equipment of the region's maritime law enforcement agencies.

47. In the field of the law of the sea, we consider it fundamentally important to preserve the integrity of the regulatory regime established by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and other fundamental documents in this area. New processes, including the June 2023 agreement on marine biodiversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction and its system of global bodies, should be without prejudice to the provisions of existing universal and regional treaties, as well as the mandates of competent intergovernmental organizations.

We are interested in the effective functioning of the bodies established under the 1982 Convention, the International Seabed Authority, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. We believe that these bodies should act strictly within the framework of the mandates provided for by the Convention, preventing a broad interpretation of their own powers and politicization of decisions.

48. Russia counts on the effective and impartial performance by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of the functions assigned to it by the UN Charter, including in proceedings involving Russia under the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, as well as the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide impeccable arguments about the absence of any "terrorism" in the Donbas and "racial discrimination" in the Crimea, as well as the absence of the Court's jurisdiction over the far-fetched accusations of Ukraine about our alleged "abuse" of the Genocide Convention. As the Court itself has previously recognized, the Convention does not address the use of force, especially when it comes to the exercise of the right to self-defence guaranteed by Article 51 of the UN Charter.

The Court's task is complicated by unprecedented political pressure from the West, which is carried out, among other things, through the avalanche-like entry of NATO countries as "third parties" in the proceedings under the Genocide Convention. The ICJ receives death threats against Russian lawyers, witnesses and experts, they are included in the "hit list of enemies of Ukraine" on the Peacemaker website. Under these circumstances, the Court must make the right choice in favour of justice, otherwise the entire system of international justice will be under attack.

49. We closely follow the activities of the UN International Law Commission, which has traditionally made a significant contribution to the codification and progressive development of international law. Within the framework of the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, we promote Russian doctrinal approaches in the field of international law, including in favor of the development of universal conventions on issues ripe for codification.

50. Over the past year, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has fully manifested its puppet and corrupt nature. The activities of this body, which has nothing to do with the UN, no longer allow us to characterize this structure as an institution of international criminal justice. We believe that when considering cooperation with the ICC, States will fully comply with the generally accepted rules of the International Covenant on the immunity of State officials.

51. Emphasize the temporary nature and strictly limited mandate of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (OM), as well as the need for its early closure. OM "inherited" the worst practices of its predecessors, primarily the ICTY, consistently demonstrating an anti-Serb bias.

We continue to believe that it is unacceptable to empower the bodies of international organizations to investigate possible internationally wrongful acts and to "attribute" responsibility towards States that have not expressly consented to this, as well as other cases in which they go beyond their competence.

The "International Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Facilitate Investigations of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011", established by the UN General Assembly in excess of its powers, is illegitimate, and its "decisions" are legally null and void.

52. The subject of the "rule of law" should be considered with an emphasis on its international dimension. Attempts to use the "rule of law" to interfere in national legal systems must also be resisted. We believe that the extraterritorial application of national legislation to the detriment of the sovereignty of other states is a negative factor in international relations.

53. The Russian Federation consistently calls on all States to build cooperation in the human rights sphere on the basis of universally recognized principles and norms of international law, as well as to work together to develop a constructive, equal and respectful dialogue on human rights.

The Russian Federation has put forward its candidacy for re-election to the HRC in the elections to be held in October this year during the 78th session of the UN General Assembly. If elected, we will continue to build a constructive, equal and respectful dialogue on human rights. We count on the support of our partners in these elections.

We proceed from the premise that the primary responsibility for the protection of human rights rests with states, while the UN executive structures play a supporting role. We are convinced that all categories of human rights: civil and political, economic, social and cultural, are equal and equivalent.

We believe that the integration of human rights issues into all spheres of the UN's activities is counterproductive and should not lead to duplication of the work of the main bodies of the Organization. We do not support linking the activities of the HRC and the UN Security Council.

We categorically oppose the implementation of the idea hatched by the Bureau of the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly of "splitting" its sessions into the main and resumed. We consider such actions as unacceptable arbitrariness.

We will oppose the adoption of politicized country resolutions in favor of the political priorities of individual countries. It is in this context that we consider the resolution on the human rights situation in Crimea, which the Ukrainian delegation has regularly submitted to the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly since 2016. The document has nothing to do with the real state of affairs in this region of the Russian Federation and is used to spread anti-Russian propaganda at the UN.

In the activities of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), it is necessary to strengthen transparency and accountability to UN Member States in order to avoid politicization and biased approaches to assessing the human rights situation in various countries.

It is unacceptable that OHCHR continues to ignore the materials regularly sent by the Russian side about the crimes of the Kiev regime, the atrocities of Ukrainian militants and foreign mercenaries in Donbass and other Russian regions. OHCHR does not notice the manifestations of neo-Nazism in Ukraine, the persecution of canonical Orthodoxy, the ban on the activities of opposition parties and movements, the arrests and torture of oppositionists, human rights defenders, and public figures. The Office is deaf to the hateful statements of Ukrainian officials calling for the destruction of the Russian-speaking population, including children, the hunting of Russian journalists, and the mockery of captured Russian soldiers. At the same time, OHCHR turns a blind eye to the rabid Russophobia unleashed in Western countries and the ban on broadcasting more than a hundred media outlets throughout Europe and Ukraine. The supply of lethal weapons by Western countries to Ukraine is not condemned in any way.

54. We strongly condemn all forms and manifestations of discrimination. The prohibition of discrimination enshrined in international human rights instruments is general in nature and applies to all persons without exception. We do not see added value in the identification of new vulnerable groups (for example, the LGBT community, human rights defenders, Internet bloggers) who allegedly need a special legal protection regime, as well as the creation of new categories of rights. Such steps by a number of countries lead to an increase in politicization and confrontation in the work of UN human rights mechanisms.

55. In the area of social development, we support the efforts of the international community to implement practical measures to eradicate poverty, promote social integration, achieve full employment and decent work for all. We believe that this activity contributes to the progressive implementation of the decisions of the World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995) and the 24th session of the UN General Assembly.

We oppose attempts to abolish the UN Commission for Social Development, which is the main coordinating body in the Organization's system for ensuring equal opportunities for persons with disabilities, supporting older people, improving the situation of young people and strengthening the role of the traditional family. We are convinced that it is at this intergovernmental forum that the UN Secretary-General's initiative to hold the 2025 World Social Summit should be discussed.

56. We advocate a balanced consideration of gender equality and the advancement of women in the work of the UN system, without their absolutization and where appropriate. We are convinced that the UN Commission on the Status of Women remains a key intergovernmental forum for constructive dialogue on the entire range of issues related to the advancement of women, in the spirit of the decisions of the 4th World Conference on Women and the 23rd Special Session of the UN General Assembly.

We proceed from the premise that the mandate given to UN Women is decisive in the implementation of UN Women's activities, including the implementation of the provisions of the Strategic Plan for 2022-2025, which has not been interstate-agreed.

57. We support the strengthening of international cooperation in the field of the promotion and protection of children's rights, taking into account the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the final document of the 27th special session of the UN General Assembly "A world fit for children", which proclaimed, in particular, the need for a family environment for the full and harmonious development of the child's personality. We note the importance of the right of parents and/or legal representatives to properly manage and guide the child in exercising his rights in accordance with his developing abilities.

We pay close attention to the issue of children in armed conflict, including within the framework of the work of the UN Security Council. We strongly condemn the biased decision of the UN Secretary-General to include the Russian Armed Forces in the list of parties responsible for violations against children in Ukraine in his annual profile report for 2022. We proceed from the premise that the list of violators should include the Armed Forces of Ukraine, who have committed numerous crimes against minors.

We support the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and look forward to further cooperation with her. In the context of the situation of children in Ukraine, we call on the Special Representative to use only verified facts, avoiding politicization of this issue.

58. We support the discussion at the UN on the issues of interreligious and intercultural interaction, as well as the development of inter-civilizational dialogue, especially within the framework of the Alliance of Civilizations. We consider the establishment of a culture of peace to be an essential prerequisite for peaceful coexistence and international cooperation for peace and development.

59. We are ready to cooperate with all interested relevant non-governmental organizations on issues on the UN agenda. We contribute to ensuring adequate representation of the Russian non-governmental corps in the activities of the relevant segments, bodies and structures of the UN system.

60. It is advisable to be cautious about using the concept of the "multistakeholder" approach, which is actively used in UN documents and is one of the key parameters of the report of Secretary-General Antonio Guterres "Our Common Agenda". We believe it is important that the involvement of non-state actors in the work of the UN does not damage the intergovernmental nature of the Organization.

61. The Russian Federation believes that in order to overcome the consequences of migration crises that have affected individual countries and entire regions of the world, it is necessary to coordinate the efforts of all States. It is necessary to develop multilateral cooperation in this area with the central coordinating role of the UN in order to effectively address the problems associated with the mass movement of large groups of refugees and migrants.

We believe that approaches to overcoming migration challenges, including the issues of ensuring and protecting the rights of refugees, cannot contradict the basic principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, and the measures taken should not violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and be implemented without the consent of the countries where they are implemented. We are convinced that the solution to this problem lies in the plane of political settlement in the countries of origin of migrants, as well as assisting them in socio-economic development, state-building and the fight against terrorism.

The Russian Federation is making a significant contribution to strengthening the international refugee protection regime and resolving migration problems, which is reflected in large-scale humanitarian activities in many countries and regions of the world, as well as political efforts to prevent and overcome crises. In particular, our country voluntarily allocates $2 million annually. US to the budget of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

We commend the role of UNHCR in improving the effectiveness of international protection of refugees and other categories of persons under its responsibility. We consider the Office's activities to be particularly important in situations of major humanitarian crises and consider them to be an important element of comprehensive measures to resolve such crises.

Since February 2022, more than 5 million residents of the DPR, LPR, Kherson and Zaporozhye regions, as well as Ukraine, have urgently arrived in safe Russian regions. The Russian side is making every effort to receive and accommodate these persons, as well as to provide them with comprehensive assistance.

We believe that it is necessary for UNHCR to pay increased attention to stateless persons, including in Europe.

We aim to work constructively in preparation for the second Global Refugee Forum, scheduled for December 2023, which will help draw even more attention of the world community to important refugee issues and step up efforts to implement the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.

62. The annual Georgian resolution of the UN General Assembly on the situation of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which is fraught with complication of the situation in the region and the stalling of the Geneva International Discussions on Security and Stability in the South Caucasus, which remain the only dialogue format for representatives of Abkhazia, Georgia and South Ossetia, is obvious.

63. We are concerned about the extreme politicization of UNESCO and the total "Ukrainization" of the Organization's activities. The imposition of non-mandated issues of territorial integrity and sovereignty by Western countries on UNESCO, as well as the promotion of non-inclusive initiatives in the spirit of the notorious "rules-based order" on the institution, undermine international credibility and adversely affect the effectiveness of the Organization. We advocate the need to increase budgetary discipline and strict compliance by the Secretariat and Member States with UNESCO's statutory provisions.

64. We are concerned about the extreme politicization of the humanitarian sphere, attempts to discriminate against and discredit cultural figures, the introduction of unilateral restrictive measures on ethnic grounds, and the dismantling of monuments related to cultural heritage. We are outraged by the rampant Russophobia in the countries of the "collective West", the "de-Russification" of works of art and the abolition of Russian culture.

65. We are convinced that sport is a unique tool for the development and strengthening of social ties, building mutually respectful communication, and is designed to bring peoples closer together and unite. We invariably advocate the development of equal international sports cooperation that fully meets the spirit and principles of Olympism, which excludes politicisation and bias. We consider it unacceptable for some Western countries to use sports for selfish purposes. Persistent attempts to politicize sports cooperation, put pressure on relevant multilateral organizations, including the International Olympic Committee, as well as to split the international Olympic movement are contrary to Olympic goals and ideals.

We insist on holding fair and just competitions, ensuring equal access to all countries without exception for full-scale participation in the Olympic and Paralympic movements.

66. We advocate the immediate abolition of politically motivated censorship of Russian and Russian-language media by the authorities of the states of the "collective West", Ukraine and Moldova, as well as the largest IT corporations. We insist on an end to repressions against undesirable journalists and public figures. We are deeply concerned about the lack of response from relevant international organisations and UN agencies in connection with the deteriorating situation with freedom of expression in many countries of the world.

67. In the socio-economic sphere, the desire of Western countries to blame Russia for the deepening economic crisis, as well as to take advantage of the situation to exclude Russia and our like-minded people from specialized formats of cooperation, is particularly noticeable. Against this background, developing countries are less and less embarrassed to talk about the long-term (since the colonial period) economic damage caused to them as a result of armed conflicts, unilateral coercive measures, environmental pollution, unsuccessful economic transformations using Western loans and aid, and more recently, the tendency to curtail or reorient development assistance to military or humanitarian purposes. Developing countries are aware that sanctions as a form of hybrid warfare have global consequences, affect the volatility of markets, access to food and energy resources, which are the key to social stability and economic development. In a recession, without Russia, it will be impossible to take effective practical steps to restore supply chains, ensure energy and food security, and prevent the degradation of world economic relations.

68. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda), despite the existing objective difficulties, fully retains its relevance as a universal creative and consolidating initiative. Discussions around certain elements of the UN Secretary-General's reform initiative "Our Common Agenda" should not overshadow the central role of the quadrennial High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (ESDP) organized in New York in September 2023 under the auspices of the UN General Assembly. It will conduct a mid-term review of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, followed by a high-level dialogue on financing for development, a review of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development, which is an integral part of the 2030 Agenda. These intergovernmental agreements remain relevant in their entirety as guidelines for national planning and focused efforts of the UN development system.

We continue to consider the fight against poverty as a key task of the work of the socio-economic wing of the UN. Within the framework of the Third UN Decade for the Eradication of Poverty 2018-2027, we support the further development of practical measures in this area, including socio-economic and technological transformations related to the development of industrial production, especially in the least developed countries.

69. We attach great importance to international cooperation to combat climate change. We consider the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement (PS) concluded under its auspices as the main international legal mechanisms for a long-term climate settlement. We consider it important to strictly adhere to the provisions of the PS in terms of reducing the growth rate of the average global temperature in the range of 2-1.5°C and achieving carbon neutrality in the second half of the century, and not by 2050. It is necessary to observe the "division of labor" between environmental mechanisms, without creating artificial "intersecting lines" that will complicate the implementation of common tasks and interests.

We are convinced that climate efforts should be based on non-discriminatory international cooperation, taking into account economic realities and the interests of all interested countries.

We oppose linking climate and security issues and giving peacekeeping missions unusual climate monitoring functions. Major donor countries are thus trying to absolve themselves of responsibility for the economic problems in the least developed countries.

70. In matters of energy cooperation, we consider it expedient to proceed from the priority of the task of ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy sources (SDG-7), which should be addressed taking into account environmental factors.

Recognizing the relevance of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, we stand for the principle of technological neutrality without discrimination of energy sources with similar characteristics in terms of carbon footprint. We urge you to objectively assess different types of energy resources (nuclear, hydropower and all types of renewable energy sources), based on their impact on the environment throughout the entire life cycle. In this context, we advocate the expansion of the use of natural gas as the most environmentally acceptable fossil fuel, as well as the classification of nuclear and hydropower as clean energy sources. At the same time, we believe that the replacement of coal generation and the reduction in the use of fossil fuels should occur as economic and technological conditions mature.

We are convinced that the transition to low-emission development should be gradual, balanced, carefully calibrated taking into account national and regional characteristics. The development of common, uniform and understandable rules for climate regulation will contribute to increasing the effectiveness of common efforts.

At the same time, we note the fundamental importance of protecting critical infrastructure, including in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2341. In this regard, we once again call for an open and transparent international investigation into the September 2022 terrorist attack against the Nord Stream gas pipeline system.

71. We continue to advocate for the observance of the basic principles of international humanitarian assistance, enshrined in UN General Assembly resolution 46/182 and other decisions of the General Assembly and ECOSOC. We support improving the efficiency and effectiveness of such assistance. We call on the UN humanitarian agencies to rely in their work on carefully verified data on the humanitarian situation on the ground.

72. A decisive contribution to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and overcoming the global crisis could be made by the abolition of unilateral coercive measures (PKOs) that are contrary to the UN Charter and international law. PKOs have serious humanitarian consequences – they block aid to those in need and the supply of basic goods such as food, fertilizers, fuels and lubricants, medicines, as well as hinder economic recovery from international investment sources, undermine multilateral efforts to combat the consequences of COVID-19.

Of particular concern is the tendency to apply economic restrictions of an extraterritorial nature, the so-called secondary sanctions. The principle of responsibility of "third" countries, their authorities, citizens and businesses for maintaining and developing mutually beneficial trade and economic relations with those against whom unilateral restrictive actions have been applied is introduced into the practice of interstate relations. In fact, we are talking about interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, the neo-colonial practice of forcing compliance with other people's illegal sanctions restrictions under direct pressure on the socio-political circles of the focus countries.

73. The Russian side shares the calls of the UN leadership to reform the global financial architecture, which, in its current form, contributes to the preservation of Western countries' dominance in the world economy and increases the debt burden of developing countries, as well as impedes free and non-discriminatory access to international capital markets. We support initiatives to reform the Bretton Woods institutions and to ensure more representative participation of developing countries and countries with economies in transition in their capital and governing bodies. We note with regret that the UN Secretary-General is not sufficiently promoting scientific cooperation and, above all, technology transfer.

Illicit financial flows from developing countries, which had been used as a de facto source of financing for Western economies, needed to be returned to countries of origin, including through the development of a new multilateral instrument to the Convention against Corruption on asset recovery.

74. We call for further strengthening the effectiveness of the activities of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) in order to implement the UN SDGs. We emphasise the need to counter the policy of a number of Western countries to politicise the work of these programmes and dilute their technical mandates.

The results of the second session of the UN-Habitat Assembly emphasized the importance of the Program as the leading intergovernmental platform of the UN system for equal interstate cooperation in the field of sustainable urban development and the implementation of the "new urban agenda" adopted in 2016 at the 3rd UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Quito, Ecuador). We call for a non-discriminatory approach to countries where UN-Habitat works on conflict and natural disasters.

A key objective of UNEP is to enhance the effectiveness of international environmental cooperation. We note the inadmissibility of prioritizing the environmental dimension of sustainable development to the detriment of its economic and social components. We oppose the discussion of peace and security, human rights and humanitarian operations within the framework of UNEP.

We consider it necessary to strive for the implementation of the principle of equitable geographical representation in the professional composition of the Secretariat in accordance with resolution 5/13 adopted at the 5th session of the UN Environment Assembly.

75. Note the need to preserve the central role of the Rome international organizations – the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the UN World Food Programme and the International Fund for Agricultural Development – in coordinating international efforts to strengthen global food security, eradicate hunger, improve nutrition, and sustainable agriculture and rural development. We are actively involved in the follow-up to the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit to transform food systems. We believe that the transformation of international food systems should be carried out taking into account national priorities and characteristics.

We oppose attempts by Western countries to hold Russia responsible for the global food crisis. In the course of contacts with friendly states and at the platforms of international organizations, we explain the real consequences and impact of the unilateral restrictive measures imposed on us. We consider it extremely important to prevent the politicization of international cooperation in the agri-food sector and the process of providing humanitarian aid, as well as manipulating the fight against hunger for our own trade, economic and geopolitical purposes. We pay special attention to ensuring the stable and uninterrupted operation of food supply chains and correcting distortions in the fertilizer market, primarily in the interests of the needy population of developing countries.

76. In the area of public health, we support the actions agreed in the UN General Assembly and WHO aimed at achieving universal health coverage (UHC), including in preparation for the three high-level meetings of the UN General Assembly in September 2023 – on pandemics (20 September), UHC (21 September) and tuberculosis (22 September) – with a focus on the development of primary health care. We are also interested in taking an active part in multilateral efforts to mitigate risks in the spread of antimicrobial resistance. We will continue to contribute to the international partnership to combat HIV/AIDS in accordance with Russian legislation and based on our national priorities in this area.

Preparedness, prevention and response to outbreaks of infectious diseases are becoming a key element of cooperation on the topic of health today. We believe that the main professional work in this area should be carried out within the framework of the relevant WHO bodies, taking into account the positions of member states and unconditional respect for their national sovereignty.

77. We consistently support WHO as a centre for international cooperation on global health issues. We are in favour of enhancing the effectiveness of the Organization's work by increasing its transparency and accountability to Member States. We believe that the main professional work in this area should be moderated by the relevant WHO bodies, taking into account the positions of member states and unconditional respect for their national sovereignty. We oppose the creation of parallel structures in this area with a limited number of participants and attempts to replace them with universal UN mechanisms in the field of global health.

78. Within the framework of the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Action for 2015-2030, we are committed to expanding multilateral cooperation in the field of disaster risk reduction, including in the field of project activities and the exchange of experience through relevant departments.

79. In the context of the reform of the development system (SR), the UN intends to promote the strengthening of the UN Resident Coordinator (RC) system and the continued focus of their work on sustainable development issues. We consider it counterproductive to transfer the funding of the UNFC system to the regular budget of the world Organization or to increase the coordination fee from earmarked contributions of member countries to development assistance projects from 1% to 2%. We intend to advocate for the need to increase the accountability of the funds, programmes and special agencies of the UNODC to the Member States, the implementation of their project and normative activities based on the national priorities of the recipient countries, as well as the strengthening of regional cooperation platforms with an emphasis on the growing role of the regional economic commissions.

80. We have consistently advocated curbing the growth of the regular and peacekeeping budgets, as well as the financial estimates of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. We insist on justified reductions in the requested resources.

We support the proper implementation of the recommendations of the oversight bodies by the UN Secretariat. We have consistently advocated strengthening accountability, transparency and internal control in the work of the Secretariat. We attach particular importance to the preservation of effective control over the financial and personnel issues of the Organization by Member States. We believe that any reforms and transformations in the administrative and budgetary sphere should be carried out exclusively on the basis of the mandates approved by the UN General Assembly.

We consider the UN General Assembly to be the main platform for developing system-wide solutions in the field of human resources management and determining the conditions of service of staff based on the recommendations of the International Civil Service Commission.

81. Respect for the parity of the six official languages of the United Nations in the areas of conference services and information and communication activities remains a priority for my delegation. In this regard, it is necessary to guarantee the necessary resources for the Organization's language services. The principle of multilingualism should be of key importance in the planning and implementation of all UN projects, including in the media and social networks. Any manifestations of discrimination against the Russian language in the UN system are unacceptable.

The priority is to combat disinformation and maintain an objective and balanced approach to the work of the Organization's information resources. We are interested in the comprehensive expansion of contacts and the development of partnerships between the UN Department of Global Communications and Russian media organisations.

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