Today Putin and Shoigu met to confer on what to do next after Avdeevka’s fall. A short discussion of the main event that turned the tide—the assault through the old Soviet-era sewage pipe 3km into the Ukie rear. Putin describes the retreat as an “escape'“ bordering on a rout. The discussion turns to Krinki and the defeat of the Ukie forces that tried to establish a beachhead there. Finally, the conversation turns to the hullaballoo raised about Russian space weapons and why that occurred. All emphasis mine:
thanks karl... regarding any possible change in the direction everything is going in.. i want to discuss a concern i have, that i think is relevant.. the fact is putin is all over everything in almost all of these articles you share.. he is an amazing leader, but i think it would be hard to replicate his person or role.. in fact, it seems the structure is very top heavy, with putin at the top... what would happen should something unfortunate happen to putin?? i can't see another leader having the special traits and talents of putin here..
there are obviously a lot of brilliant and bright people in the higher level of russias system of governance.. however, if putin was to not be their - i think it will be hard to find someone anything like who putin is... so, this is the one caveat i would put on the progression of events here into the future... finding a leader to replace putin will be no easy task.. in fact it will be very difficult to impossible... so in this sense, i think putin needs to download more of what he is doing onto others to adopt a leadership role.. maybe he is already doing this and i am off in my outsiders viewpoint here.. either way, russia heavily depends on putins vision and leadership skills... i have wanted to voice this for a while, but held off doing so..
and of course at this point i do believe the west is scared, but just not bright or humble enough to seek a resolution to what they have started here..
Who will be the next Russian President when Putin retires in 2030? I see 6-10 really good candidates that are present within the Cabinet, the regions and PM Mishustin. As I've been describing Putin recently, he's become an excellent manager of his very talented team. Likewise. Mishustin's been running the government very well to make Putin look really good. Recall this is a democracy and a team effort. I know one man who very much wanted to become president but thought better of it, Moscow mayor, Sergey Sobyanin, who's Putin's peer at 66 years-old. There're several heavy lifters in the Cabinet that due to their duties and accomplishments would make excellent presidents.
What I see happening now, or since 2022 more broadly, is Putin's planning for how Russia will progress after his retirement. In other words, his replacement will need to follow the established policy paradigm and continue with Russia's development of which there remains a huge amount of work to do. For example, read this item by Ritter published yesterday about Crimea and understand that much of Russia is like that--development and modernization are essentially the same thing within Russia. https://www.rt.com/russia/592548-econstructing-crimea-ukrainian-misrule/
Recall Xi Jinping's talk about how China needs to continue to modernize to keep its economy growing. The Arctic and Far East projects are all about that--trying to create balance in a very European heavy nation. What plagued the USSR was trying to modernize far more than just Russia--the management tools and development philosophy were lacking which compounded the negative affects of the Communist Party's corruption. The descriptive term, "Gas station with nukes," was far more applicable to the USSR than to Russia post-2005 and doesn't at all apply today.
What I've described as Russia's Progressive-Conservatism will continue beyond Putin because that's Russia's norm post Peter The Great, although it wasn't consistently applied over those many decades. By 2030, two generations will have matured since the USSR's demise and have been very well taught by Team Putin how to properly go about national development and its ultimate aim--insuring the public's wellbeing. Invest in the public via People Centered Development; provide them with tools, capital and trust; directly involve the public in the development process; place all important facilities for that and national defense into public utilities; then formulate joint projects with private sector entrepreneurs such that a hybrid mixed economy is formed that's capable of operating at a much higher level of efficiency and much lower costs than others. Yes, some of that was already operating in that manner, and there were holdovers from Soviet practice that are still operative; so, Putin didn't need to start from scratch.
As you read, I don't have any qualms about who will follow Putin. Having the Ukraine conflict over with will be helpful, but the Western Bloc will always try to destabilize any competitor as long as it continues. How the Russia/NATO conflict evolves is one of several uncertain areas. By 2028, IMO we'll see who emerges as Putin's successor.
thanks karl.. unforeseen events can happen, regardless of the plans for the future.. i will take a look at the ritter article.. i want to be optimistic, but i want to be realistic too.. i am hopeful russia and putin see it the same way...
i would suggest that because of the dire historical experiences russia has experienced - the breakup of the ussr being a significant one - no one will want to see any sort of thing materialize again who were alive when that happened.. this is much more recent memory then the world wars, so a lot of folks know first hand what happens if their country goes for a slide.. here in the west - we don't, although we are seeing the obvious signs of it now!! i wish the russian people and country well in spite of any unforeseen obstacles that might present themselves moving forward here..
This subject, Putin and his team, his method of governance, the succession plans, could make a long article - in the west MSM and reports there is always and only Putin singled out, for any and every purpose, a one man band
This ignorance is deliberate and chimes with western need to never pay attention to the people or the structure of other countries but to atomise, individualise and trivialise in terms of uniquely evil and influential persons who may then be stigmatised
Whereas not only is there central and local bureaucracy and administration, constantly reformed and upgraded, there are also many potential successors as well as those who form his 'team' (who are they?)
The control and cohesion or discipline of the military? ….After the Prigozhin episode: any lingering chain of command or other weaknesses?
Any descriptions of how Russia is run, would be most welcome – the roles and influence of the worker committees, within industry and in municipalities, with a discussion of the role still played, if any, by the oligarchs, or better said the upper reaches of the capitalist class, the respective weights of the various utilities and industries, the roles of the Central Bank and private banks and so on
As well the important subject you touch upon, the shift of focus and development towards the East, and the Artic, and the relationship with China in the border areas, immigration investment etc, the defusing of obvious criticisms as to colonisation, mistreatment of minorities
With especial attention to the development of the defence industry which appears to be organised as a hybrid defence/civil industry (echoes of Darpa)
I know that sounds more like a series of articles, and lengthy ones!
PS The Ritter article was interesting, but insufficiently detailed on the form and function of the overhaul/re investment in Crimea –
- an analysis for the Donbass re construction would be interesting as shedding light on RF plans post war, and indicating perhaps what possibilities there are for the re construction of Ukraine, a subject ignored in Western MSM, I mean only discussed in terms of fantasies
Some elements related to your comment get answered in my replies to other comments, like the above to james. How does Russian Federalism work and how does it differ from the theory of US Federalism would be one lecture. My reply to Meridith Hobbes on the Chelyabinsk thread provides some info. Altogether, there're 32 Ministers from the PM down you can see here, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_of_Russia
Unfortunately, there's scant discussion about how it functions. I'll keep in mind that producing a series on that topic will probably be of interest.
Please consider the writing of a background series on how the RF system, politics and administration, and re construction, and….etc etc – bearing in mind the central role that President Putin has played in all this, but with a view to outlining how his commitment to structure and tradition has certainly allowed him to make very careful plans for his succession
It is indeed only this knowledge and understanding which can give anyone outside Russia (as unable to witness) any confidence that the RF efforts and struggle will work, have worked are on plan, will work
I think that this is a very valid point. To my mind (and I think a great many others) VVP offers extraordinary leadership. I've no idea the hours he works, but I assume it's enormous.
That said, while I think he's guaranteed the election next month I hope that he is cultivating someone(s) to follow him. Personally I think it will be Patrushyev, as I believe that western intransigence will be unending and likely increase upon VVP's retirement (test the new man), so it's important that there is a systematic transfer of power as VVP comes to the end of his next term.
I find this talk quite "amusing". I am pretty sure that it is intended also, if not especially for Western audience and, in particular, for the governments and intelligence communities, as highlighted by Gilbert Doctorow in his latest post, which your readers may find interesting as well:
Doctorow has an advantage in being able to view Russian TV media and work from it, a capability I lack. Plus, I must wait for transcripts to be published which is often 6-8 hours after the event and media reporting making it old news, excepting for others like me. The poll I posted at the end of "Putin on the Move" which has 1190 views but only 68 votes. And the same goes for the very odd ratio between views, likes and comments on all articles.
Not everyone who views/reads an article "likes" it or votes in a poll.
Personally I "like" all/most articles I read, however I did not vote in the poll at the end of "Putin on the Move", as I could not decide how to vote, since I already struggle to keep pace with your articles, which quite often are very long. :)
I never remember to "like" an article. LOL In fact, I don't do that on any site. I'm just too lazy or never adopted the habit. I've gotten "likes" on my articles, but I just ignore that, too.
There are other stats that indicate the level of readership--the clicking of internal article links being the most important. I see way too few to support the numbers substack presents. Plus, there's no stat for unsubscribers, which I see as another flaw.
I found the loss of a thousand Ukrainians per day - 2400 over the course of 17-18 February - IN THIS ONE LOCATION ON THE FRONT - to be instructive. And again, we don't know if that includes wounded or not; the use of the term "losses" might indicate so, but you know what Martyanov thinks (and Mercouris disagrees.)
The problem I have with Mercouris on this is as follows: We know the Russians were firing a massive number of 155mm artillery shells per day during much of the war, in addition to everything else going on: ground fighting, tank battles, air strikes, missile strikes. etc. The kill radius of a 155mm shell is 50m and an additional wound radius of 100m. In the earlier days in the war, around fall, 2022, they were estimated to be firing over 20,000 rounds per day.
Given the number of shells fired and even assuming many Ukrainians were in fortified positions so that most of the shells didn't kill anyone, and given the kill radius, and given that much of the shelling was counter-battery fire aimed at Ukrainian gun positions manned by at least 4-9 personnel per gun, how the hell does Mercouris believe that the 250-350 Russian MoD claimed "losses" per day were both killed and wounded?
If a dozen Ukrainian guns were put out of action per day, that's up to 108 Ukrainians right there. And again, that doesn't count all the other activity and still less the strikes behind the lines, which were over 100 per day, which I conservatively estimated in my reports last fall.
Currently the analysts are saying Ukraine is losing 1,000 troops per day, or 20-30,000 per month. I said all along that was happening since the war started. It was only the ten or more waves of mobilization that kept the Ukraine army going this long. Last fall I estimated the figure at 50-90,000 per month. How many Ukrainians remained available for the war depended on how many they managed to mobilize which was never clear and Ukrainian statements are almost certainly BS (Zelensky is still claiming over 800,000 available now, which is ludicrous.)
The main problem is that the Russians are inconsistent in their reporting. They use various euphemisms for "losses", and occasionally say "killed and wounded" when they used to not say that hardly at all, but used words like "terminated" or "eliminated" or whatever.
I even send an email to the Russian MoD asking them to clarify the reporting, but of course got no response.
But I remain convinced that Ukraine can't have more than a couple hundred thousand combat-capable fighters left, if that. Whatever additional number of nominal forces they have are just logistical backup, probably conscripted civilians driving trucks and the like. All the reports say the current level of troops have ZERO training.
And we must all remember that, as Mercouris noted yesterday, Russian still hasn't committed the bulk of its available forces to the war.
Determining enemy losses for me has always been a "fog of war" issue. Given today's ISR abilities, determining enemy losses is much easier than ever before, but still has a degree of guesswork. As for how that transfers into operations, if your aim is to attrit, then you attrit until its clear the op-forces are decimated and down to half or less strength, which can be gleaned from radio intercepts as to which units are opposite the FEBA. Currently, a massive hodge-podge exists and the degree of weakness is supported by other intel. The launching of another probing offensive will be done to gauge the level of Ukie reserves and the next battlefield will be shaped for the next offensive which may already be occurring.
The US/UK has no plan B, they’ve recently admitted as much but it’s been obvious from day one. Their Plan A was based solely on what they would do in Russia’s situation: take Kiev as quickly as possible and topple the government. Of course that’s mostly a media victory. Then they planned to find and run an insurgency with NATO ISR capability. If you go back and look at the very first weapons deliveries they weren’t tanks, artillery and ammunition. They were shoulder-fired anti-tank guns and similar munitions. Multiple power players, including Hillary Clinton, were publicly talking about giving Russia its “Afghanistan”. (Which is humorous since the US gave the USSR its “Vietnam” in Afghanistan, or so it claims.)
Plan B, such as it has been, is actually a reaction to Russia not falling into the trap of Plan A. The US and NATO were never prepared to supply a fairly high intensity, conventional conflict lasting 2+ years. They aren’t even built to fight that kind of conflict for themselves. Now whether Russia saw through the plan and didn’t fall into it or limitations to Russia’s power in 2022 made it infeasible is an open question.
I happen to think it was a little of both. Putin wasn’t interested but Russia also wasn’t ready for a full blown war in Ukraine and its hand was forced. I think that’s evidenced by the one good operation NATO managed in fall of 2022. In any case, now the equation is completely different. And from here forward the war will be fought as Russia prefers - ISR limitations and US support in terms of air defense and long range weapons notwithstanding.
That’s terrible news for DC. And in all this time nobody there has bothered to develop a feasible Plan B. It’s all just media and hoping Plan A will win by some miracle.
They're on like plan D now. "A" was let Kiev lose and guerilla warfare + sanctions. "B" was sanctions + wunderwaffe. "C" was the counteroffensive + possibly the intrigue with Prigozhin. Plus all the special ops (blowing up nord stream, briefly threatening to cut off Kaliningrad, blowing dam on Dniepr, ukro marines attempting to assault ZNPP, shelling ZNPP, Kerch bridge, mining the black sea, setting an offshore oil rig on fire, assasinations, and sundry terrorism) ...
Okay. Going down-the-drain all the way. The ultimate political goal for Team Putin will take until 2025 as Shoigu predicted, at least regarding Ukraine... er.... New Russia.
Those aren’t plans, they’re rough sketches of concepts. The sanctions were part of Plan A, they had been developed prior. That is, sanctions plus insurgency to destabilize Russia in both the economic and social spheres.
It could be argued that the southern offensive was a “plan” because the idea was to cut the landbridge to Crimea. But the plan was poorly thought out because it was based on assumptions like Russian forces just running away and never had enough resources to both take the territory and hold it.
A serious plan is one that incorporates as many potential reactions from the adversary as possible and includes a suite of choices for responses to those reactions. All these US “plans” are the military and geostrategic equivalent of South Park’s underpants gnomes.
Even without evaluating the operational schemes, it was all pissing in the wind from the get go. Antagonizing Russia + Antagonizing China = Russia + China alliance. These guys are even more checked out than the neocons. Unfortunately the European leadership buys into this nonsense, with predictably devastating results
The answer about what Russia's initial plans and expectations were awaits a proper debriefing of the major actors at its conclusion. I do have an educated guess based on what was happening prior to 24 February 2022 as revealed in primary documents, but that's a very long article not a comment reply. IMO, much of what happened initially was a test of what to expect from NATO, meaning Outlaw US Empire, and that outcome was supplied by the nixing of the negotiated settlement and order to continue the war until total victory over Russia. But, yes I do agree that there was no Plan B once it became clear Russia's strategy was attrition. Once Russia devises an effective counter to FPV drones, it's all over for Ukraine as those drones are the substitute for an air force and artillery.
thanks karl... regarding any possible change in the direction everything is going in.. i want to discuss a concern i have, that i think is relevant.. the fact is putin is all over everything in almost all of these articles you share.. he is an amazing leader, but i think it would be hard to replicate his person or role.. in fact, it seems the structure is very top heavy, with putin at the top... what would happen should something unfortunate happen to putin?? i can't see another leader having the special traits and talents of putin here..
there are obviously a lot of brilliant and bright people in the higher level of russias system of governance.. however, if putin was to not be their - i think it will be hard to find someone anything like who putin is... so, this is the one caveat i would put on the progression of events here into the future... finding a leader to replace putin will be no easy task.. in fact it will be very difficult to impossible... so in this sense, i think putin needs to download more of what he is doing onto others to adopt a leadership role.. maybe he is already doing this and i am off in my outsiders viewpoint here.. either way, russia heavily depends on putins vision and leadership skills... i have wanted to voice this for a while, but held off doing so..
and of course at this point i do believe the west is scared, but just not bright or humble enough to seek a resolution to what they have started here..
Who will be the next Russian President when Putin retires in 2030? I see 6-10 really good candidates that are present within the Cabinet, the regions and PM Mishustin. As I've been describing Putin recently, he's become an excellent manager of his very talented team. Likewise. Mishustin's been running the government very well to make Putin look really good. Recall this is a democracy and a team effort. I know one man who very much wanted to become president but thought better of it, Moscow mayor, Sergey Sobyanin, who's Putin's peer at 66 years-old. There're several heavy lifters in the Cabinet that due to their duties and accomplishments would make excellent presidents.
What I see happening now, or since 2022 more broadly, is Putin's planning for how Russia will progress after his retirement. In other words, his replacement will need to follow the established policy paradigm and continue with Russia's development of which there remains a huge amount of work to do. For example, read this item by Ritter published yesterday about Crimea and understand that much of Russia is like that--development and modernization are essentially the same thing within Russia. https://www.rt.com/russia/592548-econstructing-crimea-ukrainian-misrule/
Recall Xi Jinping's talk about how China needs to continue to modernize to keep its economy growing. The Arctic and Far East projects are all about that--trying to create balance in a very European heavy nation. What plagued the USSR was trying to modernize far more than just Russia--the management tools and development philosophy were lacking which compounded the negative affects of the Communist Party's corruption. The descriptive term, "Gas station with nukes," was far more applicable to the USSR than to Russia post-2005 and doesn't at all apply today.
What I've described as Russia's Progressive-Conservatism will continue beyond Putin because that's Russia's norm post Peter The Great, although it wasn't consistently applied over those many decades. By 2030, two generations will have matured since the USSR's demise and have been very well taught by Team Putin how to properly go about national development and its ultimate aim--insuring the public's wellbeing. Invest in the public via People Centered Development; provide them with tools, capital and trust; directly involve the public in the development process; place all important facilities for that and national defense into public utilities; then formulate joint projects with private sector entrepreneurs such that a hybrid mixed economy is formed that's capable of operating at a much higher level of efficiency and much lower costs than others. Yes, some of that was already operating in that manner, and there were holdovers from Soviet practice that are still operative; so, Putin didn't need to start from scratch.
As you read, I don't have any qualms about who will follow Putin. Having the Ukraine conflict over with will be helpful, but the Western Bloc will always try to destabilize any competitor as long as it continues. How the Russia/NATO conflict evolves is one of several uncertain areas. By 2028, IMO we'll see who emerges as Putin's successor.
thanks karl.. unforeseen events can happen, regardless of the plans for the future.. i will take a look at the ritter article.. i want to be optimistic, but i want to be realistic too.. i am hopeful russia and putin see it the same way...
i would suggest that because of the dire historical experiences russia has experienced - the breakup of the ussr being a significant one - no one will want to see any sort of thing materialize again who were alive when that happened.. this is much more recent memory then the world wars, so a lot of folks know first hand what happens if their country goes for a slide.. here in the west - we don't, although we are seeing the obvious signs of it now!! i wish the russian people and country well in spite of any unforeseen obstacles that might present themselves moving forward here..
This is a very interesting comment, thank you:
This subject, Putin and his team, his method of governance, the succession plans, could make a long article - in the west MSM and reports there is always and only Putin singled out, for any and every purpose, a one man band
This ignorance is deliberate and chimes with western need to never pay attention to the people or the structure of other countries but to atomise, individualise and trivialise in terms of uniquely evil and influential persons who may then be stigmatised
Whereas not only is there central and local bureaucracy and administration, constantly reformed and upgraded, there are also many potential successors as well as those who form his 'team' (who are they?)
The control and cohesion or discipline of the military? ….After the Prigozhin episode: any lingering chain of command or other weaknesses?
Any descriptions of how Russia is run, would be most welcome – the roles and influence of the worker committees, within industry and in municipalities, with a discussion of the role still played, if any, by the oligarchs, or better said the upper reaches of the capitalist class, the respective weights of the various utilities and industries, the roles of the Central Bank and private banks and so on
As well the important subject you touch upon, the shift of focus and development towards the East, and the Artic, and the relationship with China in the border areas, immigration investment etc, the defusing of obvious criticisms as to colonisation, mistreatment of minorities
With especial attention to the development of the defence industry which appears to be organised as a hybrid defence/civil industry (echoes of Darpa)
I know that sounds more like a series of articles, and lengthy ones!
PS The Ritter article was interesting, but insufficiently detailed on the form and function of the overhaul/re investment in Crimea –
- an analysis for the Donbass re construction would be interesting as shedding light on RF plans post war, and indicating perhaps what possibilities there are for the re construction of Ukraine, a subject ignored in Western MSM, I mean only discussed in terms of fantasies
-witness the Ukraine Mariupol re construction brochure - https://www.neglobal.eu/a-vision-for-mariupols-reconstruction/
A lot of this work you do anyway, and in any case you already have too much work to do, but….
Some elements related to your comment get answered in my replies to other comments, like the above to james. How does Russian Federalism work and how does it differ from the theory of US Federalism would be one lecture. My reply to Meridith Hobbes on the Chelyabinsk thread provides some info. Altogether, there're 32 Ministers from the PM down you can see here, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_of_Russia
Unfortunately, there's scant discussion about how it functions. I'll keep in mind that producing a series on that topic will probably be of interest.
Dear Karl
Thanks for your reply – much appreciated
Please consider the writing of a background series on how the RF system, politics and administration, and re construction, and….etc etc – bearing in mind the central role that President Putin has played in all this, but with a view to outlining how his commitment to structure and tradition has certainly allowed him to make very careful plans for his succession
It is indeed only this knowledge and understanding which can give anyone outside Russia (as unable to witness) any confidence that the RF efforts and struggle will work, have worked are on plan, will work
I think that this is a very valid point. To my mind (and I think a great many others) VVP offers extraordinary leadership. I've no idea the hours he works, but I assume it's enormous.
That said, while I think he's guaranteed the election next month I hope that he is cultivating someone(s) to follow him. Personally I think it will be Patrushyev, as I believe that western intransigence will be unending and likely increase upon VVP's retirement (test the new man), so it's important that there is a systematic transfer of power as VVP comes to the end of his next term.
I find this talk quite "amusing". I am pretty sure that it is intended also, if not especially for Western audience and, in particular, for the governments and intelligence communities, as highlighted by Gilbert Doctorow in his latest post, which your readers may find interesting as well:
https://gilbertdoctorow.com/2024/02/20/nord-stream-three-and-the-russian-capture-of-avdeevka/
Doctorow has an advantage in being able to view Russian TV media and work from it, a capability I lack. Plus, I must wait for transcripts to be published which is often 6-8 hours after the event and media reporting making it old news, excepting for others like me. The poll I posted at the end of "Putin on the Move" which has 1190 views but only 68 votes. And the same goes for the very odd ratio between views, likes and comments on all articles.
Not everyone who views/reads an article "likes" it or votes in a poll.
Personally I "like" all/most articles I read, however I did not vote in the poll at the end of "Putin on the Move", as I could not decide how to vote, since I already struggle to keep pace with your articles, which quite often are very long. :)
I never remember to "like" an article. LOL In fact, I don't do that on any site. I'm just too lazy or never adopted the habit. I've gotten "likes" on my articles, but I just ignore that, too.
There are other stats that indicate the level of readership--the clicking of internal article links being the most important. I see way too few to support the numbers substack presents. Plus, there's no stat for unsubscribers, which I see as another flaw.
I found the loss of a thousand Ukrainians per day - 2400 over the course of 17-18 February - IN THIS ONE LOCATION ON THE FRONT - to be instructive. And again, we don't know if that includes wounded or not; the use of the term "losses" might indicate so, but you know what Martyanov thinks (and Mercouris disagrees.)
The problem I have with Mercouris on this is as follows: We know the Russians were firing a massive number of 155mm artillery shells per day during much of the war, in addition to everything else going on: ground fighting, tank battles, air strikes, missile strikes. etc. The kill radius of a 155mm shell is 50m and an additional wound radius of 100m. In the earlier days in the war, around fall, 2022, they were estimated to be firing over 20,000 rounds per day.
Given the number of shells fired and even assuming many Ukrainians were in fortified positions so that most of the shells didn't kill anyone, and given the kill radius, and given that much of the shelling was counter-battery fire aimed at Ukrainian gun positions manned by at least 4-9 personnel per gun, how the hell does Mercouris believe that the 250-350 Russian MoD claimed "losses" per day were both killed and wounded?
If a dozen Ukrainian guns were put out of action per day, that's up to 108 Ukrainians right there. And again, that doesn't count all the other activity and still less the strikes behind the lines, which were over 100 per day, which I conservatively estimated in my reports last fall.
Currently the analysts are saying Ukraine is losing 1,000 troops per day, or 20-30,000 per month. I said all along that was happening since the war started. It was only the ten or more waves of mobilization that kept the Ukraine army going this long. Last fall I estimated the figure at 50-90,000 per month. How many Ukrainians remained available for the war depended on how many they managed to mobilize which was never clear and Ukrainian statements are almost certainly BS (Zelensky is still claiming over 800,000 available now, which is ludicrous.)
The main problem is that the Russians are inconsistent in their reporting. They use various euphemisms for "losses", and occasionally say "killed and wounded" when they used to not say that hardly at all, but used words like "terminated" or "eliminated" or whatever.
I even send an email to the Russian MoD asking them to clarify the reporting, but of course got no response.
But I remain convinced that Ukraine can't have more than a couple hundred thousand combat-capable fighters left, if that. Whatever additional number of nominal forces they have are just logistical backup, probably conscripted civilians driving trucks and the like. All the reports say the current level of troops have ZERO training.
And we must all remember that, as Mercouris noted yesterday, Russian still hasn't committed the bulk of its available forces to the war.
Determining enemy losses for me has always been a "fog of war" issue. Given today's ISR abilities, determining enemy losses is much easier than ever before, but still has a degree of guesswork. As for how that transfers into operations, if your aim is to attrit, then you attrit until its clear the op-forces are decimated and down to half or less strength, which can be gleaned from radio intercepts as to which units are opposite the FEBA. Currently, a massive hodge-podge exists and the degree of weakness is supported by other intel. The launching of another probing offensive will be done to gauge the level of Ukie reserves and the next battlefield will be shaped for the next offensive which may already be occurring.
Thanks, Karl. That makes sense. I'd never heard the term, there was no definition of it online and it had the ring of statespeak.
Again, that was a nice interview to focus on yesterday.
Great write up. You can almost feel the excitement as they write their own history and there's nothing western imperialism can do about it.
One question for the hang: What's with "stratostability". Is that some euphemism for nukes?
I think that's Russia-speak for Strategic-Stability.
The US/UK has no plan B, they’ve recently admitted as much but it’s been obvious from day one. Their Plan A was based solely on what they would do in Russia’s situation: take Kiev as quickly as possible and topple the government. Of course that’s mostly a media victory. Then they planned to find and run an insurgency with NATO ISR capability. If you go back and look at the very first weapons deliveries they weren’t tanks, artillery and ammunition. They were shoulder-fired anti-tank guns and similar munitions. Multiple power players, including Hillary Clinton, were publicly talking about giving Russia its “Afghanistan”. (Which is humorous since the US gave the USSR its “Vietnam” in Afghanistan, or so it claims.)
Plan B, such as it has been, is actually a reaction to Russia not falling into the trap of Plan A. The US and NATO were never prepared to supply a fairly high intensity, conventional conflict lasting 2+ years. They aren’t even built to fight that kind of conflict for themselves. Now whether Russia saw through the plan and didn’t fall into it or limitations to Russia’s power in 2022 made it infeasible is an open question.
I happen to think it was a little of both. Putin wasn’t interested but Russia also wasn’t ready for a full blown war in Ukraine and its hand was forced. I think that’s evidenced by the one good operation NATO managed in fall of 2022. In any case, now the equation is completely different. And from here forward the war will be fought as Russia prefers - ISR limitations and US support in terms of air defense and long range weapons notwithstanding.
That’s terrible news for DC. And in all this time nobody there has bothered to develop a feasible Plan B. It’s all just media and hoping Plan A will win by some miracle.
They're on like plan D now. "A" was let Kiev lose and guerilla warfare + sanctions. "B" was sanctions + wunderwaffe. "C" was the counteroffensive + possibly the intrigue with Prigozhin. Plus all the special ops (blowing up nord stream, briefly threatening to cut off Kaliningrad, blowing dam on Dniepr, ukro marines attempting to assault ZNPP, shelling ZNPP, Kerch bridge, mining the black sea, setting an offshore oil rig on fire, assasinations, and sundry terrorism) ...
Okay. Going down-the-drain all the way. The ultimate political goal for Team Putin will take until 2025 as Shoigu predicted, at least regarding Ukraine... er.... New Russia.
Those aren’t plans, they’re rough sketches of concepts. The sanctions were part of Plan A, they had been developed prior. That is, sanctions plus insurgency to destabilize Russia in both the economic and social spheres.
It could be argued that the southern offensive was a “plan” because the idea was to cut the landbridge to Crimea. But the plan was poorly thought out because it was based on assumptions like Russian forces just running away and never had enough resources to both take the territory and hold it.
A serious plan is one that incorporates as many potential reactions from the adversary as possible and includes a suite of choices for responses to those reactions. All these US “plans” are the military and geostrategic equivalent of South Park’s underpants gnomes.
Yes total farce.
Even without evaluating the operational schemes, it was all pissing in the wind from the get go. Antagonizing Russia + Antagonizing China = Russia + China alliance. These guys are even more checked out than the neocons. Unfortunately the European leadership buys into this nonsense, with predictably devastating results
The answer about what Russia's initial plans and expectations were awaits a proper debriefing of the major actors at its conclusion. I do have an educated guess based on what was happening prior to 24 February 2022 as revealed in primary documents, but that's a very long article not a comment reply. IMO, much of what happened initially was a test of what to expect from NATO, meaning Outlaw US Empire, and that outcome was supplied by the nixing of the negotiated settlement and order to continue the war until total victory over Russia. But, yes I do agree that there was no Plan B once it became clear Russia's strategy was attrition. Once Russia devises an effective counter to FPV drones, it's all over for Ukraine as those drones are the substitute for an air force and artillery.