Two Expert.Ru Essays & Rossiya 1's 25th Anniversary Documentary on Putin

"We go our own way: Russian Foreign Policy as a Cultural Phenomenon" and "From globalization to protectionism: A paradigm shift without a declaration of war"

Broadcaster Rossiya 1 produced a documentary film dedicated to Putin’s 25th anniversary as Russia’s leader, Russia. The Kremlin. Putin. 25 Years. Sputnik compiled a list of “key statements by Putin” with the last three asking the question on many minds, not just Russians:

On a successor:

▪ Russia should foster individuals capable of earning the public’s trust;

▪ The president said he observes and assesses each person's potential when thinking about a successor;

▪ He constantly considers the question of a possible successor, but it is up to the Russian people to make a final decision on who will be the next leader of Russia.

I’ve only found one source for the video which is 1:38 in length and all in Russian. I hope we’ll soon be provided with a dubbed English translation, but I haven’t looked for one yet. I see that Martyanov has used a specific portion of the film to make an important observation, and based on past practice, I expect him to post an English overdubbed version, probably Monday. Thanks to Martyanov, I was able to obtain the primary link to the video and much more, although it’s still all in Russian.

I continue to discover key Russian journals that feature writings by Russia’s ruling and advisory classes: эксперт or Expert. The first is from 28 April by Timofey Bordachev, Professor at the Higher School of Economics and Programme Director of the Valdai Club, whose writings have been featured by the Gym before. His essay is titled:

We go our own way: Russian Foreign Policy as a Cultural Phenomenon

"Only crows fly," says an old proverb adopted in the Vladimir-Suzdal land, where, after the crushing Batu Khan invasion, the revival of the Russian state began at the end of the 13th century. It began so that 250 years later, a power arose in the east of Europe, the power of which and the right to make decisions independently could not be questioned. In the first two and a half centuries of the history of our new statehood, the experience of war and diplomacy was accumulated, which remains the basis of Russian foreign policy culture to this day. The goal has always been the same: to preserve the ability to always determine one's own future.

The methods for achieving this goal remained very diverse, but they always relied on polyvariance—the absence of invariable "stratagems," any ideological dogmas, and unpredictability for adversaries. The civilizational country, which in less than a century (1552-1637) went from the Volga to the Pacific Ocean, did not create anything similar to European or Asian strategic foreign policy doctrines, simply because it never needed them: the natural inclination to non-standard solutions does not allow for a matrix of foreign policy activity.

But these features of the national foreign policy culture did not appear immediately. Until the middle of the thirteenth century, the Russian lands did not differ much from the rest of Eastern Europe. And they could well repeat the fate of other Slavic peoples who eventually fell under German or Turkish influence. The "heroic", according to the apt definition of Lev Gumilev, period of our history was distinguished by fragmentation, competition of ambitions of cities and princes. And the complete absence of grounds for creating a single state.

There was no practical need for unification: geography allowed the city-states of Russia to cope with everything on their own, and the climate never contributed to their intensive social and economic interaction. In other words, up to the second half of the thirteenth century, we followed the same path as the rest of the small peoples of Eastern Europe.

However, a "wondrous" event, as Nikolai Gogol put it, happened: in 1237, invincible hordes of Mongol rulers invaded Russia and literally demolished most of its most powerful state centers. The largest foreign policy catastrophe became, according to the classic, precisely a miraculous event, because after it we had, firstly, an understandable reason to create a single state, and secondly, pragmatism and the ability to bend without breaking. For the next 250 years, the Russians became tributaries of the Golden Horde, but were never its slaves.

All relations between the Russian lands and the Golden Horde were a continuous struggle, in which direct clashes were interspersed with cooperation. In the process, the very "sharp Moscow sword" was forged—the Russian state as a military organization of the people inhabiting it. And there was a feature of foreign policy culture that remains with us today–-the absence of a clear line between conflict and cooperation, war and peace. For several centuries, these phenomena flowed into one another, without causing any cognitive dissonance in our glorious ancestors.

At the same time, centuries of relations with neighbors that looked invincible have formed such a feature of our foreign policy culture as the absence of a connection between the strength of the enemy and the justice of his claims. In Russia, the Western European idea that injustice is inevitable in relations between people and states has not historically taken root. Thomas Hobbes's theory says that force creates the right to a higher position. For Russia, force is only the most important factor in relations, but never what determines the laws. In the famous song about the Crimean Khan's march on Moscow in the 16th century, one of the first lines is "the Crimean Tsar is riding the dog." He is a "tsar" because he has a powerful military force. But he is a "dog" because the truth is not on his side. Similarly, after the end of the Cold War, recognizing the power of the West did not mean for Russia simultaneously recognizing the rightness of its actions.

Demography, a direct consequence of the climate, has always remained our problem, although it created the basis for the integration of peoples. Only at the end of the 18th century, Russia became equal in population to France. Although even then it occupied a space several times larger than the whole of Europe.

The Russian lands had no allies.

“Russian foreign policy culture is based on the knowledge that no one will solve our problems for us, and there cannot and should not be allies on whom Russia's survival depends.”

Although Russia itself has always been and remains a loyal ally that can be relied on even in the most difficult situations.

In the middle of the XV century, the Moscow Grand Duke Vasily Vasilyevich decided to settle his allies on the eastern borders of Russia—the Kazan princes Kassim and Yakub. The history of the multinational Russian state begins, in which the main thing is not religious affiliation, but devotion to the country in solving defense problems.

In this, by the way, Russia differs from Europe from the very beginning. The evolution of Russian society became mosaic, because each ethnoconfessional group (or system of such) included in it acquired its own pace and speed of development. In Europe, this could not be the case, since the pragmatism of secular rulers was always limited by the power of the church. The Spanish kings completed their reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula by killing, expelling, or forcing the Arabs and Jews who inhabited it to be baptized. In Russia, each ethnic group was included as it was, and then it was only a matter of serving the common national interests of defense. Christianization was welcomed, but it was never a condition for public service.

Russia's modern foreign policy culture and strategy are based on historical tradition in several of its dimensions at once. Firstly, this is the already mentioned basis of the raison d'être of statehood–-defense against external challenges, which is now being transformed into a general development strategy in a changing and unpredictable world.

Secondly, both then and now, all efforts are subordinated to the solution of one task--to preserve the freedom to choose the path under any circumstances. In general, the independence of determining the trajectory of its development is the strategy of the country, for which it is most unnatural to create hard-core doctrinal guidelines. Also because ideology is needed to create doctrines and strategies. And this has not historically been characteristic of Russia.

Thirdly, Russia never has "eternal" opponents. The history of the first centuries of Muscovite statehood has convinced us that today's irreconcilable enemy may become part of the Russian state the day after tomorrow. No country in the world, except Russia, has known the experience of completely absorbing its most dangerous enemy. For more than 250 years, the Golden Horde was a formidable neighbor. However, in 1504, the Horde fell, and 50 years later, almost all its peoples and cities became equal parts of the expanding Russian state, the aristocracy merged with the Russian one.

And, finally, deep in history are the roots of the Russian "operational code", or method of waging a struggle (diplomatic or military). In its history, Russia has won few wars by exerting all its capabilities. As a rule, victory was achieved by prolonged exhaustion of the enemy, gradually creating the basis for him to realize the hopelessness of resistance. The Golden Horde was defeated in an almost bloodless stand on the Ugra River in 1480, and the second "eternal" enemy, Poland, was not defeated in a decisive battle, but reduced to an insignificant position by the pressure of Russian power over several centuries.

“For Russia, the main thing has always been not the brightness of victory, but the achievement of the desired result. Therefore, among other things, Russia is always open to negotiations: political goals invariably prevail over military ones.”

Moreover, it cannot be said about Russia that its domestic policy affects foreign policy—they are simply intertwined. And any large-scale foreign policy action is aimed at solving the problem of internal consolidation of society in order to achieve the strategic objectives of its development at a certain stage. Just as for the Moscow princes of the early time, the fight against foreign opponents was a way to unite the Russian lands.

Now the geopolitical landscape around Russia is changing again. The West, led by the United States, remains the most powerful force, but its possibilities are not unlimited. China is increasing its influence on the world, but so far it is behaving with restraint. Europe, which has historically been the main source of threat for Russia, is leaving the historical stage because it cannot create its own image of the future. Russia, the United States and China have such an image. Therefore, relations in the "triangle" will become decisive for world politics in the coming decades. And then India may join the “troika”--it is still lagging behind in terms of development but also has its own unique image of the future.

Does this mean that the Western direction will cease to be the main direction for Russian foreign policy? After all, the foundations of the science of international relations say that the most important geographical direction is the one from which the greatest danger can be expected. Most likely, in this regard, unfortunately, nothing will change. Europe has ceased to be the center of world politics, but it still remains at its center, since it is here that the most difficult border between Russia and America lies.

But we can get real resources for development only through the development of Eurasia. Friendly relations with neighbors in the East are necessary for the peaceful development of our own territory and population. It seems that this can create the material basis for the most important thing in any Russian image of the future-–the ability to go its own way. [My Emphasis]

Russian historians of Russia have always emphasized the Mongol period as crucial for its contribution to Russia’s development. Lev Gumilev’s works I now have access to, and now Gym readers do too, although it’s all in Russian. Lavrov is very influenced by his work and has high praise. As the essay shows, Russia uses a different lens to look at the world that’s proven highly successful. That Russians weren’t taught religious-based hatreds unlike Europe and its English-speaking colonies is also a very crucial difference. The short-lived period of Great Russian Chauvinism was destroyed by Revolutions and Wars, while constant existential pressure over the last 100+ years contributed greatly to Russian cohesion as a multinational people the West thought would be easy to exploit, which proved to be its greatest error, IMO. My last observation is related to Russia and Law—that Law isn’t dependent on power, that Law is superior to Might Makes Right. That ought to help readers understand why the UN Charter is still held in high esteem by Putin, Lavrov, and other high ranking Russians despite the West ignoring it because they think their power is more consequential. When we look at something very fundamental regarding Law like contract law and its basis in honesty and honor and the fact those are the only ways to build a business relationship, we can understand why Law is superior to force—force/power can wither and die while honesty and honor can be infinite.

*****************************

The next essay, published on 29 April, is by a well-placed person of importance as shown by his introductory bio: Alexander Yakovenko, Head of the Committee on Global Problems and International Security of the Scientific and Expert Council of the Security Council of the Russian Federation:

From globalization to protectionism: A paradigm shift without a declaration of war

The all-out tariff aggression of the Donald Trump administration suggests that, as on the eve of the First World War, globalization is fraught with a return to protectionism–-as part of the inevitable correction of its unintended consequences by the key affected players and the fixation of a new balance of power by the winners.

Then, at the beginning of the last century, Germany, the United States and Russia were winning, and Great Britain had to squeeze in. Therefore, London did not particularly object to a major European war, realizing that Berlin intended to unleash it, among other things, as a means of restraining the development of Russia, whose economy was then growing at a rate comparable to the current Chinese one. According to the calculations of those years, by 2050 the population of Russia was supposed to be 600 million people, and it was supposed to become the dominant (in the understanding of the Western elites) economic power not only in Europe, but also in all of Eurasia.

The British stubbornly refused, despite the insistence of St. Petersburg (this was the main mission of the then Russian ambassador Alexander Benckendorff), to declare publicly or convey to Berlin through diplomatic channels that they would side with France and Russia in the event of German aggression. In fact, this is what happened, but the opportunity to prevent a European catastrophe was missed. Berlin, which until recently had offered London an alliance in the event of French aggression against the British Isles (a direct reference to the times of Napoleon), was shocked, but the deed was done: war was declared on Russia, and France then declared war on Germany.

Obviously, now the list of losers is much longer. It is headed by America, but also by the entire European Union and Great Britain. China and a number of other countries, including India and Russia, have benefited the most. This time, Beijing and Moscow have become the objects of deterrence. Over the past three years, Moscow has proved its self-sufficiency, mobilization potential, and at the same time has set high standards for modern warfare. Hence Trump's policy of normalizing relations with Russia, which will bring Russian-American relations to an unprecedented level of positive and equal cooperation in peacetime. India is of interest to the United States as a counterbalance to China, which is becoming the main object of containment and even isolation by Washington.

The nuclear factor ensures the relatively peaceful nature of the current transformation of the world and the reflection of the new balance of power in the world order. As the Americans themselves expect, by 2030 China will be militarily equal to America, including its nuclear missile potential. Then, naturally, the task of its forceful deterrence will disappear. However, the experience of the SVO in Ukraine has shown that it will be difficult for the United States to confront China far from its borders - if Beijing decides to force the reunification of Taiwan. In any case, the threat of nuclear war will not be able to scare Beijing, since the equation of strategic deterrence has already become trilateral—with the participation of Russia: it is stupid to destroy each other in full view of Russia. In fact, this is all about Trump's pacifism: he excludes the option of war.

Washington's economic aggression remains, albeit clearly belated. It is not only about the significant trade, economic and investment interdependence between the United States and China, as indicated by the first salvos in this trade war. China has created a network structure of relevant relations with all US allies, including European ones, and much more broadly. In the face of geopolitical turmoil, no one is ready to sacrifice their economic well-being for the sake of restoring "American greatness" in Trump's interpretation.

Washington will have to face a united front of beneficiaries of the 40-year globalization of the world economic system. Allied Europe will have a motive to prevent Trump from succeeding and thereby doom his conservative revolution to failure. But the West will remain in the usual system of geopolitical coordinates.

The task clearly turned out to be more difficult than originally assumed. A long-term comprehensive strategy will be required, taking into account, among other things, the interests of American business. It can be assumed that this will be something similar to Roosevelt's New Deal, with the only amendment that it will require a smooth entry into protectionism with a parallel solution to such problems as balancing the federal budget and the national debt. Monetary shocks affecting the future of the Fed and the dollar are not excluded. Thus, multiple issues of both the dollar and government bonds cannot be ruled out. Then the question of assets denominated in old, unsecured dollars, as well as Treasuries issued with a yield of zero or so (although they will have to be repaid), will become acute. The peculiarity of capitalism is that assets can instantly be zeroed out and even acquire a negative value.

One of the Roman historians describes an episode when a young man from an aristocratic family comes to a patrician for advice, who makes the following verdict: his financial problems are such that they can be solved only through a civil war, that is, they are insoluble in the existing legal order. It is possible that this is also true for the Trump administration. Then it will be a quasi-civil war within the United States with a decisive role for the state and a "clean slate" in foreign economic terms, since this is quite in the power of America as the main shareholder of the global monetary and financial system.

In the meantime, everything suggests that there is a slowdown in global growth and world trade in the face of the uncertainty that has already developed in the first hundred days of Trump's presidency. The IMF's annual report is indicative, according to which this year global growth will fall to 2.8% (from 3.3% this year), for the United States - to 1.8% (from 2.8%) and the EU - to 0.8% (from 0.9%). China will suffer significantly - up to 4.0% (from 5.0%). In the medium term, exports to the United States may decline in the range from 19.3 to 27.6%.

Of interest are the estimates of the report of the BlackRock megafund, which manages $10.5 trillion in assets around the world. It emphasizes the importance of energy security, which will be associated with the development of artificial intelligence (it is mentioned that China is building nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 100 gigawatts, as a result of which it will account for half of all global nuclear power generation), and the prospects for infrastructure modernization with a global investment of $68 trillion by 2040. Among other things, the importance of tokenization for both payments and investments is noted.

In general, experts expect the trade war to escalate, and its effect will accumulate over time, which will be associated with distortions affecting capital accumulation and productivity losses due to the redistribution of resources. Tariffs will act as shock therapy both for America itself and for the countries against which they are imposed. At the same time, global inflation may increase slightly but then decline due to a drop in economic activity. The accumulation of distortions caused by non-market measures may eventually have a widespread impact.

This, in principle, is the price of global transformation. Self-sufficient countries, such as the United States and Russia, and those countries that manage to create relatively closed trade, economic, and monetary settlement orders within their macro-regions will be in an advantageous position.

Emissions of power politics in international relations cannot be ruled out either. Historical experience shows that the object always has an advantage and can "wait around the corner" for the subject of the policy directed against it. This happened to Russia in Ukraine, but the same can happen to China, as, by the way, has already happened to it within the framework of globalization launched by the Americans. Only this time they can "double down" and rewrite the rules of the game imposed on them, reshaping the geopolitical coordinate system into a geo-economic one. It will be society against society, and then it will be difficult to say on whose side time is on. [My Emphasis]

IMO, Trump’s attempt to reset relations with Russia will fail, which is the end game that’s now emerging. I do hope Yakovenko is correct on the use of nukes, but I don’t think his assumption about Trump’s pacifism is correct. As with his first term, he’s surrounded by Neocons and Zionists along with Neoliberal financial advisors. Long term planning is also something Americans don’t do. IMO, it’s best to look at FDR and the New Deal as an anomaly within US history as the Empire was still rising, while now it’s steadily declining with its deplorable financial state leading the way down—Parasites like Black Rock cannot be seen as strengths within the US economy as they take, not add. As mentioned in several articles and comments recently, China’s electrical power production is surpassing the combined efforts of the other leading nations—it’s planned very well for the future. And the final plus for both Russia, China and those associated with both is the overall geoeconomic system they continue to build in a manner the Outlaw US Empire will have great difficulty in defeating. And then there’s the idea that the Empire is self-sufficient like Russia; IMO, that hypothesis is incorrect. Historically, the Empire has greatly depended on the infusion of high intellect and their ideas via immigrants, people it’s now shunning that have returned home where their contributions are very welcome. I don’t see the BRICS or SCO rewriting the rules of the game. In their oratory, their leaders embrace the UN and WTO rule systems, while they find the Bretton Woods financial system to be the unfair component. I expect a new system to be made available to the world that bypasses the unfair system, and it’s a development the Empire is powerless to stop. I see time being on the side of the Global Majority, but there are many obstacles that will need to be overcome and buried over the next 75 years.

*
*
*
Like what you’ve been reading at Karlof1’s Substack? Then please consider subscribing and choosing to make a monthly/yearly pledge to enable my efforts in this challenging realm. Thank You!