The empire has less and less room to poke its filthy nose into. It searches for cracks like a desperate rat, but there are fewer and fewer cracks and they are getting narrower. No wonder they hate Vladimir Putin, the Great Architect.
It must be noted Putin isn't alone as the Chinese are equally as wise. I almost posted Putin's meeting with government members today instead that examines domestic policies and such annual things as preparations for the Heating Season and the expansion and modernization of Russia's medical facilities. If you're curious, plug the link into your favorite translator, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75331
Sinwar? Another win for Israel and Empire. The west universally cheers this 'success'. And again, hails Israel's right to defend itself. Murder is labelled 'justice'. Justified military resistance against illegal occupation is 'terrorism.' What will the leaders of the SCO, BRICS+ et al or Iran and the Arabs do?
The fact that Russia, a key member of both BRICS+ and the SCO, has struggled to decisively defeat Ukraine despite its initial expectations raises significant questions about the actual strength and coherence of these future alliances. It highlights the military and strategic limitations some of these nations face, even as they aim to challenge the Western-dominated global order.
Though Russia is often portrayed as a military heavyweight, its numerous difficulties in Ukraine have exposed significant weaknesses in leadership, strategy, and logistical capacity. This casts doubt on whether the broader BRICS+ or SCO alliances can realistically compete with or replace Western organizations like NATO, AUKUS and the QUAD, particularly in terms of military coordination and effectiveness.
Russia's performance may temper the unrealistic expectations surrounding the future dominance of these blocs. The ongoing Cold War already splits the world into two competing spheres, and its effects—including trade barriers and sanctions—will likely continue to drain the SCO/BRICS group’s resources and influence. Their inability to temper any of Israel's military actions is a sign of their collective impotence today.
While they may claim there's no Cold War or deny that they form a bloc or defense alliance, the reality is that both are already in place, with growing implications.
I guess you've missed Simplicius (among others) who have analysed details that lead to contrary conclusions to yours regarding Russia's performance. Anyway you bring up AUKUS which is a joke, I mean Australia is pathetic, ditto the UK. Australia is little more than a token expeditionary component that pays an insurance policy to the empire. The UK still harbours fantasies of it empire days, but it's like a phantom limb, just not there.
I don't need Simplicius to think for myself. That others have contrary conclusions than my own, which is always the case for everyone, is of no concern to me.
Do you think Simplicius (among others) cares if I have analyzed details that lead to contrary conclusions to their own? :-)
Ok, so you don’t understand the point. It’s not so much an opinion as sifting evidence that’s available from primary sources, media reports that quote from official sources, then evaluating, testing conclusions and presenting. Simp is just one of many as other substackers have done similar. I’ve stopped bothering with sources like the NY Times or Washington Post, etc, as their narratives have been tested and founding wanting. Still wishful thinking is prevalent but even Julian Ropke seems to be rather glum about Ukraine’s prospects.
I totally understand the point. You just do not like my conclusions. That's all there is to it.
I am far more than "glum" about Ukraine's prospects. So clearly you have no idea what I think, based on what I have already said. You are making it up instead. Frankly I do not care if the country and its people rot in hell for eternity. It is of no importance now, a destroyed relic of what it once was.
You are talking to an imaginary strawman in some far-off fantasyland, not to me. I was talking about Russia in the 'big picture' of an already firmly established Cold War. Anyone can disagree with my opinions. But I draw a line putting words in my mouth, if that's ok with you and Karl.
"The fact that Russia [...] has struggled to decisively defeat Ukraine despite its initial expectations..."
What leads you to draw that conclusion? I would argue that in the context of fighting a peer adversary with similar arms and capabilities (at least at the outset) Russia has done quite well, especially considering the self-imposed constraints, none of which Ukraine observes - specifically avoiding harm to civilians, minimizing their own casualties, and limiting damage to civilian infrastructure when possible.
Arrayed against them are the combined arms and personnel of NATO, not just Ukraine, so I have to ask, given those conditions how would you define decisive? Two years to reduce Ukraine to a failed state, which it demonstrably is, seems fairly decisive to me, especially when you consider they're now advancing on all fronts while Ukraine's erstwhile supporters have basically written them off while the UAF is in complete disarray. In strictly military terms it's all over for Ukraine. All they can do now is delay the inevitable. How is that not decisive?
Hello ebear. Several factors, too many to list here, lead me to the conclusion you've highlighted. Ukraine, in my view, was already a failed state by 2014, long before this conflict. It's been dysfunctional for some time, and what Russia has accomplished since Putin came to power far exceeds anything Ukraine has managed. Given that, I wouldn’t define Ukraine as a 'peer competitor' to Russia, regardless of the material support from NATO and others. While Russia may ultimately prevail, I still wouldn't view Ukraine as having ever been on equal footing militarily.
"While Russia may ultimately prevail, I still wouldn't view Ukraine as having ever been on equal footing militarily."
I did specify "at the outset" bearing in mind that Ukraine had 8 years to prepare, and that the forces engaged initially on both sides were roughly equal in terms of men and arms. Of course Russia never committed its entire force to the conflict and still hasn't done so, so in that sense they have the superior force.
I've seen a lot of comments suggesting that Russia is struggling based on their slow rate of advance, but that view fails to take a number of factors into account. First, it was never their intention to take over the entire country, just to liberate the Russian areas, remove the Nazis influence, and enforce a state of neutrality on the remaining territory of Ukraine. Unrealistic perhaps, but that was the original plan following the doctrine that war is the pursuit of politics by other means. So if there was a failure, it was in overestimating the effect of military intervention, not a question of actual capabilities.
Failing in that aspect, Russia then implemented a policy of attrition, which was in line with their stated goal of limiting their casualties while depleting the UAF forces. I'd say they've achieved that, although it doesn't satisfy the war bloggers who see everything in terms of major battles and territory captured.
If I had to guess at what the current strategy is, I'd say Russia is hoping for emergence of a more rational faction from the Ukrainian military following removal of their present leadership, but I've no sense of how realistic that is. That would be ideal in the sense that Ukraine would still exist as a nation without the necessity of taking over entirely, which would present major difficulties.
If I had to guess at what NATO's current strategy is (given that it's really their war - Ukraine is just the proxy, and given that their entire plan has failed) I'd say it's to force Russia to occupy the entire nation, creating much the same conditions as the USSR faced post WWII - i.e. a hostile population with an insurgency which took almost a decade to stamp out. Not the best outcome for NATO, but still a thorn in Russia's side and an excuse to continue the sanctions and the policy of isolation.
I hope I'm wrong about that last part and that there's a patriotic non-fascist element within the UAF that can rescue Ukraine from the extremist elements being egged on by NATO and come to some equitable resolution with Russia, but that's more of a hope than an expectation at this point.
You might be right. I try to avoid hypotheticals and what ifs, or trying to guess what someone else's intentions are. Russia also had 8 years to prepare. That Russia has not deployed all of its forces ever is prima facie evidence of Russian military superiority all the time. Which brings us back to 3 years of ongoing losses on both sides and no end in sight, and no idea how Russia ever achieves a settlement or a ceasefire.
I don't think you can characterize Ukraine as a failed state in 2014. Politics aside, there are three indicators of economic performance that analysts use to get a rough idea of the state of a nation's well being: grain, steel and energy production.
Using those metrics, and adjusting for population, Ukraine in 2014 was at a similar level of production to Canada in all three. The energy mix was different with gas playing a larger role than oil, but in terms of BTUs produced, still roughly equivalent.
Don't forget that a significant amount of Soviet era energy and industrial production was concentrated in Ukraine. That plus major territorial transfers (Donbass 1922 Crimea 1954) established Ukraine as a major industrial republic within the USSR, second only to Russia. Following separation, and similar to Russia, Ukraine received major western investment. So they still had a fully functioning economy in 2014. Corrupt in many aspects, but still functioning and arguably in better shape than Russia itself until the turn of the century.
The trouble for Ukraine really began with western interference in their politics which emphasized the advantages of EU membership with little recognition of what that would mean from the standpoint of national sovereignty and economic competitiveness. Ukraine had a strong industrial base, but it was geared towards the former Soviet markets and would have required at least a decade of major investment and retooling to bring it up to EU standards, for which the capital was nowhere to be found internally.
So the choice in practical terms was to accept a high degree of foreign ownership, or to continue the relationship with Russia and other post Soviet republics, gradually bringing their economies up to western standards while retaining national ownership. I believe this was the practical motivation behind Yanukovych's attempt to reorient Ukraine's economy towards Russia, but it was never properly explained and faced huge resistance from vested interests, both internally (the oligarchs) and externally from western investors.
Meanwhile the population, in particular the young, were sold on the romantic notion of becoming fully European, which for many of them meant a ticket out in much the same way as young Poles used their EU membership to migrate to Britain and Germany. I believe that was a large part of the motivation behind the Maidan protests. Not hostility towards Russia per se, but the dream (or illusion) of a better life in the EU being taken away. This was a problem in the post Soviet republics - young people had too many incentives to leave. I have friends from Russia and Ukraine here in Canada who left for exactly that reason. The same reason my parents left the UK post WWII. They couldn't see a bright future, and who could blame them at the time?
All this goes to say that Ukraine had the same potential as Russia post the breakup, and could have achieved a similar level of political and economic independence as Russia or Belarus had they pursued a realistic national policy, which Yanukovych's faction tried to implement. Instead they allowed western influence and their own domestic extremists to ruin that chance, and the rest is as they say, history.
re "I don't think you can characterize Ukraine as a failed state in 2014."
OK. Feel free to disagree. I believe it obviously was. Without the Billion$ spent by the US/Nato states building up its military to the largest army in Europe by 2021 -- there never would have been a war because Ukraine was as bankrupt (morally and economically) then, as it is now. aka a failed state. It was on life-support, including from bargain basement energy deals and grants from Russia, and it had been for a long time. It was far worse than simply corrupt; it was thoroughly dysfunctional from top to bottom. The people were no better or more ethical than the leadership there. And they have reaped what they sowed. Whether they emigrated or died there.
The writing had been on the walls for decades. If Putin / Russia hadn't been so unbelievably gullible it might have unfolded differently. But that's an unknown hypothetical.
I think we differ on our definition of a failed state. When you say failed state I think of places like Haiti, Somalia or Zimbabwe. Ukraine was nowhere near as f'd up as those places prior to 2014, which is the time I'm talking about. Even among the former republics, Ukraine was in better shape than say Georgia or Tajikistan, which had a civil war from 92 to 97 which no one in the West even heard about.
As I mentioned, Ukraine was a major industrial centre of the USSR, so that kept them afloat for some time, as did their grain exports. My own country Canada is heavily dependent on US investment and markets. If those were to disappear we'd be in serious trouble, so I don't think you can use that as a yardstick of success or failure. What would happen to China if the West put a total embargo on their exports? We live in a world of interdependence. Very few nations can actually go it alone, Russia being one of the few, but even they emphasis the importance of mutual dependence.
I also disagree on your characterization of the Ukrainian people. If you look at the election map of 2010 you'll see Yanukovych had support across a large part of the country. Half of those eligible voted for him, even though less than 20% of the population consider themselves ethnically Russian. Of those who didn't, only a small percentage were ultra-nationalists. The whole Bandera thing really didn't get started until 2014. It was always there of course, but it couldn't have gained the kind of traction it did without US interference. Bear in mind, that the young guys dying on the front today were little kids in 2014. What control did they have over the BS fed to them in school, and for some, by their parents?
People almost everywhere are basically kindhearted and simple minded - a bad combination and easy to exploit. I see Ukraine in that sense. They were led astray by forces beyond their control, as is the case almost everywhere. We saw that during the pandemic where nations regarded as modern democracies became dictatorships almost overnight.
I have friends on both sides of this conflict, including one who fought for six months in the UAF. He's no more Nazi than you or I, just a misguided guy who thought he was doing his duty. I'd say he was fairly typical of people who volunteered. He's a changed man now, after what he saw and experienced, but that just makes the case that people don't really consider the consequences of their actions until they're up to their neck in them. That to me is the tragedy here. Not that people are evil by nature, but that they're so easily led astray by a fraction of psychopaths who are, and who exploit their good nature and simplicity for their own nefarious ends.
I'm being long-winded as usual, and I apologize for that, but this is something close to my heart. What's happened here is a tragedy for both sides, even though I believe Russia did the right thing - basically the only thing they could have done given the circumstances. But those circumstances were forced on both sides in my view. Absent US interference, none of this would have happened.
One thing we do agree on is that rat-bastards such as Azov and foreign mercenaries got everything they deserved, but that's not the real Ukraine. This is:
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is primarily a political, economic, and security alliance, rather than a formal military alliance like NATO. While it focuses on regional security and cooperation, its military aspect revolves around joint efforts to combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism, which are key security threats identified by member states. The SCO facilitates military cooperation through joint exercises and intelligence sharing, particularly in counterterrorism.
Although the SCO does not have a collective defense mechanism like NATO’s Article 5, member states cooperate on security matters, including anti-terrorism and maintaining regional stability, especially in Central Asia. The organization emphasizes sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, focusing on mutual defense against common security challenges rather than direct military alliances or intervention.
However, as hinted at by the *Global Times*, things can change: "This union would lead the new bloc to have a cohesive strength superior to that of NATO and, therefore, to represent not only an adversary, but even an enemy."
Nations can and do change their minds as circumstances evolve - ref Lavrov and the post-WWII expectations and revised agreements. In my view, these nations are quite pragmatic— like the western allies and the Soviets they aren’t going to broadcast all their private backroom discussions about where they think this is heading. The *Global Times* editorial is a signal that should be filed away as a potential fork in the road.
Again, nations change their minds and their trajectories—being "determined to steer clear of what they call Cold War Mentality" is not set in stone. The reality is, they are confronted with a new Cold War every day, which is increasingly at odds with their long-term goals. None of these nations can stop the U.S. or its loyal Imperial Core, along with the global institutions they control.
They are already in a Cold War, and they lack the power to change that or significantly reform the current dysfunctional UN structures and rules.
Lastly, the idea that "eventually, the SCO, BRICS, EAEU, ASEAN, CIS, CELAC, AU, and other multilateral organizations will merge into a revamped UN" is a very ambitious goal—not necessarily one shared by all BRICS or SCO members in the long term. I suspect they are far more realistic about UN reform and, like me, may doubt it’s even possible or worth the effort. Time will tell. The future is the hardest thing to predict. :-)
That said, I suspect that the big-picture onlookers are overly ambitious and would be wise to temper their expectations. They may need to reassess what is realistically achievable in this decade and the next, especially as the new Cold War is primed to escalate into multiple hot wars at a moment’s notice.
Thank you!
The empire has less and less room to poke its filthy nose into. It searches for cracks like a desperate rat, but there are fewer and fewer cracks and they are getting narrower. No wonder they hate Vladimir Putin, the Great Architect.
It must be noted Putin isn't alone as the Chinese are equally as wise. I almost posted Putin's meeting with government members today instead that examines domestic policies and such annual things as preparations for the Heating Season and the expansion and modernization of Russia's medical facilities. If you're curious, plug the link into your favorite translator, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75331
Спасибо, Карл. 👍🏽
Sinwar? Another win for Israel and Empire. The west universally cheers this 'success'. And again, hails Israel's right to defend itself. Murder is labelled 'justice'. Justified military resistance against illegal occupation is 'terrorism.' What will the leaders of the SCO, BRICS+ et al or Iran and the Arabs do?
Nothing.
The fact that Russia, a key member of both BRICS+ and the SCO, has struggled to decisively defeat Ukraine despite its initial expectations raises significant questions about the actual strength and coherence of these future alliances. It highlights the military and strategic limitations some of these nations face, even as they aim to challenge the Western-dominated global order.
Though Russia is often portrayed as a military heavyweight, its numerous difficulties in Ukraine have exposed significant weaknesses in leadership, strategy, and logistical capacity. This casts doubt on whether the broader BRICS+ or SCO alliances can realistically compete with or replace Western organizations like NATO, AUKUS and the QUAD, particularly in terms of military coordination and effectiveness.
Russia's performance may temper the unrealistic expectations surrounding the future dominance of these blocs. The ongoing Cold War already splits the world into two competing spheres, and its effects—including trade barriers and sanctions—will likely continue to drain the SCO/BRICS group’s resources and influence. Their inability to temper any of Israel's military actions is a sign of their collective impotence today.
While they may claim there's no Cold War or deny that they form a bloc or defense alliance, the reality is that both are already in place, with growing implications.
I guess you've missed Simplicius (among others) who have analysed details that lead to contrary conclusions to yours regarding Russia's performance. Anyway you bring up AUKUS which is a joke, I mean Australia is pathetic, ditto the UK. Australia is little more than a token expeditionary component that pays an insurance policy to the empire. The UK still harbours fantasies of it empire days, but it's like a phantom limb, just not there.
I don't need Simplicius to think for myself. That others have contrary conclusions than my own, which is always the case for everyone, is of no concern to me.
Do you think Simplicius (among others) cares if I have analyzed details that lead to contrary conclusions to their own? :-)
Ok, so you don’t understand the point. It’s not so much an opinion as sifting evidence that’s available from primary sources, media reports that quote from official sources, then evaluating, testing conclusions and presenting. Simp is just one of many as other substackers have done similar. I’ve stopped bothering with sources like the NY Times or Washington Post, etc, as their narratives have been tested and founding wanting. Still wishful thinking is prevalent but even Julian Ropke seems to be rather glum about Ukraine’s prospects.
I totally understand the point. You just do not like my conclusions. That's all there is to it.
I am far more than "glum" about Ukraine's prospects. So clearly you have no idea what I think, based on what I have already said. You are making it up instead. Frankly I do not care if the country and its people rot in hell for eternity. It is of no importance now, a destroyed relic of what it once was.
You are talking to an imaginary strawman in some far-off fantasyland, not to me. I was talking about Russia in the 'big picture' of an already firmly established Cold War. Anyone can disagree with my opinions. But I draw a line putting words in my mouth, if that's ok with you and Karl.
"The fact that Russia [...] has struggled to decisively defeat Ukraine despite its initial expectations..."
What leads you to draw that conclusion? I would argue that in the context of fighting a peer adversary with similar arms and capabilities (at least at the outset) Russia has done quite well, especially considering the self-imposed constraints, none of which Ukraine observes - specifically avoiding harm to civilians, minimizing their own casualties, and limiting damage to civilian infrastructure when possible.
Arrayed against them are the combined arms and personnel of NATO, not just Ukraine, so I have to ask, given those conditions how would you define decisive? Two years to reduce Ukraine to a failed state, which it demonstrably is, seems fairly decisive to me, especially when you consider they're now advancing on all fronts while Ukraine's erstwhile supporters have basically written them off while the UAF is in complete disarray. In strictly military terms it's all over for Ukraine. All they can do now is delay the inevitable. How is that not decisive?
Hello ebear. Several factors, too many to list here, lead me to the conclusion you've highlighted. Ukraine, in my view, was already a failed state by 2014, long before this conflict. It's been dysfunctional for some time, and what Russia has accomplished since Putin came to power far exceeds anything Ukraine has managed. Given that, I wouldn’t define Ukraine as a 'peer competitor' to Russia, regardless of the material support from NATO and others. While Russia may ultimately prevail, I still wouldn't view Ukraine as having ever been on equal footing militarily.
"While Russia may ultimately prevail, I still wouldn't view Ukraine as having ever been on equal footing militarily."
I did specify "at the outset" bearing in mind that Ukraine had 8 years to prepare, and that the forces engaged initially on both sides were roughly equal in terms of men and arms. Of course Russia never committed its entire force to the conflict and still hasn't done so, so in that sense they have the superior force.
I've seen a lot of comments suggesting that Russia is struggling based on their slow rate of advance, but that view fails to take a number of factors into account. First, it was never their intention to take over the entire country, just to liberate the Russian areas, remove the Nazis influence, and enforce a state of neutrality on the remaining territory of Ukraine. Unrealistic perhaps, but that was the original plan following the doctrine that war is the pursuit of politics by other means. So if there was a failure, it was in overestimating the effect of military intervention, not a question of actual capabilities.
Failing in that aspect, Russia then implemented a policy of attrition, which was in line with their stated goal of limiting their casualties while depleting the UAF forces. I'd say they've achieved that, although it doesn't satisfy the war bloggers who see everything in terms of major battles and territory captured.
If I had to guess at what the current strategy is, I'd say Russia is hoping for emergence of a more rational faction from the Ukrainian military following removal of their present leadership, but I've no sense of how realistic that is. That would be ideal in the sense that Ukraine would still exist as a nation without the necessity of taking over entirely, which would present major difficulties.
If I had to guess at what NATO's current strategy is (given that it's really their war - Ukraine is just the proxy, and given that their entire plan has failed) I'd say it's to force Russia to occupy the entire nation, creating much the same conditions as the USSR faced post WWII - i.e. a hostile population with an insurgency which took almost a decade to stamp out. Not the best outcome for NATO, but still a thorn in Russia's side and an excuse to continue the sanctions and the policy of isolation.
I hope I'm wrong about that last part and that there's a patriotic non-fascist element within the UAF that can rescue Ukraine from the extremist elements being egged on by NATO and come to some equitable resolution with Russia, but that's more of a hope than an expectation at this point.
You might be right. I try to avoid hypotheticals and what ifs, or trying to guess what someone else's intentions are. Russia also had 8 years to prepare. That Russia has not deployed all of its forces ever is prima facie evidence of Russian military superiority all the time. Which brings us back to 3 years of ongoing losses on both sides and no end in sight, and no idea how Russia ever achieves a settlement or a ceasefire.
I don't think you can characterize Ukraine as a failed state in 2014. Politics aside, there are three indicators of economic performance that analysts use to get a rough idea of the state of a nation's well being: grain, steel and energy production.
Using those metrics, and adjusting for population, Ukraine in 2014 was at a similar level of production to Canada in all three. The energy mix was different with gas playing a larger role than oil, but in terms of BTUs produced, still roughly equivalent.
Don't forget that a significant amount of Soviet era energy and industrial production was concentrated in Ukraine. That plus major territorial transfers (Donbass 1922 Crimea 1954) established Ukraine as a major industrial republic within the USSR, second only to Russia. Following separation, and similar to Russia, Ukraine received major western investment. So they still had a fully functioning economy in 2014. Corrupt in many aspects, but still functioning and arguably in better shape than Russia itself until the turn of the century.
The trouble for Ukraine really began with western interference in their politics which emphasized the advantages of EU membership with little recognition of what that would mean from the standpoint of national sovereignty and economic competitiveness. Ukraine had a strong industrial base, but it was geared towards the former Soviet markets and would have required at least a decade of major investment and retooling to bring it up to EU standards, for which the capital was nowhere to be found internally.
So the choice in practical terms was to accept a high degree of foreign ownership, or to continue the relationship with Russia and other post Soviet republics, gradually bringing their economies up to western standards while retaining national ownership. I believe this was the practical motivation behind Yanukovych's attempt to reorient Ukraine's economy towards Russia, but it was never properly explained and faced huge resistance from vested interests, both internally (the oligarchs) and externally from western investors.
Meanwhile the population, in particular the young, were sold on the romantic notion of becoming fully European, which for many of them meant a ticket out in much the same way as young Poles used their EU membership to migrate to Britain and Germany. I believe that was a large part of the motivation behind the Maidan protests. Not hostility towards Russia per se, but the dream (or illusion) of a better life in the EU being taken away. This was a problem in the post Soviet republics - young people had too many incentives to leave. I have friends from Russia and Ukraine here in Canada who left for exactly that reason. The same reason my parents left the UK post WWII. They couldn't see a bright future, and who could blame them at the time?
All this goes to say that Ukraine had the same potential as Russia post the breakup, and could have achieved a similar level of political and economic independence as Russia or Belarus had they pursued a realistic national policy, which Yanukovych's faction tried to implement. Instead they allowed western influence and their own domestic extremists to ruin that chance, and the rest is as they say, history.
re "I don't think you can characterize Ukraine as a failed state in 2014."
OK. Feel free to disagree. I believe it obviously was. Without the Billion$ spent by the US/Nato states building up its military to the largest army in Europe by 2021 -- there never would have been a war because Ukraine was as bankrupt (morally and economically) then, as it is now. aka a failed state. It was on life-support, including from bargain basement energy deals and grants from Russia, and it had been for a long time. It was far worse than simply corrupt; it was thoroughly dysfunctional from top to bottom. The people were no better or more ethical than the leadership there. And they have reaped what they sowed. Whether they emigrated or died there.
The writing had been on the walls for decades. If Putin / Russia hadn't been so unbelievably gullible it might have unfolded differently. But that's an unknown hypothetical.
I think we differ on our definition of a failed state. When you say failed state I think of places like Haiti, Somalia or Zimbabwe. Ukraine was nowhere near as f'd up as those places prior to 2014, which is the time I'm talking about. Even among the former republics, Ukraine was in better shape than say Georgia or Tajikistan, which had a civil war from 92 to 97 which no one in the West even heard about.
As I mentioned, Ukraine was a major industrial centre of the USSR, so that kept them afloat for some time, as did their grain exports. My own country Canada is heavily dependent on US investment and markets. If those were to disappear we'd be in serious trouble, so I don't think you can use that as a yardstick of success or failure. What would happen to China if the West put a total embargo on their exports? We live in a world of interdependence. Very few nations can actually go it alone, Russia being one of the few, but even they emphasis the importance of mutual dependence.
I also disagree on your characterization of the Ukrainian people. If you look at the election map of 2010 you'll see Yanukovych had support across a large part of the country. Half of those eligible voted for him, even though less than 20% of the population consider themselves ethnically Russian. Of those who didn't, only a small percentage were ultra-nationalists. The whole Bandera thing really didn't get started until 2014. It was always there of course, but it couldn't have gained the kind of traction it did without US interference. Bear in mind, that the young guys dying on the front today were little kids in 2014. What control did they have over the BS fed to them in school, and for some, by their parents?
People almost everywhere are basically kindhearted and simple minded - a bad combination and easy to exploit. I see Ukraine in that sense. They were led astray by forces beyond their control, as is the case almost everywhere. We saw that during the pandemic where nations regarded as modern democracies became dictatorships almost overnight.
I have friends on both sides of this conflict, including one who fought for six months in the UAF. He's no more Nazi than you or I, just a misguided guy who thought he was doing his duty. I'd say he was fairly typical of people who volunteered. He's a changed man now, after what he saw and experienced, but that just makes the case that people don't really consider the consequences of their actions until they're up to their neck in them. That to me is the tragedy here. Not that people are evil by nature, but that they're so easily led astray by a fraction of psychopaths who are, and who exploit their good nature and simplicity for their own nefarious ends.
I'm being long-winded as usual, and I apologize for that, but this is something close to my heart. What's happened here is a tragedy for both sides, even though I believe Russia did the right thing - basically the only thing they could have done given the circumstances. But those circumstances were forced on both sides in my view. Absent US interference, none of this would have happened.
One thing we do agree on is that rat-bastards such as Azov and foreign mercenaries got everything they deserved, but that's not the real Ukraine. This is:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_xYhlbq-4oY
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is primarily a political, economic, and security alliance, rather than a formal military alliance like NATO. While it focuses on regional security and cooperation, its military aspect revolves around joint efforts to combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism, which are key security threats identified by member states. The SCO facilitates military cooperation through joint exercises and intelligence sharing, particularly in counterterrorism.
Although the SCO does not have a collective defense mechanism like NATO’s Article 5, member states cooperate on security matters, including anti-terrorism and maintaining regional stability, especially in Central Asia. The organization emphasizes sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, focusing on mutual defense against common security challenges rather than direct military alliances or intervention.
However, as hinted at by the *Global Times*, things can change: "This union would lead the new bloc to have a cohesive strength superior to that of NATO and, therefore, to represent not only an adversary, but even an enemy."
Nations can and do change their minds as circumstances evolve - ref Lavrov and the post-WWII expectations and revised agreements. In my view, these nations are quite pragmatic— like the western allies and the Soviets they aren’t going to broadcast all their private backroom discussions about where they think this is heading. The *Global Times* editorial is a signal that should be filed away as a potential fork in the road.
Again, nations change their minds and their trajectories—being "determined to steer clear of what they call Cold War Mentality" is not set in stone. The reality is, they are confronted with a new Cold War every day, which is increasingly at odds with their long-term goals. None of these nations can stop the U.S. or its loyal Imperial Core, along with the global institutions they control.
They are already in a Cold War, and they lack the power to change that or significantly reform the current dysfunctional UN structures and rules.
Lastly, the idea that "eventually, the SCO, BRICS, EAEU, ASEAN, CIS, CELAC, AU, and other multilateral organizations will merge into a revamped UN" is a very ambitious goal—not necessarily one shared by all BRICS or SCO members in the long term. I suspect they are far more realistic about UN reform and, like me, may doubt it’s even possible or worth the effort. Time will tell. The future is the hardest thing to predict. :-)
That said, I suspect that the big-picture onlookers are overly ambitious and would be wise to temper their expectations. They may need to reassess what is realistically achievable in this decade and the next, especially as the new Cold War is primed to escalate into multiple hot wars at a moment’s notice.