Zhou Bo: "Liberal International Order"? This is nothing more than a form of historical myopia

More Geopolitical Comedy from Guancha

The editors at Guancha note:

Recently, Zhou Bo, a researcher at Tsinghua University's Center for International Strategic and Security Studies, was interviewed by Gerardin Dugg and Hamish MacDonald, hosts of ABC Radio International's "Global Adventures" program, to elaborate on China's views on the current international situation, the Taiwan Strait issue and global responsibilities.

The fact that this is comical will become apparent as one reads the transcript. The differing POV between China and West is quickly addressed in a way that’s very pragmatic and clearly doesn’t conform to that of the West. IMO, it’s these contradictory POVs that supply the comedic element and is what makes this interview so valuable, which is why Guancha’s editors translated and published it. A search for an English version of this transcript was attempted but nothing was found, although a link to the previous interview that’s mentioned at the opening was found. I’m aware that a new conflict point’s been opened by Outlaw US Empire terrorist proxies in Kashmir that has caused India and Pakistan to semi-mobilize their forces, which was the terrorist act’s intent. Hopefully, wise eyes will see the manipulation and calm the waters. Neither side has anything to gain by the action, so cui bono must be invoked, and that points to the usual suspects who benefit from sowing chaos. That maxim must be kept in mind as this long read is digested:

Geraldine Doogue: The next person we're going to interview is Zhou Bo – we've interviewed him before, and the response was very good. He is a retired colonel who recently published a new book, Should the World Be Afraid of China? This is a rare book from a Chinese perspective.

Hamish MacDonald: So let's start at this moment, and to be honest, what I specially, really want to know is: how does China see the situation in the world right now? The world is in chaos, but what does it all look like from China's perspective?

Zhou Bo: It's really a "billion-dollar question". I've been thinking about it myself, in part because I don't quite believe in the once-ingrained concept of the so-called "liberal international order."

To put it simply, I believe that the current international order is not fundamentally different from the past: it has always been a collection of different countries, different social systems, different national identities, different cultures, and most importantly, different civilizations. For example, it was not until the "Great Geographical Discoveries" in the 16th century, that is, after da Gama discovered India and Columbus discovered America, that people gradually understood the outline of the world and began to have a more complete understanding of the world.

But if you simply define the "world order" as a so-called "liberal international order", it is actually a kind of historical myopia. Because if you really look at it that way, it's a bit like living in a Francis Fukuyama-esque world – the world where "history ends."

Geraldine: So you mean, it's actually a Western-imposed worldview, right?

Zhou Bo: Yes, the so-called "liberal international order" only looked like that at best, during the period when the Soviet Union collapsed and China had not yet fully emerged. But if you really believe in that order, it's easy to fall into narcissism; as soon as you find that you are no longer strong, you will start looking for "enemies". This is actually very dangerous. But if you believe that this world order is a collection of civilizations, then you ask yourself: How do I coexist with others?

Geraldine: In a way, President Trump will probably agree with you to some extent. He also seems to be envisioning a "shared" pattern of power and influence, which has caused a stir in some parts of the West-–because he has chosen to work with people who hold a completely different view of power. So in that sense, is the line of thinking that you're describing somewhat consistent with Trump's point?

Zhou Bo: No, I don't think so. Because Trump's slogan is "Make America Great Again", and this "Great Again" is basically to restore American hegemony and restore dominance over the world. China, on the other hand, prefers to see itself as part of the world, nothing more.

Geraldine: Isn't he just trying to divide the world? Aren't we beginning to see this? He seems to be engaged in the division of "spheres of influence"?

Hamish: yes, for example, he's willing to "cede" Europe to Russia, and maybe Asia to China, and then let the United States focus on its own affairs.

Zhou Bo: You may be right. But the point is that the so-called "sphere of influence" is actually a very old concept that simply does not apply to the 21st century. I have always stressed that China has no sphere of influence in the first place; Even if China wanted to have it, it wouldn't.

Why? A lot of people will refer to Southeast Asia as China's "backyard," but if you look at Southeast Asia, there are quite a few countries that have territorial disputes with China over the South China Sea, and several countries that are allies of the United States. Looking at Northeast Asia, North Korea will not necessarily listen to China.

So, where is China's "sphere of influence"? So the conclusion is: if China doesn't have a sphere of influence at all, then there's no need to build one. We just need to go out into the world and make ourselves more influential.

Understand that "influence" and "sphere of influence" are two different things. China's influence is already global, so there is no need to pursue so-called spheres of influence. Pursuing a sphere of influence means you'll have to make a bunch of allies, and why would you want to do that when alliances are expensive and hard to maintain?

Geraldine: Interesting. You are putting forward the idea that China is completely non-aligned in its handling of international affairs. And you also have an interesting observation about China's "national character": you say that China still has a certain degree of "victim mentality", which is not conducive to the country's development. So why do you think this mentality is not helpful for China's own development?

Zhou Bo: Yes, many Chinese do believe in this "victim mentality". In a sense, this mentality is not unreasonable, because China did suffer from foreign aggression after 1840. But the so-called "hundred years of shame" that we often refer to is theoretical, and even mathematically, if it is counted from 1840, to 1949.

When the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, Mao Zedong declared that "the Chinese people have stood up from now on." Now that the Chinese people have "stood up," this humiliated history should also be turned over. This victim mentality can create nationalism because you feel like you've been treated unfairly. But once you get stronger, this emotion can make others start to feel nervous.

If we divide China's economic aggregate by the size of its population, China is certainly a developing country. But at the same time, China does have the potential to become the world's largest economy. So the question arises: can the world's largest economy still be called a developing country? If the answer is "yes", then what is the point of dividing "developed countries" from "developing countries"? If China becomes one of the most powerful countries in the world, will it be necessary to maintain a "victim" mentality? Will you continue to call yourself a "victim"?

Hamish: Okay, but isn't that exactly one of the core issues of U.S. dissatisfaction with China? The United States believes that China is using its status as a "developing country" for its own benefit. For example, in the international sharing of responsibility for the climate transition, this has become a point of contention–-because China is classified as a developing country, it does not need to bear the same responsibilities and obligations as developed countries in the West when dealing with climate change. And this is unfair in the eyes of the West, after all, as you yourself mentioned, China may soon become the largest economy in the world. [Unmentioned is the fact that China has done more to reduce emissions than the West; thus, the question is fallacious.]

Zhou Bo: The problem is that China is wearing "too many high hats"–-and every hat is real, which confuses many people, including Chinese. In the eyes of the Chinese themselves: we are the world's second largest economy in terms of GDP, but in terms of purchasing power parity, we are the world's largest economy; We are the world's largest trading nation, the largest exporter, and the world's largest industrial nation. But at the same time, not so long ago we were the most populous country in the world.

Hamish: So, the question is: why does China seem afraid to admit its power and influence?

Zhou Bo: I think it's because China wears too many high hats, so every aspect of China is real. It depends on who you're talking to, and it also depends on where you stand and what perspective you use to view China.

Hamish: Indeed, Mr. Zhou, I do have this feeling of "wearing too many high hats" when I listen to your explanation. You say that China does not need and does not want allies, but at the same time it has "no limit to friendship" with Russia. How can these two statements be put together?

Zhou Bo: I'm glad you asked this question–-let me try to convince you in the simplest way possible. For example, I said, Hamish, I want to be friends with you. And then I said, wait a minute, Hamish, our friendship must have a limit. Do you think that makes sense? So the so-called "friendship without limits" is basically an expression of a good wish, hoping that this friendship can last for a long time.

Hamish: But China doesn't say that to all of its friends. It will indeed say that friendship has a bottom line. That's what it says to us in Australia. We've been through periods of growing friendships, but there have also been times when China will say, "No, there's a problem here." [Which side acts to terminate the friendship—China is even-n=handed while Australia oscillates politically like a wind sock.]

Zhou Bo: Maybe I can convince you in another way. Although this friendship is described in the same document as "unlimited", just a sentence or two after this sentence, we make it clear that this is not a military alliance. Therefore, this shows that even in this kind of friendship, China has a bottom line. China opposes the use of nuclear weapons in any form, and China has not supplied Russia with any missiles or military equipment.

Hamish: yes, that's what I don't quite understand. China wants to be a major global power, so why not exert influence in its relationship with Russia to bring about an end to the war in Ukraine?

Zhou Bo: That's because you're looking at this issue from a European perspective. And when China looks at this relationship, it must first look at it from a bilateral perspective.

Hamish: But China has also said that economic growth, for example, depends on peace, and that global stability is a prerequisite for sustained prosperity.

Zhou Bo: Oh, of course. With regard to "stability", the question is what causes instability? Because Russia believes that NATO expansion is precisely the source of instability. This statement is not unreasonable, because the biggest difference between Putin and the previous leader is that he is the one who said, "Enough, that's it." Since the Soviet era, whether it is Gorbachev, Yeltsin or Putin, their attitude towards NATO has basically been the same--NATO should not continue to expand. But the difference is that Putin decided to act, and this is the difference between him and the previous leader.

Geraldine: I don't think we can resolve this difference of opinion in this episode, but I want to move on to another issue. You make an obvious point in your book: the biggest problem for all of us is how to avoid wars between China and other countries, no matter who the "other countries" are. And your answer is very direct, and it does point out a challenge in the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Can you summarize your point of view and let us hear what you think?

Zhou Bo: First of all, I don't think a war between China and the United States is inevitable. There are only two places where we can have conflicts: one in the South China Sea and the other in the Taiwan Strait. I put the South China Sea in front of the Taiwan Strait, which is different from what many people think, because the United States has been sending planes and warships to the South China Sea, and we sometimes intercept them. This creates a very dangerous close encounter.

Hamish: What's wrong with the U.S. sending ships and planes to the South China Sea to maintain freedom of navigation?

Zhou Bo: That's exactly the problem. These islands and reefs are Chinese territory, but the United States does not recognize them. The problem is that the United States itself has not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, but has always considered itself a "guardian". Then I want to ask, if this law is really that good, why don't you approve it? If it's not good, why are you using it to challenge others?

Geraldine: But I still want to bring it back. I see you wrote in your introduction: "How to avoid war in the Taiwan Strait? My answer is simple–-convince China that peaceful reunification is still possible. This quote is very special. I would also like to add that you did not mention the people of Taiwan. What do they want? How do we reach a consensus where everyone's rights are respected?

Zhou Bo: I say this because it's the simplest answer to a "billion-dollar question." According to Chinese law, one condition for China to use non-peaceful means is that China believes that the prospect of peaceful reunification has been completely lost. Therefore, we must believe: "The prospect of peaceful reunification has not been completely shattered, and we still have patience." And now that China is in the midst of rapid development, it begs the question: Will China become more confident in pursuing peaceful reunification, or will it become more impatient and resort to force?

I believe that convincing the Chinese government that peace is still possible means that the United States has to exercise restraint, and the Taiwan authorities have to exercise restraint. If all of this can be done, I believe that peace is possible. If the Chinese Government believes that the path to peaceful reunification is no longer possible, it will be a completely different situation.

Hamish: But there are many ways to achieve reunification, and many people will cite Hong Kong as an example. So it is entirely possible that Taiwan will be "taken back" in a similar situation, right?

Zhou Bo: That analogy is not entirely appropriate. Let me give you another example. Before the pandemic, about 1.5 million Taiwanese lived in Chinese mainland, so you can't imagine that the two sides of the strait are completely isolated.

1.5 million Taiwanese live in Chinese mainland, which means that about 6% of Taiwanese already live in the mainland. People always mention that the mainland will use a "big stick", but everyone often forgets that the mainland actually gives a lot, a lot of "carrots". For example, Taiwanese children can go to kindergarten in Fujian Province, just like our own children. They will also have an ID card, which is almost the same as the mainland ID card.

So those 1.5 million people say a lot. These people don't care about living in a completely different society and a completely different political system–-as long as that society provides them with better opportunities. And these people are all above the middle class, so I believe that with the development of globalization and the acceleration of artificial intelligence, just like the rest of the world, the integration between the two sides of the strait is also accelerating. This also means that perhaps one day, Taiwanese people will feel that it is not bad to be part of the most powerful country on the planet.

Hamish: I'm interested in how you see China's future role as a global power. In China's message to the outside world, we often hear references to the "rules-based international order". At the same time, the United States seems to be abandoning its soft power and seems to be treating its allies as enemies. If the United States no longer plays its traditional role, how will China position itself? Is it to replace it, or is it something else in mind?

Zhou Bo: China has actually stepped in. Because when the rest of the world looks more and more chaotic, it's only natural for people to look to China and ask the same questions as you. But what role will China play? In my opinion, China is more like an "anchor" or "stabilizer" in this turbulent world.

Hamish: But if China wants to be a stabilizer, doesn't that mean it has to play the role of mediator in the Middle East conflict, in the European conflict? Then we have to do something that China doesn't often do on the international stage, right?

Zhou Bo: I think China can indeed play a role in the Middle East and the war in Ukraine. Although Russia and the United States are communicating now, if you read the news like me, you know that the ceasefire proposed by Putin is actually conditional, right? So there may come a time in the future when all the major powers, including China, will need to provide some form of collective security.

Hamish: Do you think China would really do that? Like in Ukraine or the Middle East?

Zhou Bo: Yes, I think it's possible, it depends on how the situation develops. If the end result is a kind of "truce", then security guarantees are definitely needed.

Hamish MacDonald: So what kind of security guarantees do you think are possible, taking Ukraine as an example?

Zhou Bo: For example, Russia has announced that it will annex those four oblasts to Russian territory, but it is actually very difficult for Russia to really take full control of those four oblasts, because Ukraine has at least the full support of Europe, and possibly even the United States. So, in the future these four states may well turn into an Afghan-like situation— the Ukrainians will conduct endless guerrilla warfare like the Mujahideen. This means that Russia will never be able to truly control those four regions. So, this means that the so-called "armistice" is possible. A lot of people are talking about a ceasefire, a truce, or any other scenario, and a "truce" is the one that is most discussed.

Hamish: So, first of all, I want to ask you, are China's security guarantees going to Russia, or are they going to Ukraine?

Zhou Bo: It should be a collective security guarantee for both sides, because neither side can completely defeat the other, but both sides are actually very afraid. There is a fear that what will happen once the ceasefire is broken. This is not only Ukraine afraid, but Russia is also afraid, afraid that it will appear isolated. That's why Russia wants the Global South, such as China, India, and Brazil, to get involved.

Geraldine: You also mentioned in your book that China actually plays a very important role in global peacekeeping, which I didn't know much about before. If there is an arrangement for a truce in Ukraine, is China willing to send peacekeepers to supervise it?

Zhou Bo: I think China can do so if the parties to the conflict request–-which is the first requirement for peacekeeping. This is because China is the largest troop contributor of the five permanent members of the Security Council, and its credibility in global peacekeeping is beyond question. So I think China can take on that role with India, along with other countries in the Global South, plus some non-NATO European countries. After all, this war is taking place in the heart of Europe, and European countries should still participate, but not NATO members. Because I suppose for Russia, these countries will only be seen as "wolves in sheep's clothing".

Geraldine: Maybe we should go back to the title of your book: Should the World Be Afraid of China? Your answer is clearly "no". Can you expand on that point of view, especially at a time when the situation is very uncertain and no one knows what's going to happen next. Can you talk about why you think China can actually play a constructive role in the new world order?

Zhou Bo: Let's start with China's history over the past 40 years. The rise of China is already a miracle in human history, and that in itself says a lot. I think the next thing for China to prove is that even if China is strong, it doesn't need to act in a hegemonic way. This is the next challenge facing China. I think the first issue we've solved. Now it depends on whether China can become one of the most powerful countries in the world but not follow the path of hegemony.

It's really challenging, but we have time to observe. If China has been able to remain peaceful for the past 40 years, why can't China make the world safer? The world is not the single perspective of the West as it sees the world. If you look at the world from the perspective of the Global South, I think people's perception of China is generally positive. In Africa, the vast majority of countries have a positive impression of China. In the Indo-Pacific, the situation is more complicated, but even last year, according to a poll, in Southeast Asia, people actually praised China more than they did about the United States.

Geraldine: What about India? Can I interject? The relationship between China and India seems to be a bit more complicated.

Zhou Bo: Yes, it is. Because Sino-Indian relations were originally good, until that deadly conflict occurred on the border in 2020. But even in that incident, I saw something positive — that neither side chose to shoot. Don't you think it's weird? The modern armies of the two worlds, however, are fighting in the Stone Age way. This shows that the soldiers on both sides subconsciously know: you can't shoot.

Hamish: We may have kind of overlooked the feelings of some countries in Africa and some countries in the Pacific–-especially the debt and debt repayment obligations that they are now burdened with because of Chinese loans. I wonder how we in Australia should view this relationship in this context? Does China want to be friends with us, or is it a more nuanced matter?

Zhou Bo: Let me tell you this, the first country I visited abroad was actually Australia, and that was in 1990. At that time, I came to work as an interpreter, accompanying Chinese pilots on the simulator of Ansel Air to help train Chinese pilots. Ansel doesn't seem to exist anymore. But I went again in 1999, when I was the first Chinese visiting fellow at the Royal Australian Military College, and I stayed there for three months. So I think that, overall, the Chinese's feelings towards Australia are quite positive. For you are far away from us, a great island in the middle of the ocean. Theoretically, we should not be enemies with each other, but historically you have always been involved in other people's wars.

Hamish: Yes, we're really far away. So why are Chinese Navy ships circumnavigating Australia? What is the purpose of this? How do we interpret this behavior?

Zhou Bo: Then I should probably remind you why your warships sail so close to China's coastline? And why did your military planes invade the airspace of the Paracel Islands? That's China's airspace. And you've not done this once or twice, but many times.

Hamish: But our official position is that we're ensuring freedom of navigation in international trade lanes. There is a difference between the two.

Zhou Bo: Can I also borrow your words and do the same thing for the same reason as we detoured to Australia?

Hamish: You're saying you're going around Australia to transport trade supplies? Is that what it means?

Zhou Bo: I mean, our ships are also conducting "freedom of navigation" operations around Australia.

Hamish: And what's the purpose?

Zhou Bo: First of all, it's the high seas, and we have the right to sail. There is no international regulation that prohibits us from doing that. In fact, the question should be to ask you: Why did you cross the Taiwan Strait? What are you passing through there for? You don't really have much real trade through there, do you? One-third of your trade is with Chinese mainland, and warships don't need to cross the Taiwan Strait to transport these goods.

Hamish: So you mean, the interpretation that we should get from this is, "You don't do this to us"?

Zhou Bo: I don't think the Chinese government has ever expressed its views in this way, but international law does allow us to do so. But if you can ask yourself, I think that's good for you.

Hamish: (laughs) So let's end here, shall we?

Geraldine: Oh, wait, I also want to ask you a question in particular, which is about "hard power" and "soft power". Joseph Nye once said that in the long run, soft power often trumps hard power. For example, the Chinese People's Liberation Army is now very advanced in equipment, and your navy is also the envy of the whole world. But I would say that China's soft power is not really strong. Despite your improved image in the Global South, China's soft power is still at a disadvantage overall. What do you think, is this China's shortcoming?

Zhou Bo: I don't think so, it really depends on how you define soft power. In the case of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) you just mentioned, so far, the Chinese military's overseas operations have been all humanitarian in nature, whether it's anti-piracy, peacekeeping, or disaster relief. Our hospital ship, the Peace Ark, has traveled the world, providing people with medicines and medical services free of charge, never at any cost. These are all efforts by China to demonstrate its goodwill.

As a veteran of the People's Liberation Army, my hope is that even if China has the largest number of warships in the world, the PLA will continue to do only humanitarian missions in the future. Because there are always excuses to kill, but who can remember those excuses, right? But if you're just going to help people in need around the world, they'll appreciate you. And who can deny the importance of peacekeeping, the fight against piracy, disaster relief, these things? And this is exactly what the PLA has been doing. In the last 40 years, you can't find an example of the PLA killing a person overseas–-isn't that commendable?

Hamish: Mr. Zhou, we come from two countries that often misunderstand each other and don't often communicate directly. So personally, thank you very much for coming and talking to us today. I really hope to invite you back in the future to continue this conversation. I think that's more important than ever.

Zhou Bo: Thank you, Hamish, thank you, Geraldine. It was a funny, friendly argument.

Geraldine：[Chuckles] Friendly quarrel, we may need more friendly quarrels. [My Emphasis]

IMO, Zhou Bo misreads Russia and its SMO for Russia isn’t “fearful” and has vastly greater military capabilities over Ukraine and NATO. Otherwise, his replies to standard Western Propaganda/Talking points were excellent parries. More forceful responses were available, but Zhou’s tact was great. As for soft power, IMO the Global Majority sees how powerful China is and also sees its other behavior and listens to its proposals. Promoting a shared future for humanity is very far from being hegemonic. how China manages the Era of the Outlaw US Empire’s Decline is an excellent question that entirely depends on the Empire’s behavior. Currently the Empire continues to weaken itself in a manner that worsens its decline. The world has tired of paying tribute now that alternatives exist. And that’s what we see blossoming—regional arrangements generating new nodes of power. But what’s meant by power in this case is economic power judged by living standards—the advancement that development aims for. And what we see in declining powers is a lowering standard of living.

Clearly, Zhou’s book provides the context behind the talk of “victimhood” at the outset. The link goes to an excellent Sinology substack’s book review, which is a big read itself.

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